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I. Introduction
The United States Supreme Court got away with this twice before, and now is doing it 
again.  First, in Chapman v. California1 and later decisions explaining Chapman, the Court 
regulated the proceedings of state appellate courts in criminal cases, by requiring such courts to 
replace their own less rigorous standards of harmlessness of federal constitutional error with the 
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" test.2  Then in Griffith v. Kentucky3 and subsequent 
decisions explaining Griffith, the Court regulated state appellate courts further, by requiring them 
to apply in criminal cases the Supreme Court's current view on the retroactivity of new federal 
constitutional rules.4
The Court imposed both of these requirements while writing repeatedly that states need 
not provide criminal appeals at all,5 yet the Court made no attempt in either the Chapman or the 
Griffith line of cases to specify what provision of the Constitution authorizes it so to regulate 
criminal appeals in states that do choose to allow them, much less to explain why the Court so 
interpreted the unidentified provision.6  Despite the Court's silence on these fundamental 
questions, in each instance state appellate courts followed the Court down the two primrose 
paths, applying first Chapman and then Griffith, each for many years, before the Court even 
1386 U.S. 18 (1967).
2See infra Part V.A.2.a.
3479 U.S. 314 (1987).
4See infra Part V.A.2.b.
5See infra Part V.A.1.
6See infra Part V.A.2.a-b.
2wrote explicitly that federal law required state courts to apply the new prescriptions.7  Very few 
state courts or commentators questioned these developments.8
Now the Court is at it again, apparently repeating the process to regulate yet a third 
crucial aspect of state criminal appeals, again without identifying the purported source of its 
power to do so.  In a series of recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court has prescribed 
and applied new requirements of de novo appellate review of lower courts' decisions of mixed 
questions of federal constitutional law and fact in criminal cases.9  In so doing, the Court has 
written nothing about the possible legal sources of these new requirements and thus about 
whether they govern state appellate courts at all, and very little about other issues concerning the 
scope of applicability of the new requirements.10  The answers to such questions are important 
not only theoretically but also practically, because recent changes in the law of federal habeas 
corpus have left direct review in state appellate courts as the only form of review with procedural 
and remedial law favorable to the great majority of criminal defendants in this country.11
These recent Supreme Court decisions concerning de novo review bear with them, of 
course, the implicit threat that decisions of any courts that ignore these vague new dictates, or 
that apply them more narrowly than the Court later deems correct, will be vacated or reversed.  
As a result, many state appellate courts have been following the Court down this third primrose 
7See infra Part V.A.2.a-b.
8See infra Part V.A.2.a-b.
9See infra Parts II.B., III.A-D.
10See infra Parts II.B., III.A-D.
11See infra Part VI.
3path, resolving any doubts that may have occurred to them by following the new precedents, and 
by extending their scope of application far beyond any specific requirements the Supreme Court 
has yet announced.12  Meanwhile, scholars have provided very little commentary on the most 
difficult issues raised by these developments.13
This Article describes flaws in the Court's recent decisions and in many state appellate 
courts' responses, identifies the practical significance of these events, and considers possible 
explanations for these confusing and unsettling developments.  In the course of exploring these 
current issues, the Article addresses specifically the similar flaws in the Court's previous creation 
of its Chapman and Griffith doctrines and in state courts' responses to those prior developments.   
Finally, the Article proposes improvements in the decisions or at least in the opinions of the 
Supreme Court, and in state courts' and legislatures' responsive practices.  My proposed 
improvements are designed to prevent the United States Supreme Court from continuing to 
remake appellate practice in state criminal cases without having even to attempt an explanation 
and justification of the legal basis for its program of supposed reform.
II. Overview
A. Basic Ideas of Standards of Review 
The outcome of one court's review of the decision of another court often depends heavily, 
of course, on the standard of review.14  A great many state and federal criminal convictions are 
12See infra Part IV.
13See infra notes 15, 47 and accompanying text.
14See STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 1.02, at 1-20 
(1992) (quoting with approval litigator Barry Sullivan's advice in an American Bar Association publication that "a 
thoughtful consideration of the appropriate standard of review will often determine the outcome of an appeal"); 
STEVEN WISOTSKY, PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT ON APPEAL § 8.01, at 160 (2002) (referring to a standard of review's 
4reviewed on appeal in this country, especially in felony cases that are tried on their merits and 
that result in prison sentences, in which the stakes are highest for defendants and for protection of 
society.15  As a result, standards of appellate review in criminal cases have important 
consequences for persons accused of crime and for the effectiveness of criminal law 
enforcement.
Federal and state law in the United States is universal that on appeal decisions of 
questions of pure law are reviewed de novo,16 and decisions of questions of pure fact, often 
called "historical" fact, are almost always reviewed with considerable deference to the decision of 
the court being reviewed.17  However, applications of law to historical facts, often called 
decisions of mixed law and fact,18 have been reviewed on appeal under a variety of standards in 
"powerful influence on the outcome of appeals").
15
"About 70,000 criminal appeals are pending at any given time."  Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi 
Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 388 n.13 (2002).  "[I]n some jurisdictions, as many as 90% of the defendants who were 
convicted after trial and sentenced to prison will appeal their convictions."  WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE § 1.3(s), at 24-25 (3d ed. 2000).
16
"Questions of law are reviewed de novo."  See WISOTSKY,  supra note 14,  § 8.03, at 162.  See also
RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL: BETTER BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT § 5.11, at 73 (1992) (writing 
that "pure questions of law" are subject to "plenary" or "de novo" review); MARSHALL HOUTS ET AL., ART OF 
ADVOCACY APPEALS § 6.03[6], p. 6-11 (2002) (stating that "[q]uestions of law will be reviewed de novo . . . .").
17See APPELLATE PRACTICE MANUAL 23 (American Bar Assn. Section of Litigation, Priscilla Anne Schwab 
ed., 1992) (stating that most federal appellate courts apply the clearly-erroneous standard when reviewing district 
courts' fact-findings); HOUTS ET AL., supra note 16, § 6.03[4], at. 6-8 (stating that "[i]n an appeal from a bench trial, 
the trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless it is found to be clearly erroneous").  See 
generally Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988) (statement by Court that judges' decisions of questions of 
law are traditionally reviewed de novo, and their decisions of questions of fact for clear error).  Some commentators 
have expressed the view that in practice the clear-error standard often is equivalent to the very deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard.  See, e.g., WISOTSKY, supra note 14, § 8.03, at 163 (2002).  Currently the Supreme Court seems 
to agree.  See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 694 n.3 (1996).
18Applications of law to historical facts have also been called "ultimate facts."  Martin B. Louis, Allocating 
Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels:  A Unified View of the Scope of 
Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 1002 (1986).
5American criminal cases.19
In case some readers of this article are unfamiliar with these three categories of questions 
-- law, fact, and mixed -- here is an example in which distinguishing among them is relatively 
easy.  "How clearly must a suspect request the presence of counsel to trigger the requirement of 
Edwards v. Arizona20 that law enforcement agents immediately cease questioning him?" is a 
question of pure law, the answer to which is a general standard expressed independently of the 
facts of any particular case.21  The answer (a statement of pure law) happens to be, according to 
the opinion for the Court in Davis v. United States,22 that the suspect "must articulate his desire 
to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances 
would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney."23  "What did the suspect in the 
Davis case say to the agents questioning him?" is a question of pure fact, the answer to which is 
independent of any legal rule or principle.24  The answer (a statement of pure fact) happens to be 
19
"Where the issue on appeal is a mixed question, the deference accorded to the trial court's determination 
is not always easy to ascertain."  HOUTS ET AL., supra note 16, § 6.04[3], p. 6-15.  "Because mixed questions are 
impossible to classify by logic alone, there is room for reasoned argument and disagreement."  WISOTSKY, supra
note 14, § 8.04, at 169.  See also DAVID G. KNIBB, FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS MANUAL § 30.2, at 520 (4th ed. 
2000) (stating that ". . . courts have struggled with the standard for reviewing" decisions of mixed questions).
The same is true of mixed questions in civil cases.  "[T]he division of power [between trial and appellate 
courts] over mixed questions has been neither simple nor consistent . . . ."  Louis, supra note 18, at 1003.  See also
Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making and the Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts:  The Mixed 
Questions Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 235 (1991).
20451 U.S. 477 (1981).
21
"Declarations of law are fact-free general principles that are applicable to all, or at least to many, disputes 
and not simply to the one sub judice."  Louis, supra note 18, at 993 n.3, citing H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL 
PROCESS 374 (tent. ed. 1958).
22512 U.S. 452 (1994).
23Id. at 459.
24Examples of historical facts are "who did what, when, where, how, why, or with what intent."  Henry P. 
Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 235 (1985).
6"maybe I should talk to a lawyer."25  "Was Davis's utterance sufficiently clear to trigger the 
Edwards requirement?" is a mixed question of law and fact, calling for application of the 
proposition of pure law to the proposition of pure fact.26  The answer to this mixed question 
happens to be, again according to the opinion for the Court in Davis, "no."27
Standards for reviewing decisions of mixed questions long have included, at the most 
deferential extreme, review of trial courts' decisions for abuse or "manifest abuse" of discretion;28
at the opposite extreme, review with no deference, often called "independent" review or review 
de novo;29 and between these extremes review for "clear error" or under comparable words or 
25512 U.S. at 462.
26The identification or assignment of some questions among the three categories of law, fact, and mixed 
questions is debatable.  "[L]aw and fact . . . are points of rest on a continuum of experience."  Monaghan, supra note 
24, at 233-34 & n.16.  It is beyond the scope of this Article to attempt improvement in the definitions of these 
categories of questions.
Although some legal scholars have asserted that there is "no essential difference" between questions of pure 
law and of pure fact, at least in terms of ontology and epistemology, see, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo,
The Myth of the Law-Fact Distinction, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1769, 1770-71 (2003), this Article refers to those 
categories of questions and to the third category mixing them in the manner lawyers and judges long have used them 
and still continue to use them.  At least some of those scholars seem to share my view that, whatever ontology and 
epistemology may tell us, the practical questions in our legal system are "who should decide [each question and] 
under what standard."  Id. at 1771.
27Specifically, the Supreme Court wrote that "the courts below found that petitioner's remark . . . '[m]aybe I 
should talk to a lawyer' . . . was not a request for counsel, and we see no reason to disturb that conclusion."  512 U.S. 
at 462.  The legal standard articulated in Davis requires courts to consider not only the content of the suspect's 
utterances, but also the circumstances under which they were made.  Id. at 459.  In Davis's case, those circumstances 
included the agents' having advised Davis that he was a suspect in the crime, the length of the interview before Davis 
mentioned talking to a lawyer, the agents' responses to that mention, Davis's subsequent conduct during the 
interview, and perhaps other circumstances.  Id. at 454-62.  The courts' consideration of these circumstances along 
with the content of Davis's remark about a lawyer does not make this example of the distinctions among purely legal, 
purely factual, and mixed questions less clear, however, because each of the additional circumstances can also be 
described as a purely factual answer to a question such as "what did the agents say to Davis?" and "how long did the 
interview last before Davis mentioned a lawyer?"
28See, e.g., State v. Ramstad, 87 N.W.2d 736, 737, 741 (N.D. 1958) (affirming decision as to sufficiency of 
foundation of proffered evidence, under "manifest abuse of discretion" standard).
29See, e.g., State ex  rel. Creagan v. Rigg, 97 N.W.2d 276, 277-79  (Minn. 1959) (affirming on de novo 
review lower court's conclusion that relator had intelligently waived counsel).
7phrases conveying requirements of one moderate degree or another of deference.30
B. Recent Supreme Court Decisions Concerning De Novo Review 
State courts' choices of standards for reviewing decisions of mixed questions of law and 
fact in criminal appeals have been changing lately under the influence of recent United States 
Supreme Court decisions.  The Court has long adopted standards of review to be applied by 
federal courts in reviewing decisions of various mixed questions, in civil as well as in criminal 
cases.31  State courts long have consulted the Supreme Court's precedents, sometimes even 
following them, when similarly adopting standards for state courts' appellate review.32
In the last several years, though, the United States Supreme Court has been especially 
active in addressing standards of appellate review of trial courts' decisions in criminal cases.  
There have been ample opportunities, since for many mixed questions of federal constitutional 
law and fact the Court previously had left not only state but even federal appellate courts free to 
30See, e.g., State v. Maxwell, 430 S.W.2d 152, 154-55 (Mo. 1968) (affirming decision that defendant 
received adequate assistance of counsel as not clearly erroneous and explaining "[c]learly, this is not a de novo 
review").  "The usual formulation is that '[a] finding is "clearly erroneous" when although there is evidence to 
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been committed.'"  Louis, supra note 18, at 993 n.53 (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum co., 333 U.S. 
364, 395 (1948)).  Some courts have used the phrase "manifestly erroneous" and have described it as a "deferential 
standard of review."  See, e.g., People v. Sorenson, 752 N.E.2d 1078, 1083 (Ill. 2001).
31See, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963) (stating that, when a state conviction is challenged 
on the theory that a confession admitted in evidence at the trial was involuntary, a federal habeas judge's "duty to 
apply the applicable federal law to the state court findings independently . . . was settled in" the fragmented opinions 
in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953)); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589-96 (1935) (reviewing independently 
and reversing state court decision " that no impermissible racial exclusion from state juries had been proved").
32See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wilborne, 415 N.E.2d 192, 199 (Mass. 1981) (reviewing voluntariness of 
defendant's confession independently on direct appeal and, in support of this standard of review, citing only a state 
decision quoting from two Supreme Court decisions including Brown v. Allen, the holding of which on the standard 
of review is summarized in the immediately preceding footnote in this Article); Donovan Contracting of St. Cloud, 
Inc., v. Minnesota Dept. of Transportation, 469 N.W.2d 718, 719-20 (Minn. 1991), and Heath v. County of Aiken, 
394 S.E.2d 709, 711 (S.C. 1990) (both following Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988), in choosing standard 
of review under state statutes similar to federal statute addressed in Pierce).
8disagree with one another about standards of review, and considerable disagreement has indeed 
occurred.33  Such disagreement has been invited by the Court's acknowledgment that "when . . . 
the trial court determination is one for which neither a clear statutory prescription nor a historical 
tradition exists, it is uncommonly difficult to derive from the pattern of appellate review of other 
questions an analytical framework that will yield the correct answer" as to the standard of 
review.34  Indeed, such disagreement has been almost inevitable, since the Court has expressly 
refused even to "attempt to discern or to create a comprehensive test" for selecting standards of 
appellate review.35
To be specific about the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions addressed in this 
Article, the Court beginning in 1996 handed down a series of four decisions purporting to clarify 
the scope of review of certain issues of mixed federal constitutional law and fact that arise in 
criminal appeals.  In some of these four cases the Court replaced a mere assumption about a 
particular standard of appellate review with a holding,36 and in the first of the four the Court 
33See, e.g., United States v. Mask, 330 F.3d 330, 335 n.7 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing authorities illustrating 
circuit split on standard of appellate review of decision whether Fourth Amendment seizure occurred); compare
United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 901, 913 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (opinion for majority of judges, stating 
that under Ornelas federal court of appeals must review de novo decision whether property was within home's 
curtilage, and citing authorities illustrating circuit split on the issue), with id. at 919 (opinion for Tashima, J., 
disagreeing that Ornelas requires court of appeals to discontinue review of curtilage decisions only for clear error).  
See generally 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:  A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 11.7 
(2004) (collecting many conflicting federal and state decisions about standards of review of decisions of various 
Fourth Amendment questions of mixed law and fact).
Not only has disagreement been common, choices have seldom been explained.  "[T]he choice between 
discretion and law is made ad hoc for every type of mixed question, ordinarily without explanation . . . ."  Louis, 
supra note 18, at 1038.
34Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988).
35See, e.g., id. at 559 (stating that "no more today than in the past shall we attempt" such discernment or 
creation).
36See infra text accompanying note 91.
9resolved a split among lower federal courts about a standard of review.37
The series of recent rulings began with Ornelas v. United States,38 in which the Court 
resolved a split among the courts of appeals for various federal circuits.  It held that an appellate 
court should39 review de novo both a trial court's decision that the circumstances faced by police 
officers in a particular case had given them reasonable suspicion justifying their stopping and 
questioning persons suspected of crime, and the trial court's decision that the developing 
circumstances had later given the officers probable cause to perform a search without a warrant.40
Since the federal court of appeals in this case had shown deference to the federal district court's 
decisions of these Fourth Amendment issues, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the court
 of appeals for its de novo review of these determinations.41
Six years later, in 2002, the Court in United States v. Arvizu42 applied Ornelas, with the 
Supreme Court itself engaging in de novo application of the requirement of reasonable suspicion
37Similar observations can be made about civil cases.  For example, in Cooper Industries, Inc., v. 
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001), the Court granted certiorari "to resolve confusion among the 
Courts of Appeals" on the standard for reviewing the constitutionality of awards of punitive damages, and prescribed 
the de novo standard.  Id. at 431.
38517 U.S. 690 (1996).
39The text of this Article here uses the word "should" advisedly, for reasons explained below.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 74,75.
40517 U.S. at 699.  It is not surprising that a circuit split had arisen over the standard of review of decisions  
of  these mixed questions, since the Court had reviewed such decisions on many occasions, sometimes affirming trial 
courts’ decisions of these questions and sometimes reversing them, without expressly identifying the standard or 
standards of review the Court was using.  See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) (on direct review 
reversing state appellate court’s reversal of judgment of conviction, on ground that in Court’s view officer had 
possessed reasonable suspicion and that trial court therefore had correctly denied motion to suppress, without 
expressly specifying Court’s standard of review).
41517 U.S. at 700.
42534 U.S. 266 (2002).
10
for an investigative stop of a suspect to the circumstances under which the stop had occurred.  
The Court held that the federal court of appeals, in rejecting the federal district court's 
determination that reasonable suspicion had existed and in therefore reversing the judgment of 
conviction entered on the defendant's conditional guilty plea, had erroneously examined some of 
these circumstances in isolation from the others and had thereby understated the level of 
suspicion these circumstances had justified.43  Conducting its own, independent application of 
the legal standard to all the relevant facts, the Supreme Court then concluded that the district 
court had correctly determined that the agent had possessed reasonable suspicion justifying the 
stop.44  The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.
During the six years between the Court's Ornelas prescription of de novo appellate review 
of these two kinds of Fourth Amendment determinations and its own Arvizu exercise of such 
review, the Court relied on Ornelas to extend this prescription to two other issues of mixed law 
and fact that arise in criminal cases.  First the Court's 1998 decision in United States v. 
Bajakajian45 relied on Ornelas, in holding that it is appropriate46 for a federal appellate court to 
review de novo a federal district court's decision that a particular forfeiture violates the Excessive 
43Id. at 274-76.
44Id. at 277-78.
45524 U.S. 321 (1988).
46The text of this Article here uses the word "appropriate" advisedly, as it used the word "should" above in 
describing the Ornelas decision, supra text accompanying note 39, for reasons explained below.  See infra note 84 
and accompanying text.
11
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.47  Applying the legal standard de novo to the facts of the 
case, the Court held that forfeiture of currency in the amount sought by the United States would 
be excessive and thus unconstitutional.48
Then in 1999 a plurality of Supreme Court justices in Lilly v. Virginia,49 relying on 
Ornelas, expressed their view that the prescription of de novo appellate review should be 
extended from the Fourth and Eighth Amendment contexts described above to the Sixth 
Amendment issue whether a hearsay statement has sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to be 
admissible against a criminal defendant under the Confrontation Clause.50  Reviewing an 
affirmed judgment of conviction and sentence on certiorari to the Virginia Supreme Court, this 
plurality of justices engaged in their own independent application of the legal standard to the 
facts of the case, and concluded that the state courts had violated the Sixth Amendment by 
admitting the challenged evidence.51
47524 U.S. at 336.
48Id. at 337.
49527 U.S. 116 (1999).
50Id. at 136-37.
51Id. at 137-39.  The question of how trustworthy a particular statement is under the circumstances has since 
become less important than it appeared when the Court decided Lilly.  In 2004 the Court held in Crawford v. 
Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004), that introduction against a criminal defendant of what it called "testimonial 
evidence," a category it postponed defining, violates the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause in the absence of an 
opportunity for cross-examination, regardless of how reliable the circumstances indicate the evidence is.
Though Crawford reduced the importance of that more substantive question of procedure (reliability of a
statement) addressed in Lilly, the contrasting discussions in Lilly of the more procedural issue of procedure (the 
standard of appellate review of decisions as to Sixth Amendment reliability) are likely to remain almost as important 
as when they were written, for two reasons.  First, when the Court finally tells us what "testimonial evidence" 
consists of, we may well learn that the Sixth Amendment admissibility of at least some kinds of evidence outside that 
category still depends on its indicia of reliability, and courts then will read the Lilly opinions when choosing a 
standard of appellate review of such reliability rulings.  Second, some courts have already relied on Lilly in choosing 
de novo review of decisions of Sixth Amendment mixed questions other than reliability, such as (1) a decision that 
the prosecution's unsuccessful efforts to procure the attendance of a witness at trial were insufficient to warrant the 
12
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court and particular justices wrote opinions in these four 
cases, described and evaluated in some detail below,52 that at best left crucial questions 
unanswered and at worst were so cursory as to be little more than fiats.  This misfortune has been 
compounded by the similarly deficient opinions of a number of state appellate courts, some of 
which are also described below, that subsequently have relied on one or more of these Supreme 
Court decisions in deciding quite a wide variety of matters.53
C. State Courts' Responses to Recent Supreme Court Decisions 
Deficiencies in the opinions in these four Supreme Court cases have led state appellate 
courts to create a large body of questionable case law having significant consequences for 
persons charged with crimes and for public efforts to control crime.  Neither the Supreme Court 
nor any of these state courts has yet given adequate consideration to all of the legal issues raised 
by the Court's new precedents.  Due to the inadequacies of these Supreme Court and state 
opinions, the doctrine calling for de novo appellate review of decisions of mixed constitutional 
questions in criminal cases is being applied with breadth that is remarkable in at least four 
conclusion that the witness was "unavailable" for purposes of the Confrontation right, see, e.g., People v. Cromer, 15 
P.3d 243, 244, 247-50 (Cal. 2001), and (2) a decision that limiting a defendant's cross-examination of a prosecution 
witness did not violate the Sixth Amendment, see, e.g., People v. Grimes, No. 240010, 2003 WL 21995214 (Mich. 
App. Aug. 21, 2003); People v. Bunton, No. 236335, 2003 WL 21508500 (Mich. App. July 1, 2003).
52See infra Parts III.A-D.
53See infra Part IV.  Many opinions of federal courts of appeals are subject to similar criticisms.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Paradis, 351 F.3d 21, 24, 27-35 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing only Ornelas as support for its review of "the 
ultimate Fourth Amendment conclusions de novo"; reviewing in that fashion district court's decisions of mixed 
questions of reasonable expectations of privacy, propriety of purported protective sweep of premises, and attenuation 
of taint of Fourth Amendment violation; and reversing some of those decisions on Government's interlocutory 
appeal); United States v. Ball, 90 F.3d 260, 262 (8th Cir. 1996) (extending the rule of Ornelas from the mixed 
questions of probable cause and reasonable suspicion it expressly encompassed to the separate Fourth Amendment 
mixed question of exigent circumstances, rulings on which the court said it previously had reviewed only for clear 
error, without explanation except to say that Ornelas "instructs us" to do so).  However, such federal appellate 
decisions are beyond the scope of this article, which focuses entirely on the consequences of this line of Supreme 
Court decisions for criminal prosecutions in state courts.
13
respects, all four of which are at least somewhat debatable, and some of which are probably 
unsound in whole or part.  For the reader's convenience in distinguishing among these four 
points, just below a number introducing each and a key word or phrase in each appear in bold 
type.
First, some state appellate courts are assuming themselves bound to follow this doctrine 
of de novo appellate review, even though the Supreme Court has not yet stated expressly, nor 
otherwise eliminated substantial doubt, that in whole or part it is a constitutional doctrine and 
thus binding not only on federal reviewing courts but on state appellate courts as well.54
Second, many state appellate courts are assuming that this doctrine applies to every federal 
mixed question of constitutional law and fact arising in criminal cases.55 Third, some state 
appellate courts are assuming that these United State Supreme Court precedents govern the 
standard of review by state appellate courts of lower courts' decisions of issues of mixed state 
law and fact.56  Fourth and finally, some state appellate courts are assuming that this doctrine 
governs their review even of trial courts' decisions that have favored criminal defendants.57
The state courts have made only few and inadequate attempts to explain their decisions 
on these points.  In addition, so far there has been little scholarly commentary on any of these 
matters, and apparently none on some of the most important issues.58
54See infra Part IV.A.
55See infra Part IV.B.
56See infra Part IV.C.
57See infra Part IV.D.
58 See, e.g., Craig Bradley, The Middle Class Fourth Amendment, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1123-24, 1131-34 
& n.36, & 1149-50 (2003) (stating author's purpose as identifying the theme of the Supreme Court's decisions since 
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D. This Article's Treatment of the Subject 
This Article begins to fill the need for such commentary.  It first identifies deficiencies in 
the recent United States Supreme Court opinions prescribing de novo appellate review, 
deficiencies which invited these problems in the state courts.59  The Article then describes and 
evaluates decisions of state appellate courts illustrating the resulting uncertainty and confusion 
concerning standards of appellate review of decisions of mixed questions of federal 
1995 on constitutional criminal procedure, discussing Arvizu and citing Ornelas, and raising the possibility of a 
pattern favoring either the defense or the prosecution, but not mentioning the issue of the Court's power to require 
use of de novo review in favor of appellants (most of whom in criminal cases are defendants) nor even addressing the 
scope and consequences of this new requirement); Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment:  A 
Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 851, 895 (2002) (discussing 
application of Ornelas and Arvizu to state cases at length, and urging that reform should begin with "challenging 
Ornelas and Arvizu," without ever mentioning the issue of the power of the Court to require de novo appellate 
review in state courts); Roger W. Kirst, Appellate Court Answers to the Confrontation Questions in Lilly v. Virginia, 
53 Syracuse L. Rev. 87, 92, 147-48 (2003) (undertaking to "examine the questions raised in Lilly and the answers 
that can be found in the first round of appellate cases after Lilly," analyzing numerous state appellate applications of 
Lilly, and describing extensive reliance by state courts on Lilly when using de novo review of such rulings, but failing 
to address or even identify the issue of the power of the Supreme Court to regulate state courts' standard of review of 
applications of Lilly); Jennifer Christianson, The Future Implications of Lilly v. Virginia, 55 U. Miami L. Rev. 891, 
901-03, 905-08, 910-14, 917-23, 927-28 (2001) (mentioning the disagreement among the Lilly justices on the 
standard of appellate review, and analyzing state appellate applications of Lilly at length, but omitting to mention the 
issue of the Court's power to require state courts to conduct independent review); Jeffrey M. Grybowski, Note, The 
Appellate Role in Ensuring Justice in Fourth Amendment Controversies:  Ornelas v. United States, 75 N.C. L. Rev. 
1819 (1997) (discussing Ornelas at length, without addressing legal source of the requirement of de novo review).
One of the better commentaries on the recent Supreme Court decisions is in 5 LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 
11.7.  Professor LaFave addresses some of issues addressed in this Article.  He also cites some noteworthy state-
court decisions discussed herein, including Guzman, see infra text accompanying notes 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 
181, 182, 183, and Brockman, see infra text accompanying notes 164, 165, 166, 167,168.  See 5 LAFAVE, supra note 
33, n.92.7.  However, understandably in a treatise on the Fourth Amendment, his focus is limited to the context of 
that amendment.  Also, he does not question the source of the Supreme Court's power to impose any requirement of 
de novo review on state courts, and he treats summarily  the issue of whether the Ornelas prescription of de novo 
review is, as he puts it, "constitutionally grounded," not even addressing the question of whether that prescription is 
an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment or of the Due Process Clause, or an example of constitutional common 
law.  Compare id. nn.92.6 & 92.7 (relying only on Bose Corporation as authority for statement that "[t]he Supreme 
Court's rulings on standards of appellate review are sometimes constitutionally grounded and thus applicable to the 
states . . .," and immediately concluding that". . .  the analysis [in Ornelas] certainly suggests that this is the case as 
to the Ornelas holding"), with infra note 120 (summarizing other commentators' discussions of scope of holding in 
Bose Corporation).
59See infra Part III.
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constitutional law and fact.60  Then the Article offers a tentative analysis of possible bases for a 
Supreme Court mandate that state courts use de novo review, especially the Due Process Clause.  
This analysis includes recapitulations of others' criticisms of the Court's related regulations of 
state-court appeals in its cases that imposed a right to counsel and a specified test of 
harmlessness, and the author's original criticism of the Court's requirement that state appellate 
courts apply a prescribed test of retroactivity.61  Then the Article considers to what kinds of 
mixed questions the requirement of de novo review may apply.62  Next, the Article addresses the 
practical significance of these doctrinal problems.63
Finally, the Article concludes with suggestions of ways in which the United States 
Supreme Court in the future could avoid inviting such problems, and state appellate courts could 
avoid compounding them.64  In brief summary, each time the Supreme Court announces a rule 
affecting state appellate practices, it should explain specifically and thoroughly why it has the 
authority to do so.  The Court also should be explicit and specific about the content and scope of 
applicability of each prescription of a standard of appellate review or other rule of appellate 
procedure it chooses to announce.  In addition, however well or badly the Court conforms to that 
expectation, state courts should make their own decisions about standards of review thoughtfully 
and independently, within whatever latitude the Supreme Court has not expressly taken from 
60See infra Part IV.
61See infra Part V.A.
62See infra Part V.B.
63See infra Part VI.
64See infra Part VII.
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them.  Neither the Supreme Court nor many state courts are performing nearly at these standards.  
Doing so could have significant benefits for constitutional doctrine and enormous consequences 
for the outcomes of criminal proceedings.
III. Recent Supreme Court Decisions Concerning Standards of Review
A. Ornelas v. United States
The first of these four recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court contained the 
most extensive and authoritative explanation of the doctrine it announced.  In resolving a circuit 
split over the standard of appellate review, the Court in Ornelas v. United States65 provided two 
reasons for de novo review of trial courts' determinations that officers had the reasonable 
suspicion and probable cause the Fourth Amendment requires at specified stages of warrantless 
investigative conduct.
First, the Court explained, appellate courts performing de novo review can create more 
detailed and more consistent law concerning the content of these two standards; deferential 
review would be less informative to lower courts and, perhaps more important, to police officers 
and their trainers and supervisors.66  Second, a de novo standard for reviewing on appeal police 
officers' decisions about probable cause for warrantless searches provides a sharp contrast with 
the extremely deferential standard by which first trial courts and then appellate courts are allowed 
65517 U.S. 690 (1996).
66Id. at 697-98.  At least one authority has divided what I summarize as the first of these two reasons into 
three, creating a total of four.  See 5 LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 11.7 at __ (identifying the Ornelas Court's four 
reasons as (1) contribution to a unitary system of law, (2) appellate control and clarification of legal principles, (3) 
unification of precedent and guidance of law enforcement officers, and (4) preserving officers' incentive to seek 
warrants).  Another division of the Court's analysis, this one into three reasons, appears in a judicial opinion.  See
United States v. Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 1998).
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to review the decisions of magistrates issuing search warrants that probable cause exists.67  This 
contrast, the Court reasoned in Ornelas, desirably reinforces the incentives provided by other 
law68 for an officer in doubt concerning probable cause to seek a magistrate's approval, before 
invading a person's interests in liberty, privacy or property by conducting a search or seizure.69
These reasons are at least plausible, though there is some room to doubt each of them, as 
did Justice Scalia, dissenting alone in Ornelas.  The first reason can be discounted with the 
observation that the meanings of the reasonable-suspicion and probable-cause tests are 
susceptible only to so much detailed and consistent development.70  The second reason can be 
discounted by questioning the incremental incentive to seek a warrant when a police officer 
already knows that other aspects of Fourth Amendment law provide huge incentives to seek 
warrants whenever possible.71
Evaluating these competing arguments is not part of the function of this Article, however.  
Instead, I wish to point out the Supreme Court's failure to identify the legal source of its 
prescription of the de novo standard of review, and its failure to define clearly that standard's 
content and the scope of its applicability, and I also wish to address the consequences and 
implications of these failures.
67517 U.S. at 699.
68See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (creating exception to Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule for evidence seized under invalid warrant, when police in reasonable good faith rely on warrant).
69517 U.S. at 699.
70Id. at 701-04 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
71Id. at 704-05 (Scalia, J. dissenting).  Justice Scalia also faulted the majority for internal inconsistency, 
since its de novo standard of appellate review incorporated some deference to decisions both of police officers in the 
field and of trial courts.  Id. at 705 (Scalia, J. dissenting).  None of Justice Scalia's three criticisms of the majority's 
decision is essential to the arguments made in this Article.
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With regard to the source of this legal requirement, one first observes that Ornelas was a 
federal prosecution.  Consequently, it is conceivable that the Court in deciding this case deemed 
the scope of appellate review to be dictated either by federal constitutional law or by other 
federal law, such as the Supreme Court's so-called "supervisory power" or "supervisory 
authority" to prescribe rules of procedure to govern the lower federal courts.72  The Court in 
Ornelas failed expressly to disclose from which legal source this new doctrine arose, despite the 
Court's history of clarity in identifying the legal sources of certain standards of procedure the 
Court had prescribed in some of its previous decisions.73
Attempts to parse the Court's language concerning the legal basis of the rule are 
complicated a bit by the bizarre fact that the Court, after expressing the reasons for de novo 
review described above, decided in this regard only that "as a general matter determinations of 
reasonable suspicion and probable cause [for seizures and searches without warrants] should be 
reviewed de novo on appeal."74  "Should," not must?  "As a general matter," not always?  Such a 
qualified and precatory designation of a procedure to be followed by appellate courts is 
surprising enough if based only on the Supreme Court's supervisory power and if thus directed 
only to lower federal courts; it would seem astonishing if based on the United States Constitution 
and thus directed also to every state appellate court in the country.
72See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.6(i) (2d ed. 1999) (describing 
genesis, development, and current status of supervisory authority).
73An example of a clear disclosure of the Court's view that a new rule was an interpretation of a specific 
constitutional provision, though with an inadequate rationale for that interpretation, was Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 
436 (1970) (holding that collateral estoppel is part of a state-court defendant's protection under the Fifth Amendment 
Double Jeopardy Clause, as incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment).  A comparable example of the Court's 
clarity in resting a decision expressly on its supervisory power is McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
74517 U.S. at 699 (emphasis added).
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The Court's use of these soft phrases on this occasion may have been careless or 
calculated vagueness, rather than a signal that the specification of de novo review of decisions of 
these Fourth Amendment questions is to be optional or subject to exceptions, in view of the 
disposition of Ornelas.  The Court vacated the judgments and "remanded the case to the Court of 
Appeals to review de novo the District Court's determinations that the officer had reasonable 
suspicion and probable cause in this case,"75 making the mandatory nature of the new 
requirement of de novo review rather clear, at least for that lower federal court under the 
particular circumstances of that case.
Moreover, the rest of the Court's opinion arguably lends itself to the conclusion that the 
Court viewed its prescription of this standard for appellate review as dictated by the United 
States Constitution and as mandatory.  Both of the Court's reasons for the prescription are based 
on constitutionally grounded policies.
That is, first, the Fourth Amendment requirements of reasonable suspicion and probable 
cause apply nationwide, and will to a greater degree mean the same thing throughout the country 
if given relatively detailed and consistent interpretations and applications.  This will enable 
police officers everywhere to know better the rules governing warrantless searches and seizures, 
so individuals' constitutional rights should be more consistently respected.  Likewise, adding de 
novo appellate review of trial courts' decisions that police officers had Fourth Amendment 
justifications for their warrantless activities, on top of the existing legal incentives for officers' 
obtaining warrants and otherwise complying with constitutional requirements, serves the policies 
on which this constitutional protection is grounded.  Thus, despite the qualified and tentative 
75Id. at 700.
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terms in which the Court stated the new rule, arguably both of the stated rationales for the rule 
tend to support the conclusion that this is a mandatory rule of constitutional law.
Turning from the question of the legal source of the Ornelas doctrine to that of the scope 
of its applicability, the rationales tending to indicate that de novo review of decisions of these 
Fourth Amendment mixed questions is constitutionally required by policies rooted in that 
amendment also tend to limit the scope of the requirement to the Fourth Amendment context.  
However, parts of the Court's explanation of one of those rationales suggest that this doctrine 
may extend to mixed questions of law and fact arising under other constitutional amendments.
For example, the Court described "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause" as 
"commonsense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with 'the factual and practical considerations 
of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.'"76  The Court 
explained that "as such, the standards are 'not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of 
legal rules.'"77  In these respects the Court contrasted these Fourth Amendment standards with 
what the Court had in Illinois v. Gates78 called the "finely-tuned standards" of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of evidence.79  It described reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause as "fluid concepts that take their substantive content from the particular contexts 
in which the standards are being assessed."80  These explanations are also arguably applicable to 
76Id. at 695.
77Id. at 695-96.
78462 U.S. 213 (1983).
79Id. at 235.
80517 U.S. at 696.
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various other federal constitutional concepts and standards, so could later be viewed as 
supporting expansion of de novo appellate review beyond the Fourth Amendment context to 
other mixed questions of federal constitutional law and fact with similar characteristics.  For 
these reasons, the scope of this Ornelas holding, like its source, appeared debatable when the 
decision was handed down.
B. United States v. Bajakajian
Chronologically, the second of these four decisions of the Supreme Court was United
States v. Bajakajian.81  The court in this case relied on Ornelas to extend the requirement of de 
novo appellate review to the issue of a forfeiture's excessiveness under the Eighth Amendment, 
and then conducted such review for itself.  However, this decision shed virtually no light on the 
legal source of the prescription of this standard of appellate review, and contained no explicit 
discussion of the scope of its applicability.
The Court addressed the scope of appellate review only in a footnote.  Even there, in 
rejecting the defendant-respondent's call for use of the abuse-of-discretion standard, the Court 
wrote only that "the question whether a fine [to which the Court held this forfeiture equivalent] is 
constitutionally excessive calls for the application of a constitutional standard to the facts of a 
particular case, and in this context de novo review of that question is appropriate," citing Ornelas
with only the introductory signal "see."82  Only five justices joined the opinion for the Court, but 
the four dissenters expressed no disagreement with the majority's choice of the standard of 
81524 U.S. 321 (1998).
82524 U.S. at 336 n.10.
22
appellate review.83
Again the Court chose not to state expressly the source of this rule of appellate procedure.  
This case, like Ornelas, had begun in federal court, so again the decision as to the scope of 
appellate review could have been based either on the supervisory power or on the Constitution.  
And again the Court may have sowed a seed of doubt that de novo review was constitutionally 
required by using a weak word in writing that de novo review is "appropriate," instead of a 
clearly mandatory word like "necessary" or "required," much as it had done by writing in Ornelas
that courts "should" employ de novo appellate review.84
As for the scope of applicability of the prescription of this standard of review, its 
extension from the Fourth Amendment to the Eighth Amendment context tells us only that the 
Ornelas rationales specific to the former amendment have not deterred the Court from relying on 
Ornelas in the context of another constitutional amendment.  The Court's cursory explanation in 
Bajakajian for this reliance left one uncertain about possible further extensions of the 
prescription of de novo review.
C. Lilly v. Virginia
83Id. at 344-56 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
84The Court later interpreted Bajakajian, in Cooper Industries, Inc., v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 
U.S. 424, 435 (2001), as noting that the courts of appeals "must" review proportionality determinations de novo.  
The very next paragraph of the Court's opinion in Cooper Industries, however, summarized the Ornelas holding as 
being that trial judges' determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause "should" be reviewed de novo on 
appeal.  Id. at 436.  The Cooper Industries Court provided no reason either for shifting from the precatory word 
"appropriate" to the mandatory word "must" concerning Bajakajian, nor for persisting in using the precatory work 
"should" concerning Ornelas, and gave the impression of inattention to such distinctions when it linked the two 
paragraphs with the word "likewise."  Id.  Further evidence of the Cooper Industries Court's inattention to the matter 
is the fact that the Court in Cooper Industries twice described its holding in that case as being that courts of appeals 
"should" use de novo review when passing on the constitutionality of punitive damages awards, id. at 436, 443, but 
at another point wrote that "the constitutional issue merits de novo review," id. at 431, and clearly meant to create a 
mandate since it remanded the case to the court of appeals for its determination of the constitutionality of the award 
"under the proper standard."  Id. at 431.
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Of the four recent Supreme Court decisions this Article primarily addresses the third, 
Lilly v. Virginia,85 probably is hardest to decipher in the respect considered in this Article.  This 
difficulty arises in part from the fact that there was no opinion for the Court concerning the 
standard of appellate review of resolutions of the particular mixed question of Sixth Amendment 
law and fact on which the decision seemed to depend.86
That need not have been an insuperable obstacle to understanding the Lilly Court's 
treatment of the scope of appellate review.  After all, careful analysis of several dissonant 
opinions by various justices in a case without an opinion for the Court can on occasion produce a 
firm conclusion about the view of a majority of the justices on a particular issue.87  Nevertheless, 
an attempt to make sense of the several Lilly opinions on this subject is further impeded by the 
ways in which the various opinions were written.  That is most regrettable, because the genesis of 
Lilly made it a particularly apt vehicle for clarifying the basis and scope of the expanding 
requirement of de novo appellate review.
In contrast with the other three recent Supreme Court cases under discussion, Lilly arose 
85527 U.S. 116 (1999).
86Id. at 135-37 (Part V of opinion of Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer).  In 
my text I write only that the decision "seemed" to depend on resolution of that mixed question, because in the 
fragmented opinions in Lilly only four justices joined part V of the plurality's opinion, the part in which the plurality 
addressed the Sixth Amendment question whether the extrajudicial statements had sufficient circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness.  Justices Scalia and Thomas wrote opinions, both concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment, in which for different reasons neither deemed it necessary to address that question.  Id. at 143-44.  For 
himself and two other justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, disagreeing that 
appellate courts should independently review a trial court's decision that guarantees of trustworthiness meet Sixth 
Amendment standards, and favoring a remand for deferential review of that decision by the state appellate court.  Id. 
at 144-49.
87See, e.g., 1 LAFAVE, supra  note 72, § 2.10(e), at __ (analyzing various opinions in Teague v. Lane, 489 
U.S. 288 (1989), in which there was no opinion for the Court on the issue of retroactivity, and concluding that ". . . 
seven justices expressed agreement with the view that, subject to certain exceptions, a new ruling should not be 
applied on a habeas review of a conviction that had been final at the date of that new ruling").
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from a proceeding begun in a state court, rather than a federal forum.  The Court disposed of the 
case when it reviewed on certiorari to the Virginia Supreme Court the latter court's affirmance 
on direct review of a judgment of conviction and sentence entered by a Virginia trial court.  The 
state-court genesis of the case might have made it an occasion for announcing a federal 
constitutional right of defendants to de novo appellate review at least of decisions of this issue of 
mixed Sixth Amendment law and fact, and perhaps of other federal constitutional mixed 
questions, if that were the Court's view.
However, a majority of the Court were able to agree only on a description of the facts and 
procedural history of the case, on the existence of jurisdiction in the U.S. Supreme Court, on the 
conclusion that admission of the challenged evidence violated the Sixth Amendment 
Confrontation Clause, and on the desirability of remanding the case to the state courts for a 
determination of whether the error was harmless.  Concerning the issue addressed in this Article, 
the required standard of appellate review of mixed questions of federal constitutional law, there 
was considerable disagreement and even more ambiguity of expression.
The four-justice plurality cited the Ornelas decision concerning de novo appellate review 
of Fourth Amendment decisions about reasonable suspicion and probable cause for warrantless 
police investigative activity,88 and wrote in favor of extending that doctrine to the context of the 
Sixth Amendment.89  The plurality opined that "courts should independently review" the 
adequacy of indicia of trustworthiness of hearsay statements in applying the Sixth Amendment's 




The plurality did provide some explanation for this conclusion.  These justices wrote that 
the Court's prior Sixth Amendment opinions had "assumed, as with other fact-intensive, mixed 
questions of constitutional law, that '[i]ndependent review is . . . necessary . . . to maintain 
control of, and to clarify, the legal principles' governing the factual circumstances necessary to 
satisfy the protections of the Bill of Rights."91  In support of that statement, the plurality merely 
cited and quoted Ornelas, with no introductory signal and with only the bare parenthetical 
summary of its "holding that appellate courts should review reasonable suspicion and probable-
cause determinations de novo."92
These justices then further explained that Sixth Amendment trustworthiness of a hearsay 
statement does not depend on the hearsay declarant's in-court demeanor, to judge which a trial 
court would be better situated than an appellate court, or on "any other factor uniquely suited to 
the province of trial courts."93  Based on that analysis, the plurality concluded that "when 
deciding whether the admission of a declarant's out-of-court statements violates the 
Confrontation Clause, courts should independently review whether the government's proffered 
guarantees of trustworthiness satisfy the demands of the Clause."94







regard to its legal basis, the plurality provided no explicit identification of the source of the 
Court's power to prescribe such a standard of appellate review.  Part of the plurality's rationale, 
the relative unimportance for applications of this Sixth Amendment doctrine of witness 
demeanor or other factors uniquely suited for trial courts, was not specific to constitutional 
policies.  However, another part of the rationale, the necessity of independent appellate review to 
clarify and control protections found in the Bill of Rights, was rooted in the Constitution.
For another clue to the legal source of this position, the plurality in this case used the soft 
word "should,"95 much as the Court had done in both Ornelas and Bajakajian.  This was even 
more surprising when the Court reviewed the state-court conviction in Lilly than when it 
reviewed those two federal judgments.  "Should" is not the mandatory kind of word one expects 
to find, when reading an opinion supporting the U.S. Supreme Court's reversal of a judgment of a 
state supreme court.
One therefore could read this soft word to mean that this designation of de novo review is 
just advice and, since the Supreme Court does not sit to advise state courts, the designation is 
addressed (in this opinion about review of a state case!) only to the Court itself and perhaps to 
other federal appellate courts.  On this interpretation of the language, though state trial courts 
must comply with the Sixth Amendment when ruling on the admissibility of evidence, the Unites 
States Supreme Court and other federal appellate courts merely should employ de novo review, 
and state appellate courts are perfectly free to chose any standard of appellate review of these 
questions.
However, the plurality thrice wrote about the need for appellate "courts" in general to 
95Id.
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conduct independent review, never expressly modifying this word to cover just federal courts.96
Thus the plurality implicitly declined to tell the reader whether the prescription applies only to 
federal reviewing courts such as the Supreme Court.  The plurality almost seemed to invite 
readers to interpret the prescription as applicable to all appellate courts, including those created 
by and operating within state governments, but if so it chose not to make this explicit.
It is difficult to reconcile these conflicting signals about the legal basis on which the 
plurality sought to rest its prescription of de novo review.  One recalls that in Ornelas the nature 
of the Court's remand, instructing the lower appellate court to conduct de novo review, probably 
converted the precatory "should" to a command, if only a command covering a single case and 
addressed to a single lower federal court.97  This may also have increased the likelihood that a 
constitutional requirement of de novo review, not a supervisory rule, was being announced; a 
precatory doctrine of appellate procedure created under the Court's supervisory power would 
have seemed more plausible than a precatory doctrine deemed to flow from the Constitution.
No such clue appears in the Lilly remand, however, because of the contrasting ways in 
which the Court remands cases to federal and to state appellate courts.  The Court remanded 
Ornelas to a federal court of appeals, so was entitled to and did give that court specific 
instructions.  In contrast, the Court's custom is to remand cases to state courts with the more 
open-ended phrase, "for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion."98  Since Lilly
96Id. at 136-37.
97See supra text accompanying note 75.
98See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).   See generally Note, Individualized Criminal Justice 
in the Supreme Court: A Study of Dispositional Decision Making, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1260, 1277 (1968) (stating that 
". . . the Court has traditionally left the state free to complete the adjudicatory process in any manner 'not 
inconsistent' with its opinion").
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had come to the Supreme Court from a state appellate court, and since there was only an 
incomplete opinion for a majority of the Court, in this instance the Court merely reversed and 
remanded to the Virginia Supreme Court "for further proceedings,"99 without even a direction 
that the state court avoid inconsistency with whatever views one might attribute to five or more 
justices of the Supreme Court after reading their fragmented opinions.  Thus, after reading the 
terms of this remand and the various opinions addressing the standard of review, the state 
supreme court was left to wonder whether in future cases it and other state appellate courts 
"should" (or even must) conduct de novo review of decisions of this Sixth Amendment mixed 
question, or whether only federal reviewing courts "should" (or must) do so.
In any event, the Lilly plurality saw no need for the state supreme court, on remand from 
the United States Supreme Court, to conduct further de novo review of the trial court's decision 
of the Sixth Amendment mixed question presented in that case.  These four justices rejected the 
view of the posture of the case held by the three justices concurring in the judgment, the view 
that the mixed question was not properly before the United States Supreme Court since the state 
supreme court had not applied the Sixth Amendment test to the facts of the case.100  The plurality 
decided instead that the Virginia Supreme Court's thorough application of a substantially 
identical test of state law to the same facts was an adequate substitute for application of the Sixth 
Amendment, permitting the United States Supreme Court itself to review de novo the state 
appellate court's previous de novo decision of the cognate question.101  This the plurality then 
99527 U.S. at 140.
100See id. at 148-49 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment).
101Id. at 135 n.6.
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proceeded to do, concluding that the trial and appellate courts had erred.102  Only a decision 
about harmlessness of the error remained to be made by the state court on remand.
On this view of the case, it was not necessary for the plurality to decide whether the 
Constitution had required the Virginia Supreme Court to review the state trial court's decision de 
novo.  In sum, the legal basis for the prescription of this standard of appellate review remained 
quite unclear after Lilly.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, for himself and two 
other justices.  As I wrote above, they thought the issue of the scope of appellate review was not 
presented since, on their view of the record, the state trial and appellate courts had not applied 
that Sixth Amendment test to the facts of the case.103  Nevertheless, they expressly disagreed 
with the plurality's conclusion "that appellate courts should independently review the 
government's proffered guarantees of trustworthiness" under Sixth Amendment law.104
They explained that they considered deference to trial courts' decisions of this mixed 
question more appropriate because, on this mixed question of law and fact, "the mix weighs 
heavily on the 'fact' side."105  They further explained:  "We have said that 'deferential review of 
mixed questions of law and fact is warranted when it appears that the district court is better 
positioned' than the appellate court to decide the issue in question or that probing appellate 
102Id. at 137-39.
103Id. at 148-49.
104Id. at 144 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment).
105Id. at 148.
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scrutiny will not contribute to the clarity of legal doctrine."106  In the view of these justices, under 
those criteria trial courts' decisions of this particular Sixth Amendment question should be 
reviewed with deference.
With four justices calling for de novo appellate review of decisions of this Sixth 
Amendment issue and three for deference to trial courts, one turns to the separate opinions of 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, each concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, for signs 
that a majority conclusion was reached on this issue.  Scalia did not address the standard of 
review, apparently because he deemed introduction of the evidence in this case a "paradigmatic" 
and "clear" Sixth Amendment violation,107 the standard of appellate review of which was 
therefore inconsequential.  However, he had dissented in Ornelas, writing that it was "unwise to 
require courts of appeals to undertake the searching inquiry" that de novo review requires into the 
Fourth Amendment questions there presented.108  It seems somewhat unlikely, therefore, that he 
would have approved of the Lilly plurality's extension of that precedent to the Sixth Amendment 
context.109
Justice Thomas's separate opinion in Lilly, like Scalia's, did not address the standard of 
appellate review, since he expressed disagreement with the plurality's broad interpretation of the 
Sixth Amendment and also agreed with the dissent's view that the state courts had not applied the 
106Id. at 149 (quoting the Court's opinion in Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 233 (1991)).
107Id. at 143.
108517 U.S. at 700.
109In Bajakajian, Scalia had joined a dissent not addressing the standard of appellate review.  524 U.S. at 
344-56 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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constitutional standard to the facts of the case.110  However, Thomas had joined the Court's 
opinion in Ornelas,111 and he had written for the Court when in Bajakajian it had extended de 
novo review from the Fourth Amendment context to that of the Eighth Amendment.112  Thus 
there is at least a good chance that he would have approved the Lilly plurality's view that this 
standard of appellate review should be further extended to the context of the Sixth Amendment.
Even after these attempts to understand the various Lilly opinions and the Court's 
opinions in the previous two cases under discussion, it seems unclear whether the plurality's 
prescription of de novo review would be a requirement of federal constitutional law, or a doctrine 
governing only review conducted by federal courts of decisions made by other federal and by 
state courts.  Turning from that issue of the legal source of this prescription to the issue of its 
content, here, as I wrote above,113 precatory language was not converted into a command by a 
remand for another appellate court's de novo review, so it is conceivable that the Lilly plurality 
considers such review merely something an appellate court, in the language of the Ornelas Court, 
"should" do "as a general matter."
Finally, as for the scope of applicability the Lilly plurality would assign to the 
prescription, the author of the opinion wrote that independent review is necessary of "fact-
intensive, mixed questions of constitutional law."114  The plurality quoted Ornelas as to the 
110527 U.S. at 143-44.
111517 U.S. at 690.
112524 U.S. at 324.
113See supra text accompanying notes 98, 99.
114527 U.S. at 136.
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contribution such review can make to appellate courts' clarity and control of federal 
constitutional protections, and relied on the unimportance for application of this Sixth 
Amendment test of a person's "in-court demeanor . . . or any other factor uniquely suited to the 
province of trial courts."115  These explanations, combined with those provided by the Court in 
Ornelas, tend to support expansion of the prescription of de novo beyond the specific mixed 
questions presented in Ornelas, Bajakajian and Lilly to various other constitutional issues, 
though not necessarily to every mixed question of federal constitutional law that arises in 
criminal cases.
D. United States v. Arvizu
The Court's decision in United States v. Arvizu,116 the most recent of these four Supreme 
Court cases, added little if anything to one's knowledge of the source or scope of the prescription 
of de novo appellate review.  In Arvizu, which like Ornelas was a federal prosecution, the Court 
merely adhered to and applied for itself the Ornelas requirement of de novo appellate review of a 
trial court's finding of reasonable suspicion for a warrantless stop of a suspect.117
E. Context of Supreme Court's Opacity on This Subject 
The Court's consistent failure in the four cases just described to be explicit about the legal 
source of the requirement of de novo review is especially noteworthy for two reasons.  First, 
twelve years before the Court in its 1996 Ornelas decision launched this program of changing or 
clarifying standards for reviewing decisions of mixed questions of federal constitutional law and 
115Id. at 137.
116534 U.S. 266 (2002).
117Id. at 275-78.
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fact in criminal cases, the Court in Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States, 
Inc.,118 had mandated de novo review of decisions of the mixed question of actual malice in civil 
cases governed by the First Amendment doctrine of New York Times v. Sullivan,119 and in Bose 
Corporation the Court had been explicit that the Constitution was the source of the mandated 
standard of review.120  The Court showed in Bose Corporation that of course it is capable of 
adverting to and resolving at least in general terms the issue of the source of such a rule of 
appellate procedure.
Second, by the time various justices in Lilly disagreed with one another about a new 
requirement of de novo review in criminal cases, reported decisions in various states had made it 
clear that state appellate courts disagreed among themselves as to whether the Ornelas
requirement of de novo review was a constitutional ruling applicable to state appellate courts, or 
only an exercise of the Supreme Court's supervisory power over lower federal courts.121  Thus the 
Court had shown that it knew how to be explicit on this subject, and various state courts had 
shown that explicit communication was needed.  Under these circumstances, the Court's 
persistent silence in these four criminal cases as to the legal source of the requirements of de 
118466 U.S. 485 (1984).
119376 U.S. 254 (1964).
120The Court in Bose Corp. did not attempt to identify the constitutional source of its own power to 
constitutionalize such a rule of appellate procedure, nor even to define the scope of the rule.  See, e.g., Allen & 
Pardo, supra note 26, at 1787 (stating that in Bose Corp. "the Court did not explain why the 'importance' [of the 
constitutional issue before it] does not extend to all constitutional issues"); Monaghan, supra note 24, at 230-39 
(interpreting the Bose Corp. Court's rationale for independent review as based entirely on the First Amendment, but 
not easily confined to that context).  Still, the Court did in Bose Corp. what it failed to do in each of the four 
decisions on which this Article mainly focuses; it identified the mandate of de novo review as a constitutional 
requirement.
121See infra Part IV.A.
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novo review appears quite remarkable.
IV. State Appellate Courts' Responses to Recent Precedents
A. Decisions to Follow the Supreme Court 
Of the four categories of questionable applications, summarized above,122 that state 
appellate courts have made of the recent Supreme Court precedents on de novo review, the state 
courts' decisions that they are bound by these precedents present probably the most analytically 
difficult issue.  It certainly is also the most fundamental of the four issues, for the following 
reason.
Suppose that we had an authoritative and thorough explanation, for example, that state 
courts indeed are bound to employ de novo appellate review, that this requirement is an 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and that a set of rather 
specifically stated reasons support this interpretation of due process.  This explanation probably 
would shed much light on each of the other three issues, (1) which mixed questions of federal 
constitutional law and fact are covered by this requirement of de novo review and which are not, 
(2) whether due process similarly requires de novo review of some or all kinds of decisions of 
mixed state law and fact, and (3) whether due process requires that prosecutors too get the benefit 
of de novo appellate review.
Because of the difficulty and fundamental nature of the issue of the legal basis for the 
Supreme Court's requiring de novo review by state appellate courts, this Article will devote 
disproportionate space here to description of state courts' various treatments of this issue, and 
122See supra Part II.C.
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below to analysis of this issue,123 and less space to each of the other three questionable state-
court applications of the Supreme Court's recent precedents.
Already, many state appellate courts have undertaken de novo review of lower courts' 
decisions of various mixed questions of federal constitutional law and fact in reliance on one or 
more of the Supreme Court precedents discussed above.  When so doing, a number of state 
courts have indicated at least fairly clearly that they consider themselves bound by federal law to 
do so, though without questioning the source of the Supreme Court's power so to bind state 
courts.  Some others have simply followed these precedents without indicating whether they 
deem the precedents binding or only persuasive authority.  Just a few state courts or judges have 
expressed doubts as to whether state appellate courts must follow the Supreme Court concerning 
de novo review.  Each of these three alternative treatments of the matter is discussed in turn just 
below.
1. State Courts Deeming These Precedents Binding 
Courts of about ten states have indicated rather clearly that they consider themselves 
obligated under federal law to use this standard of review.  For example, in State v. Campbell124
the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's conclusion that the defendant's 
statements to police were voluntary and thus admissible in evidence consistently with the Fifth 
Amendment, writing that "[o]ur prior cases followed a standard of review on mixed questions of 
law and fact that has now been declared erroneous in Ornelas."125  Those prior cases had 
123See infra Part V.A.
124691 A.2d 564 (R.I. 1997).
125Id. at 569.
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reviewed decisions concerning voluntariness under the "deferential"126 standard that the trial 
court's conclusion as to voluntariness must be "clearly erroneous."127  However, in Campbell the 
court quoted the Ornelas Court's rationales that appellate courts should curb inconsistent 
decisions of trial judges and should control and clarify legal principles, and wrote that "[t]his 
Court will review de novo . . . mixed questions of law and fact insofar as those issues impact on 
constitutional matters, pursuant to Ornelas."128
Another state court considering itself bound to follow Ornelas on the standard of 
appellate review is the Maryland Court of Special Appeals.  In Jones v. State129 the court decided 
two probable-cause issues de novo with this explanation of its lack of deference to the trial court 
(and to the police officer who had initially determined that probable cause existed):
Ornelas modifies this State's existing law in a very subtle, yet important, manner.  
. . .
. . .  [Under prior state law], . . . when reviewing an officer's "on the street" 
determination of probable cause, an appellate court's task [was] to decide whether the 
officer had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.  . . .  Ornelas . . 
. holds that a reviewing court does not extend this sort of deference to the officer, but 
must make its own de novo determination of whether probable cause existed in light of 
the not clearly erroneous first-level findings of fact and assessments of credibility.130
126State v. Hightower, 661 A.2d 948, 961 (R.I. 1995) (using "deferential" standard of review in affirming 
trial judge's conclusion that statements were voluntary).
127State v. Garcia, 643 A.2d 180, 188-89 (R.I. 1994) (reciting the "clearly erroneous" standard, affirming 
conclusion that statement was voluntary, and writing that "[n]othing in our review of the record indicates that the 
trial justice's ruling was clearly wrong").
128691 A.2d at 569.  Remarkably, the Rhode Island Supreme Court later went on to extend the requirement 
of de novo appellate review to decisions of mixed questions of federal and state constitutional law and fact arising in 
civil actions, simply quoting from Campbell's reliance on Ornelas.  See Foley v. Osborne Court Condominium, 724 
A.2d 436, 439 (R.I. 1999).
129681 A.2d 1190 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
130Id. at 1195 (emphasis added).
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The Nebraska Supreme Court showed almost as clearly that it deems itself bound by the 
Ornelas prescription of de novo review, by writing in State v. Konfrst :131
In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ornelas . . ., the traditional clearly 
erroneous standard of review of a district court's determinations of reasonable suspicion 
to conduct an investigatory stop and probable cause to perform a warrantless search is no 
longer applicable.  The clearly erroneous standard has now been supplanted by a two-
stage standard in which the ultimate determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable 
cause are reviewed de novo . . . .132
South Dakota provides another example.  That state's supreme court in State v. Hirning133
simply cited Ornelas and wrote that "[t]oday we modify our standard for reviewing decisions on 
warrantless searches and seizures.  Our past standard -- abuse of discretion -- conflicts with the 
current Fourth Amendment analysis employed by the United States Supreme Court."134
A final example I shall describe in this text, of a court of yet another state indicating 
rather clearly that it considers itself bound by a Supreme Court precedent to review a trial court's 
decision of a mixed question of federal constitutional law and fact de novo, is the Indiana Court 
of Appeals' decision of D.D. v. State.135  Less than six weeks after the Supreme Court had 
decided Ornelas, the majority of the D.D. court, reversing a trial court's denial of a motion to 
suppress evidence found during a warrantless search,  began by reciting the boilerplate 
description of the standard of review it had used previously in such cases:  "The trial court has 
131556 N.W.2d 250 (1996).
132Id. at 253-54, 258.  The court used precisely the quoted language both in the syllabus by the court on 
pages 253-54 and in the body of its opinion on page 258.
133592 N.W.2d 600 (S.D. 1999).
134Id. at 603.
135668 N.E.2d 1250 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
38
broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and we will not disturb its decision 
absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion."136  After describing the circumstances under 
which the search had occurred and concluding that the searching officer had lacked probable 
cause, however, the majority then wrote:
Contrary to the dissent's assertion, we need not defer . . . to the trial court's 
conclusion that Officer Green possessed probable cause.  In Ornelas v. United States . . . 
the Supreme Court recently held . . . that determinations of reasonable suspicion and 
probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal.  . . .  The Court reasoned that de 
novo appellate review "tends to unify precedent and will come closer to providing law 
enforcement officers with a defined 'set of rules which, in most instances, makes it 
possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy 
is justified . . . .'"  . . .  Under our de novo standard of review, we conclude that Officer 
Green lacked probable cause . . . .137
The dissenting judge's assertion with which the majority disagreed was that in Ornelas
"the Court has mandated a standard of de novo review which appears to be slightly deferential in 
nature."138  The D.D. majority's disagreement rather clearly extended only to the dissenter's 
notion that some deference was due, not also to the dissenter's view that under Ornelas use of de 
novo review was a "mandate" governing state appellate courts.
In addition to the states whose courts made the decisions described just above, courts of 
Connecticut,139 Illinois,140 Michigan,141 Ohio,142 and Texas143 have rather clearly treated the 
136Id. at 1252.  The court discussed in detail three of its prior decisions reviewing trial court conclusions as 
to probable cause that had arisen in the same context as in the D.D. case.  In all three the court had similarly written 
of the trial court's "broad discretion," and in none had the appellate court referred to independent or de-novo 
appellate review.  See id. at 1252-53 and the Indiana Court of Appeals' Walker, Bratcher, and C.D.T. decisions cited 
therein.
137Id. at 1254 (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981)).
138Id. at 1255 (Baker, J., dissenting).
139See, e.g., State v. Merriam, 826 A.2d 1021, 1040 n.27 (Conn. 2003) (stating that in Lilly the Supreme 
Court "instructed that, 'when deciding whether the admission of a declarant's out-of-court statements violates the 
Confrontation Clause, [appellate] courts should independently review whether the government's proffered guarantees 
39
recent Supreme Court precedents on de novo appellate review as binding on state courts.
The state with perhaps the most puzzling treatment of the possibly binding effect on the 
proceedings of state appellate courts of the Supreme Court's rulings concerning de novo review is 
of trustworthiness satisfy the demands of the Clause,'" and then conducting "an independent review" of this Sixth 
Amendment question "in accordance with Lilly") (brackets and bracketed word added by Connecticut Supreme 
Court).
140See, e.g., People v. Sorenson, 752 N.E.2d 1078, 1083 (Ill. 2001) (stating that traditionally the court had 
used the "deferential" standard of "manifestly erroneous" to review ultimate rulings on motions to suppress evidence, 
but that "most recently . . . this court has applied the de novo standard to the ultimate ruling on a motion to suppress, 
relying on . . . Ornelas," and proceeding to conduct de novo review of issues of reasonable suspicion for and the 
scope of a Terry frisk).
141See People v. Goforth, 564 N.W.2d 526, 528-29 & n.4, 531 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting on de novo 
review trial court's conclusion that police officer had lacked reasonable belief that defendant's mother had authority 
to consent to search of defendant's room, therefore reversing suppression of seized evidence and dismissal of charge, 
and citing Ornelas as the sole direct support for court's statement that "all mixed questions . . . must be reviewed de 
novo").  Immediately after citing Ornelas, the court wrote "see also People v. Nelson").  In Nelson, the Michigan 
Supreme Court had rejected a trial court's conclusion that police had lacked reasonable suspicion, explaining only 
that "application of constitutional standards by the trial court [to uncontested facts] is not entitled to the same 
deference as factual findings," without rejecting the possibility that some lesser but still significant degree of 
deference is appropriate.  505 N.W.2d 266, 269 n.7 (1993).  Apparently, deference was sometimes afforded in 
Michigan appellate courts prior to the Goforth decision.  See, e.g., People v. Muro, 496 N.W.2d 401, 403 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1993) (reversing suppression of evidence as "clearly erroneous" per appellate court's conclusion that police 
officer had reasonable suspicion, without expressly rejecting trial court's underlying findings of historical fact).
142See State v. Russell, 713 N.E.2d 56 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).  In Russell a panel of the Ohio Court of 
Appeals, reviewing de novo whether exigent circumstances justified peace officers' warrantless entry into and search 
of a home, wrote:  "Our inquiry on appeal was recently enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Ornelas v. 
United States . . ..  An appellate court must review the trial court's findings of historical fact only for clear error, 
giving due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by the trial court.  The trial court's legal conclusions, 
however, are afforded no deference, but are reviewed de novo."  Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
Prior to the Supreme Court's Ornelas decision, Ohio appellate courts appear to have used various standards 
of appellate review of decisions of mixed questions of Fourth Amendment law and fact.  E.g., compare State v. 
Retherford, 639 N.E.2d 498, 502-10 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (concluding on independent review that defendant was 
seized, that reasonable suspicion was absent, and that seizure tainted consent to search, and therefore reversing 
conviction), with State v. Hickson, 590 N.E.2d 779, 780 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam) (holding that trial court's 
determination that consent to search was involuntary was not clearly erroneous, and therefore affirming conviction), 
and State v. Hassey, 459 N.E.2d 573, 581 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (holding that trial court's finding that defendant 
consented to search was not clearly erroneous, and therefore affirming conviction).
143A unanimous panel of the Texas Court of Appeals, in One Car, 1996 Dodge X-Cab Truck White in 
Color 5YC-T17 VIN 3B7HC13Z5TG163723, v. State, 122 S.W.3d 422 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003), cited Bajakajian for 
the proposition that "[i]n determining whether the fine is excessive, . . . the [Texas] court of appeals de novo on 
appeal, must consider proportionality," and then went on to hold that the forfeiture before the Texas appellate court 
was "grossly disproportional to the offense under Bajakajian" and to remand with an order for return of the truck to 
its owners.  Id. at 425, 428.
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California.  Before a United States Supreme Court plurality in Lilly v. Virginia prescribed 
independent review of decisions as to Sixth Amendment reliability of hearsay statements, a 
unanimous panel of the Second District of the California Court of Appeal had decided in People 
v. Greenberger144 that such decisions were reviewed only for abuse of discretion.  Panels of other 
districts of the same court followed the Greenberger ruling on this point in unreported 
opinions.145
The first California appellate ruling citing Lilly concerning any standard of review was 
the state supreme court's decision in People v. Cromer.146  The court relied on Ornelas and Lilly
in holding that appellate courts must use independent or de novo review of a decision that the 
prosecution's unsuccessful efforts to procure the attendance of a witness at trial were insufficient 
to warrant the conclusion that the witness was "unavailable" for purposes of the confrontation 
right.147  The court did not expressly state whether it deemed itself bound to follow these 
Supreme Court precedents, much less did it try to identify the source of the Court's possible 
authority so to bind a state court.  Neither did the court mention the standard of review of 
decisions of the analogous mixed question of Sixth Amendment reliability of hearsay, nor cite 
the Greenberger precedent for review of decisions of that question only for abuse of discretion.
After the state supreme court in Cromer had adopted de novo review of decisions of the 
Sixth Amendment mixed question of "unavailability" that it had addressed, various panels of the 
14468 Cal. Rptr. 2d 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
145See, e.g., People v. Sanns, No. E028389, 2002 WL 226378, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App., 4th Dist., Feb. 14, 
2002); People v. Ton, No. H021375, 2002 WL 77796, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App., 6th Dist., Jan. 18, 2002).
14615 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2001).
147Id. at 246-50.
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California Court of Appeal used the same standard to review decisions of Sixth Amendment 
trustworthiness, the very issue addressed in Lilly.  They simply wrote that "[w]e independently 
review a trial court's determination that the statements bore sufficient indicia of reliability"148 or 
made similar pronouncements, relying on Lilly and sometimes on Cromer.149
Occasionally such writings were somewhat equivocal.  For example, a court of appeal 
panel wrote that "[i]n the opinion of at least a plurality of the United States Supreme Court, 
appellate courts should independently review whether the government's proffered guarantees of 
the trustworthiness of a hearsay statement satisfy the confrontation clause," and then went on to 
review a trial court's decision that a statement was sufficiently trustworthy only for abuse of 
discretion and to add that it would have reached the same conclusion de novo.150
Eventually, in June of 2003, four years after Lilly and more than two years after Cromer, 
a panel of the California Court of Appeal took explicit notice of the confusion.  The panel wrote 
in People v. Schmaus151 that ". . . Lilly . . . does cast doubt on the continuing validity of aspects 
of People v. Greenberger . . .," including its ruling that decisions on Sixth Amendment 
trustworthiness are reviewed only for abuse of discretion.152  Two months later, though, the state 
supreme court decided People v. Brown153 in a manner and with a result later described well by 
148People v. Roberto V., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 804, 822 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
149See, e.g., People v. Tatum, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 267, 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); People v. Eccleston, 107 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 440, 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
150People v. Wheeler, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 916, 922 (2003).
151135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 521, 528-29 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
152Id. at 528-29.
15373 P.3d 1137, 1155-56 (Cal. 2003).
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an obviously puzzled panel of the state court of appeal.
Lilly has been said . . . to cast doubt on . . . [the] Greenberger [holding] . . . that we 
should review a ruling for abuse of discretion . . . .  The latest word from our state high 
court [in Brown], however, casts doubt on those doubts, for it reviewed a statutory 
trustworthiness finding "for abuse of discretion" . . . and then, finding no abuse, 
concluded as to residual trustworthiness under Lilly, "Because we have . . . concluded that 
the evidence of [the] out-of-court statements bore sufficient guarantees of
trustworthiness, we find no confrontation clause violation occurred when the trial court 
admitted the statements into evidence" . . . .154
Despite all the inconsistency and confusion on display in these numerous California 
cases, not a single one of the dozens of appellate jurists who sat on them ever mentioned in any 
opinion the issue of whether and why the United States Supreme Court might have constitutional 
authority to require state appellate courts to use de novo review in appeals the Constitution does 
not mandate at all.  When nothing clearer than doubts about doubts -- doubts squared -- is 
generated among appellate judges of a large and influential state by the United States Supreme 
Court's failure to articulate the constitutional basis of a new line of decisions requiring de novo 
appellate review, one can hardly deny that we need clearer and more specific opinions from the 
Court on this subject.
2. Courts Following But Expressing No Opinion 
In a few other states, appellate courts have employed de novo appellate review and have 
cited Ornelas or another of these cases as authority for doing so, but have failed to explain 
whether they view the Supreme Court precedents as binding or only persuasive authority.  For 
example, in James v. Commonwealth155 the Virginia Court of Appeals reviewed de novo a trial 
154People v. Conwell, Nos. A097011, A101881, & A101927, 2004 WL 505240, at *34 (Cal. Ct. App. 
March 16, 2004).
155473 S.E.2d 90 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming trial court's decision that reasonable suspicion permitting 
pat-down search existed).
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court's conclusion that a police officer's pat-down search of a suspect had been based on 
reasonable suspicion, explaining its adoption of this standard of appellate review only in the 
following words:
It is well established in Virginia that, on review of a trial court's denial of a motion to 
suppress, the appellate courts of this Commonwealth view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the trial court's determination.  . . .  In light of Ornelas v. United States, . . . it 
appears that in certain cases a deferential standard of review may no longer be 
appropriate.156
Courts have similarly applied de novo review in reliance on one or another case in this line of 
Supreme Court precedents, without specifying whether they viewed them as binding or only 
persuasive, at least in Arizona,157 Kentucky,158 and Minnesota.159
156Id. at 91.
157See State v. Bronson, 63 P.3d 1058 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).  There a three-judge panel using de novo 
review concluded that extrajudicial statements evidence of which had been admitted at a trial lacked sufficient 
indicia of reliability to satisfy Confrontation Clause standards, and therefore reversed the conviction.  Concerning its 
choice of de novo review, the court wrote only that "Confrontation Clause violations are reviewed de novo," 
providing no explanation, and citing Lilly and no other authority.  Id. at 1061.  The en banc state supreme court later 
the same year did likewise in State v. Prasertphong, 75 P.3d 675 (Ariz. 2003).  There the court on de novo review 
agreed with the trial court's conclusion that certain extrajudicial statements bore sufficient indicia of reliability to 
satisfy Confrontation Clause standards, and therefore affirmed the convictions.  Concerning its choice of de novo 
review, the en banc court wrote only that "review of a trial court's determination of a Confrontation Clause violation 
is de novo," and cited only the Lilly plurality.  Id. at 685.  My March 26, 2004, search of the Westlaw AZ-CS 
database for all previous Arizona reported decisions containing both of the phrases "Confrontation Clause" and 
"indicia of reliability" yielded none prior to Bronson in which an Arizona court had specified the standard of 
appellate review of decisions of this mixed question.  See, e.g., State v. Bass, 12 P.3d 796, 800, 805-07 (Ariz. 2000) 
(en banc) (concluding without apparent deference to trial court that extrajudicial statements were insufficiently 
reliable to satisfy Sixth Amendment standards, and reversing convictions, without specifying standard of appellate 
review for this mixed question).
158Compare Richardson v. Commonwealth, 975 S.W.2d 932 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding on de novo 
review that "the trial court was correct in finding . . . probable cause . . ." for warrantless search, explaining use of de 
novo review by writing that in Ornelas the Supreme Court had "enunciated a new standard of appellate court review 
of a trial court's suppression rulings on investigative stops and warrantless searches," and citing only Ornelas, an 
appellate court decision in a federal prosecution, and "cf. Clark v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 868 S.W.2d 101 
(1993)" (in which the court had reversed denial of suppression for clear error)), with Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 
580 S.W.2d 208 (Ky. 1979) (affirming ruling on voluntariness of confession using clear-error standard).
159See State v. Rewitzer, 617 N.W.2d 407, 412-15 (Minn. 2000) (holding that fines and surcharges violated 
Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth Amendment, relying extensively on Bajakajian in reaching that conclusion, and 
citing in support of de novo resolution of Eighth Amendment issue only two prior decisions of Minnesota Supreme 
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3. Courts and Judges Doubting They Are Bound 
In the state cases described above, none of the courts that seemed silently to assume they 
were bound by federal law to use de novo review, nor even those that made this view explicit, 
tried to give any reasons why these Supreme Court pronouncements on standards of appellate 
review might govern state courts.  However, my research has identified just a few cases in which 
state appellate courts or individual judges thereof have expressly questioned whether these 
mandates of de novo review bind state courts.
One such case was the Washington Court of Appeals' 1996 decision in State v. 
Jackson.160  Rejecting appellate challenges to a trial court's denial of motions to suppress 
evidence, and therefore affirming two defendants' convictions, that court applied a "substantial 
evidence" test in reviewing the mixed questions of law and fact whether and when a FedEx 
package was "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.161  The court distinguished 
those issues from the probable-cause and reasonable-suspicion issues addressed in Ornelas, and 
went on to say that on the facts before it the court would reach the same result on the seizure 
Court neither of which addressed standard of review of decisions of Eighth Amendment mixed questions).
Instead of the silence or elliptical statements provided by the Virginia, Arizona, Kentucky and Minnesota 
courts as to the binding or persuasive character of the Supreme Court's precedents on de novo review, the Florida 
Supreme Court provided ambiguity.  The court wrote plenty in Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598 (Fla. 2001), about 
why it was clearly adopting the de novo standard for review of decisions of questions of mixed federal constitutional 
law and fact, but the opinion contains conflicting signals as to whether the court considers the Supreme Court 
precedents binding.  See, e.g., id. at 605 & 608 (twice referring to "policy reasons" in the Court's Ornelas opinion); 
id. at 606 & 608 (describing the Court's conclusion in Ornelas "that an appellate court has an independent 
obligation" to use de novo review, and holding that ". . . appellate courts must independently review mixed 
questions" under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments).
160918 P.2d 945 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996).
161Id. at 951 n.26.
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issue using de novo review as it actually reached using "substantial evidence" review.162  The 
court added, though, that "Ornelas was a federal supervisory case, as opposed to a constitutional 
case."163  Unfortunately, the court provided no analysis or authority purporting to support that 
characterization of Ornelas.
Despite this lack of support, later in State v. Brockman164 the Supreme Court of South 
Carolina relied on Jackson in reaching the conclusion that "Ornelas was merely a supervisory 
opinion crafted out of . . . [the Supreme] Court's policy concerns."165  The court consequently 
examined yet another Fourth Amendment mixed issue of law and fact not de novo but only to 
determine whether "there is any evidence to support the ruling."166  Applying this deferential 
standard of appellate review, the court upheld the trial court's ruling that police officers' 
involvement in a mother's search of her son's property had been so slight that the search had 
constituted private rather than state action.167  To its credit, the Brockman court did offer one 
concise if questionable reason for its conclusion that the Ornelas  doctrine of de novo review is 
not a federal constitutional requirement.  In the court's view, "there is nothing in the language of 
162Id.
163Id.
164528 S.E.2d 661 (2000).
165Id. at 664-65.  A March 26, 2004, review of every case and secondary authority listed in Westlaw's 
KeyCite service as having cited Jackson revealed that Brockman was the only court or commentator included in 
Westlaw's databases to have cited Jackson concerning the standard of appellate review of decisions of mixed 
questions.  Professor LaFave's treatise on the Fourth Amendment does, however, cite Brockman.  See LAFAVE, 




Ornelas suggesting that the Fourth Amendment mandates de novo review . . . ."168
At least one state court has treated Ornelas as only persuasive authority on standards of 
appellate review while following rather than departing from the precedent.  The Supreme Court 
of Illinois in the case of In re G.O.169 abrogated its traditional "manifestly erroneous" standard for 
reviewing the voluntariness of a defendant's statement to police, despite the court's renewed 
approval of that standard only four years earlier.170  The court cited Ornelas, as well as a Seventh 
Circuit decision extending the Ornelas standard of appellate review from the two Fourth 
Amendment mixed questions the Supreme Court had there addressed to the Fifth Amendment 
voluntariness question, agreed that the extension was sound for "the federal appellate courts and 
the Supreme Court,"171 and then went on to address the different question "whether we should 
adopt the same standard."172  Summarizing "the principles relied on in Ornelas"173 and citing 
precedents on the meaning of the Fifth Amendment requirement of voluntariness,174 the court 
decided "that the same principles apply to our review of the voluntariness of a confession . . .," 
and that consequently "we will review de novo the ultimate question of whether the confession 
168Id. at 664.








The fullest judicial discussion I have found of the legal basis of the Ornelas doctrine is in 
the concurring and dissenting opinion of Judge Meyers in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
case of Guzman v. State.176  The trial court had denied the defendant's motion to suppress 
evidence seized from his person incident to his arrest.  The Texas Court of Appeals had reversed 
the resulting conviction, concluding on de novo review that probable cause for the arrest had 
been absent.  The majority of the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the lower appellate court, 
concluding on its own de novo review that probable cause had existed.
Explaining its choice of the de novo standard of appellate review, the majority wrote that 
"[t]he amount of deference a reviewing court affords to a trial court's ruling on a 'mixed question 
of law and fact' (such as the issue of probable cause) often is determined by which judicial actor 
is in a better position to decide the issue,"177 citing the United States Supreme Court's 1985 
decision in Miller v. Fenton178 concerning the standard by which federal habeas courts formerly 
reviewed decisions that confessions were voluntary.  According to the Guzman majority, "the 
trial judge is not in an appreciably better position than the reviewing court" to decide whether an 
175Id.  The court's analysis was unsound in one respect.  The court wrote that "this court has followed 
Ornelas.  . . .  Thus this court has already found persuasive the principles relied on in Ornelas."  Id. (emphasis 
added).  However, the court cited in support of these statements solely a case in which the court had followed 
Ornelas only for its interpretation of Fourth Amendment restrictions on police conduct, which state courts clearly are 
bound to follow, and not for its choice of a standard of appellate review, which state courts arguably are not bound to 
follow.  Thus, the court overstated the significance of its having followed Ornelas in the prior decision.  Regardless 
of this error, however, the court in the G.O. decision itself clearly made a choice to adopt the de novo standard of 
appellate review by relying on Ornelas as persuasive, not binding, authority.




officer had probable cause to seize a suspect.179
Having provided that policy-based reason for choosing de novo review, the majority 
wrote:
In a recent decision, the United States Supreme Court held that . . . determinations 
of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal.  
Ornelas v. United States . . . .  The Court stated, "the legal rules for probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion acquire content only through application.  Independent review is 
therefore necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to clarify the legal 
principles."180
With this description of Ornelas's holding and this quotation of part of its rationale, the Guzman
majority simply announced that its de novo review of the matter led it to reverse the Court of 
Appeals and to affirm the judgment of the trial court.  The majority did not specifically address 
the issue of whether the Ornelas requirement of de novo review binds state appellate courts.
Judge Meyers addressed that issue in some detail, but failed to elicit a response from the 
majority.181  Judge Meyers wrote:
The Court points to Ornelas . . . in support of adopting de novo review, but offers no 
discussion as to why that opinion is binding on state court appellate review.  . . .  [T]he 
holding in Ornelas does not appear to emanate from the United States Constitution, but, 
rather, from practical considerations . . . .  There is no indication in Ornelas that de novo
appellate review is a constitutional rule, applicable on direct appeal of state convictions in 
those appellate courts.  Compare Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union of United States, 
Inc. . . . (declaring that independent appellate review of trial court's finding of "actual 
malice" in cases governed by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan . . . "is a rule of federal 
179955 S.W.2d at 87.
180Id.
181The majority did, however, respond to a somewhat related point Judge Meyers made, concerning the role 
of the Texas Court of Appeals as a "discretionary review court."  Compare id. at 88 n.3 (majority's contention that de 
novo review by Court of Criminal Appeals of trial court's and appellate court's conflicting conclusions is a proper 
form of review) with id. at 95 n.4 (Judge Meyers' contention that Court of Criminal Appeals should instead vacate 
the judgment in such a case and remand for the appellate court "to properly apply the proper test").
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constitutional law").182
It is regrettable that the Guzman majority did not respond to this pointed call for an 
explanation of the majority's reliance on Ornelas.  Its failure to do so seems to have caused some 
subsequent uncertainty concerning standards of appellate review to be used in Texas courts.  
After the en banc Court of Criminal Appeals handed down the Guzman decision, the same en 
banc court, citing Ornelas as well as Miller v. Fenton, expressly declined to decide whether in 
the light of those federal precedents Texas appellate courts would review trial courts' 
determinations of the voluntariness of confessions deferentially or de novo.183
4. Summary of State Courts' Responses 
To sum up these usually opaque and occasionally conflicting decisions, many state 
appellate courts have followed the United States Supreme Court down the primrose path toward 
de novo review, citing Ornelas and the Court's other decisions.  On the whole these state courts 
have provided inadequate consideration of the possible federal constitutional basis for a 
requirement of de novo review.  Most courts have remained silent on this issue, and the few that 
have addressed it have not provided full analysis or use of authorities.184
182Id. at 93 n.3.
183Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 544, 564 (1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 978 (1998) (affirming judgment 
and holding that affirmance would result under any arguably applicable standard of appellate review).
184The Supreme Court has caused comparable uncertainty in decisions of state courts in civil cases, by 
similarly failing to specify whether the de novo standard of review the Court prescribed in Cooper Industries, Inc., v. 
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001), is dictated by the Constitution, and by failing to specify the 
scope of applicability of the prescription.  See, e.g., Aken v. Plains Elec. Generation & Transmission Coop., Inc., 49 
P.3d 662, 668-69 (N.M. 2002) (considering possibility that Supreme Court decided Cooper Industries under its 
supervisory power over lower federal courts, and concluding that the requirement of de novo review is a 
constitutional mandate).  See generally Lisa M. White, Comment, A Wrong Turn on the Road to Tort Reform:  The 
Supreme Court's Adoption of De Novo Review in Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 68 BROOK. L. 
REV. 885, 923 n.289 (2003) (noting that "[a]lthough the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Cooper 
Industries less than two years ago, there is already widespread confusion among state courts concerning the 
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B. Extensions to Other Federal Mixed Questions 
After this lengthy discussion of state courts' decisions concerning the most fundamental 
and important issue raised by the recent Supreme Court decisions on de novo review, we can 
briefly consider the other three questionable applications state courts have made of these cases.  
The first of these concerns the question of which federal constitutional mixed questions are 
subject to de novo review, and which are not.
Many of the state appellate courts citing Ornelas and the other recent Supreme Court 
precedents for adoption of de novo review have gone beyond following the Court down this 
primrose path, they have sprinted ahead of the Court.  That is, the decisions of many state 
appellate courts relying on these cases have extended de novo review to numerous mixed 
questions of federal constitutional law and fact other than the four that the Court has recently 
addressed:  Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion and probable cause, Eighth Amendment 
excessiveness of fines, and Sixth Amendment trustworthiness of hearsay.185
A noteworthy example is the decisions of the appellate courts of Nebraska.  I quoted 
implementation of de novo review," and citing numerous decisions of state courts).
185State-court decisions such as those to be described in the text are arguably sound extensions of the 
Supreme Court's precedents to additional mixed questions to which the Court itself eventually may extend its 
prescription of de novo review.  Such cases should be contrasted with state-court decisions that conflict with other 
Supreme Court precedents and that therefore must be considered simple blunders.
For example, in State v. Hulbert, No. 02-3202-CR, 2003 WL 21788560,  at *2-3 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 
2003), the court relied on Ornelas in reviewing a trial court's conclusion that a court commissioner had correctly 
found probable cause when issuing a search warrant, and thus in reviewing the trial court's consequent denial of a 
motion to suppress evidence found when the warrant was executed.  However, other Supreme Court cases such as 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), have held that a court hearing a motion to suppress evidence seized under a 
warrant needs decide only that the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis for finding probable cause.  The Hulbert
court neither cited such cases, nor claimed to be requiring more searching review of the magistrate's decision as a 
matter of state law, nor offered any other explanation for extending Ornelas so far as to bring it into apparent conflict 
with the doctrine of cases like Gates.
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above186 language of the Nebraska Supreme Court in State v. Konfrst187 making it quite clear that 
the court considered itself bound to follow Ornelas concerning the standard of appellate review 
of decisions concerning probable cause and reasonable suspicion.  One of the mixed questions 
presented in Konfrst was indeed probable cause, and the court used de novo review in approving 
the trial court's decision of that question.188
More remarkable is the fact that, despite its previous use of the clearly-erroneous standard 
when reviewing mixed questions decided in the context of motions to suppress evidence, the 
Konfrst court also reviewed de novo the trial court's decisions of three additional mixed 
questions of Fourth Amendment law and fact:  Did the defendant have standing to challenge the 
search in question?189  Did the police reasonably believe that the passenger in the defendant's car 
had authority to consent to its search?190  Was that consent voluntary?191  The court did this 
before the Supreme Court extended its Ornelas holding in Bajakajian or Lilly, yet the Nebraska 
court provided no explanation for its own extensions of the Ornelas holding.  Later unreported 
opinions of the intermediate appellate court of Nebraska have extended de novo review to 
decisions of still other mixed questions, such as to the Fourth Amendment question whether a 
search was sufficiently contemporaneous with an arrest to be incident thereto, and beyond the 
186See supra text accompanying notes 131, 132.






Fourth Amendment to the question whether a suspect's statement was voluntary and therefore 
admissible under the Fifth Amendment though made after a Miranda violation.192
Similarly, various appellate courts of other states have conducted de novo review, citing 
one or more of these Supreme Court cases, of trial courts' decisions of the following mixed 
questions of Fourth Amendment law and fact, among others:  whether a defendant had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a residence providing standing for him to object to its 
search;193 whether a search constituted state action or private conduct;194 whether a search 
occurred within the curtilage of a home;195 whether exigent circumstances justified peace 
officers' warrantless entry into and search of a home;196 whether a traffic checkpoint had a 
primary purpose of investigating crimes such that its detentions of persons violated the Fourth 
Amendment per se;197 whether a person was seized;198 whether a law enforcement officer acted 
reasonably in detaining persons under a Fourth Amendment doctrine of "community 
192See, e.g., State v. White, No. A-98-271, 1999 WL 14505 (Neb. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1999) (stating that ". . . 
an argument could be made that the Ornelas-Thompson standard of review is applicable to the instant case involving 
application of Fifth Amendment principles.  However, we need not conclusively determine which standard of review 
to apply, because under the facts of the case at bar, the outcome would be the same under a clearly erroneous or de 
novo standard of review, or a combination of the two"); State v. Cervantes, No. A-96-916, 1997 WL 199078 (Neb. 
Ct. App. Apr. 15, 1997) (citing Ornelas and reviewing de novo the trial court's decisions on Fourth Amendment 
contemporaneity and Fifth Amendment voluntariness after Miranda violation).
193See, e.g., State v. Werner, 831 A.2d 183, 200-01 (R.I. 2003) (reviewing question of standing de novo 
despite defendant's concession of legality of search, and concluding that defendant lacked standing).
194See, e.g., State v. Brockman, 494 S.E.2d 440, 443, 446-49 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997).
195See, e.g., State v. Martwick, 604 N.W.2d 552, 556-56 (Wis. 2000).
196See, e.g., State v. DeCoteau, 592 N.W.2d 579, 584 (N.D. 1999); State v. Russell, 713 N.E.2d 56, 57 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
197See, e.g., Trent v. Commonwealth, 544 S.E.2d 379, 380-81 (Va. Ct. App. 2001).
198See, e.g., People v. Wallace, 701 N.E.2d 87, 93-94 (1998).
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caretaking";199 whether a passenger in the defendant's car could give effective consent to a search 
of a bag in the car;200 whether a suspect effectively revoked his consent to his detention and 
frisk;201 whether the inevitable-discovery exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
applied to the facts;202 and whether the good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule applied to the facts.203
State courts have likewise relied on one or more of these Supreme Court precedents for 
de novo review of decisions of the following mixed questions of Fifth Amendment law, among 
others:  whether a confession was voluntary;204 whether a person was in custody for purposes of 
the Miranda rules;205 whether the conduct of law enforcement officers was the functional 
equivalent of interrogation;206 whether a suspect's waiver of Miranda rights was voluntary;207
whether a suspect's utterances constituted an effective request for counsel under the Miranda
199See, e.g., Wright v. State, 18 S.W.3d 245, 246-47(Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
200See, e.g., State v. Derrow, 981 S.W.2d 776, 778-779 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).
201See, e.g., E.B. v. State, No. 2D03-778, 2004 WL 351800, at *2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
202See, e.g., Copeland v. Commonwealth, 592 S.E.2d 391, 395, 397-98 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) (explaining 
only that "[w]e . . . review the ultimate question of law, the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine, de 
novo," and citing only Trent, supra note ... (about 4th fn. above), which in turn had relied only on Ornelas 
concerning the standard of appellate review).
203See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Opell, 3 S.W.3d 747, 751-52 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).
204See, e.g., In re G.O., 727 N.E.2d 1003, 1008-10 (Ill. 2000).
205See, e.g., State v. Burdette, 611 N.W.2d 615, 626-27 (Neb. 2000).
206See, e.g., Watts v. Commonwealth, 562 S.E.2d 699, 702-06 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).
207See, e.g., Cary v. Commonwealth, 579 S.E.2d 691 (Va. Ct. App. 2003) (using de novo review, citing as 
authority for such use Ornelas and a Virginia state court decision, which in turn had cited Ornelas and another 
Virginia decision, which in its turn had also cited Ornelas; concluding that waiver of Miranda rights was voluntary; 
and affirming conviction).
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doctrine;208 and whether a suspect who had made such a request later effectively waived the 
right.209
Similarly, state courts have relied on these Supreme Court precedents in extending de 
novo review at least to the mixed questions of Sixth Amendment law of whether pretrial delay 
denied a defendant a speedy trial,210 and whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of 
counsel.211
State courts likewise have extended the Court's call for de novo review to various mixed 
questions that are based not on the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, but only on the free-
standing Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.  This has happened at least for the question 
whether the state's loss or destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence prejudiced the 
defendant,212 and the similar question whether, in consequence of the prosecution's inadequate 
disclosure of evidence in its possession that was favorable to the defendant, there was a 
reasonable probability that the result at trial would have been different.213  At least one state 
208See, e.g., Ortiz v. State, 763 So.2d 540, 541 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Page, 709 A.2d 1042, 
1044-46 (R.I. 1998); Commonwealth v. Redmond, 568 S.E.2d 695, 697-700 (Va. 2002) (plurality opinion).
209See, e.g., Cuozzo v. Commonwealth, No. 1843-98-2, 2000 WL 1145924, at *4-6 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 
2000).
210See, e.g., State v. Austin, 742 A.2d 1187, 1193-94 (R.I. 1999); State v. Flores, 951 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1997).
211See, e.g., Stephens v. State, 748 So.2d 1028, 1031-33 (Fla. 1999); Miguel v. State, 774 A.2d 19 (R.I. 
2001) (on convict's application for post-conviction relief, using de novo review, citing as authority for such use 
Ornelas and state cases all of which relied on Ornelas; concluding that counsel was not ineffective; and denying 
relief); Heath v. Vose, 747 A.2d 475, 477 (R.I. 2000).
212State v. Vanover, 721 A.2d 430, 432-34 (R.I. 1998).
213See, e.g., Broccoli v. Moran, 698 A.2d 720, 725-29 (R.I. 1997); Arsola v. State, Nos. 04-96-00963-CR 
& 04-96-00964-CR, 1998 WL 538125, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 1998).
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appellate court has done likewise for the mixed question arising under the Equal Protection 
Clause of whether a criminal defendant has established a prima facie case that the prosecution 
has exercised a peremptory challenge of a prospective trial juror on the basis of the juror's 
race.214
C. Extensions to State-Law Mixed Questions 
Also surprising is the practice of some state courts of relying on Ornelas and other cases 
in this line as authority for de novo appellate review of trial courts' decisions of mixed questions 
of state law.  For example, after the Illinois Supreme Court had decided in In re G.O., as 
described above,215 to follow Ornelas as persuasive authority for the standard of review of 
decisions of Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion and probable cause for police interference 
with liberty or property and of Fifth Amendment voluntariness of confessions, the Illinois 
Appellate Court in People v. DeSantis216 decided several mixed questions of federal and state 
law in the course of reversing the trial court's suppression of evidence of the defendant's written 
statement to police.  The court introduced its analysis of all these mixed questions with a single 
paragraph identifying what it called "the" applicable standard of appellate review,217 in which it 
cited only Ornelas and In re G.O., and it appeared to decide the state-law as well as some of the 
federal-law mixed questions without deference to the conclusions of the trial court.218  Florida219
214State v. Dockery, No. C-000316, 2002 WL 63437, at *2 & n.1 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2002).
215See supra text accompanying note 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175.
216745 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001), overruled on other grounds by People v. Johnson, 803 N.E.2d 442 
(Ill. 2003).
217Id. at 7.
218Id. at 10 (holding that "the defendant's state due process rights were not violated").  Another panel of the 
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and North Carolina220 courts have made similar decisions.
D. Extensions to Appeals by States 
A final and rather surprising practice of some state courts is their reliance on these 
Supreme Court cases as authority for de novo appellate review producing appellate decisions in 
favor of the state.  One example is the Illinois decision in DeSantis, described just above, but 
there have been a number of others, including some by courts apparently considering themselves 
required to follow Ornelas or another of these Supreme Court precedents.
In this manner a panel of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland relied on Ornelas and 
gave the prosecution on its appeal the benefit of de novo review, thus reversing a ruling that a 
search was not validly incident to an arrest.221  Appellate courts in at least the states of Florida, 
Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island, and South Dakota have likewise reversed judgments favoring 
defendants, by giving prosecutors the advantage of de novo review in reliance on one or another 
of these recent Supreme Court decisions, after appellate courts in these states had indicated in 
same court made an analogous decision in People v. Cox, 739 N.E.2d 1066 (App. Ct. Ill. 2000).  In Cox, the 
appellate court reviewed a trial court's ruling that a police officer had had "no reasonable basis" for walking a drug-
sniffing dog around the defendant's car, relied on Ornelas for the proposition that ". . . we conduct de novo review of 
a trial court's determination of reasonable suspicion . . . ," id. at 1068, and ultimately concluded that, though this 
conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment, id. at 1070, it did violate the state constitution because ". . . the 
officer lacked reasonable suspicion sufficient to call the canine unit."  Id. at 1071.
219See Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598, 608 (Fla. 2001) (adopting de novo standard of appellate review for 
decisions of Fourth and Fifth Amendment questions "and, by extension, article I, section 9 of the Florida 
Constitution").
220See State v. Fowler, 548 S.E.2d 684, 696-97 (N.C. 2001) (concluding that admission against the 
defendant of hearsay statements violated neither the Sixth Amendment nor the "similar right" provided by the state 
constitution, this provision of which the court had "generally construed . . . consistent with the federal provision," 
stating that in accordance with Lilly the court had "conducted a full and independent review" of the statements' 
trustworthiness, and showing no apparent deference to conclusions of the trial court as to trustworthiness).
221State v. Fernon, 754 A.2d 463, 464-65, 476 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).  See also supra text 
accompanying notes 129, 130.
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other cases that at least arguably they considered themselves bound to follow the Court's 
decisions on this subject.222  In none of these opinions did the state court attempt to explain why 
the prosecution should benefit from de novo review or, more specifically, why Supreme Court 
rulings that the state court viewed as mandates for de novo review by state appellate courts 
should operate in favor of prosecutors.
V. This Article's Analysis of the Legal Issues
A. Legal Basis of Requiring State-Court De Novo Appellate Review 
In the discussion above of these four recent Supreme Court cases, we saw that the Court 
provided no explicit statement of the legal basis of the prescription of de novo review, and that 
apparent clues to its basis seem inconsistent.  One must look beyond those cases to other legal 
authorities, and attempt to determine whether the Supreme Court can require that state criminal 
defendants receive de novo appellate review of decisions of all, or even of some, mixed 
questions of federal constitutional law and fact.
Among legal academics, a teacher of Constitutional Law and Federal Courts would seem 
best qualified to answer this question, largely because the answer may lie at least in part in 
Article III, for reasons discussed below.223  Even apart from any Article III issues, the most likely 
basis for any such constitutional right appears to be the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause, for reasons also stated below.224  Of course, the Due Process Clause covers civil as well 
222See State v. Mike, No. 3D02-2211, 2004 WL 298697, at *1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); People v. 
Goforth, 564 N.W.2d 526, 528-29 & n.4 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Wortham, 761 N.E.2d 1151, 1153 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 2001); State v. Briggs, 756 A.2d 731, 736 (R.I. 2000); State v. Hodges, 631 N.W.2d 206, 209 (S.D. 2001).  
See also supra text accompanying notes 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 133, 134, 141, 159.
223See infra Parts V.A., VII.
224See infra Parts V.A., VII.
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as criminal proceedings, so a Constitutional Law scholar might be best equipped to address this 
issue.  Still, I should be able as a Criminal Procedure teacher to contribute something to the due-
process part of the analysis.
Nevertheless, I shall approach it only tentatively.  I assume that Supreme Court justices 
take great interest in applying the existing test for identifying due process requirements -- which I 
show below  involves weighing and combining several vague, subjective, incommensurable, and 
competing factors -- to decide that due process does require one specific procedure but does not 
require another.  The justices must find that process fascinating and worthy of much time and 
effort.  That is because they have votes.  I obviously do not, and must balance the time and effort 
involved against the likely benefits.  I have done so and, unlike many law professors before me 
who have indeed published lengthy due-process analyses of particular issues only to see the 
Supreme Court apparently ignore them,225 in this Article I shall forgo a comprehensive 
application of current due process doctrine to the questions of whether the Supreme Court can 
require states to provide direct review of their criminal or civil judgments or both and, even if the 
Court cannot go that far, whether the Court nevertheless can require use of particular procedures 
in appeals that states choose to permit, in particular, use of de novo review of some classes of 
decisions.  One does not need a vote, in order to draw attention to a series of recent rulings in 
which voting is about all the Court has done.  I shall go beyond drawing attention, and address 
the merits of the due-process issue, but not nearly exhaustively.
225See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309 (1993) (64 printed pages and 349 footnotes not cited by Supreme 
Court); Leonard N. Sosnov, Due Process Limits on Sentencing Power:  A Critique of Pennsylvania's Imposition of a 
Recidivist Mandatory Sentence Without a Prior Conviction, 32 DUQ. L. REV. 461 (1994) (62 printed pages and 357 
footnotes not cited by Supreme Court).
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For those reasons, the following analysis should be viewed as only a tentative first 
attempt at finding answers, or even just at raising some of the right questions.  This attempt 
seems well worthwhile, if only because so far scholars of Constitutional Law or Federal Courts 
(or other subjects) have almost wholly failed to raise hard questions about the specific 
constitutional basis of the Supreme Court's currently expanding demands for de novo review.
The existence of a constitutional right to de novo review in state criminal appeals appears 
debatable.  Legal scholars have recognized that the standard for reviewing decisions even of 
mixed questions of federal constitutional law and fact "is generally a question of policy."226
Even after the Supreme Court in Bose Corporation had decided that the Constitution requires 
that decisions of a particular First Amendment mixed question be reviewed independently,227
Professor Monaghan examined the subject thoroughly in 1985 and concluded that, though ". . . 
appellate courts often exercise independent judgment with respect to constitutional law 
application," he saw "no persuasive case for converting this competence into a duty."228
However, the next year Professor Louis, in a leading analysis of standards of review, took 
seriously both the possibility that the Constitution requires de novo review of decisions of some 
mixed questions, and the converse possibility that requiring such review of decisions of some 
mixed questions is itself "potentially unconstitutional."229
1. Lack of Federal Constitutional Right to Review 
226Kent S. Scheidegger, Habeas Corpus, Relitigation, and the Legislative Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 888, 
904 (1998).
227See supra text accompanying notes 118, 119, 120.
228Monaghan, supra note 24, at 264.
229Louis, supra note 18, at 1031-32.
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 To evaluate these competing possibilities, one should begin with the following 
observation.  The Supreme Court has never clearly recognized a constitutional right to direct 
appeals in criminal cases, or a constitutional right to launch collateral attacks on the criminal 
judgments of state courts.230  On the contrary, the Court has stated expressly and repeatedly that 
at least in ordinary cases no such rights exist.231
The apparent lack of a generally applicable federal constitutional right to obtain direct or 
collateral state-court review of decisions in criminal cases requires one to distinguish two 
230
"[T]he Constitution apparently does not require the states to afford a right to appellate review of a 
criminal conviction." LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 15, § 18.5(c), at __.  The same appears to be true for civil 
litigation.  See Monaghan, supra note 24, at 246 (restating "the general rule that there is no constitutional right to 
appellate review in any case").  In contrast with this lack of a constitutional requirement of appellate or collateral 
review by one court of the decision of another judge, the Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment does require judicial review of the sizes of jury awards of punitive damages, and has 
reserved what it called "the more difficult question of what standard of review is constitutionally required."  Honda 
Motor Co., Ltd., v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 and n.10 (1994).
Some federal courts have interpreted the Supreme Court's opinion in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), 
as requiring in some kinds of cases "at least the availability of meaningful appellate review by a higher court," see, 
e.g., O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1213 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977), as a component of 
the "opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim" on which under Stone a bar to federal 
habeas review of such a claim depends, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976).  Accord Agee v. White, 809 F.2d 
1487, 1490 (11th Cir. 1987).  This has little if any relevance, however, to the question whether there is a 
constitutional right to appellate review of criminal convictions or sentences.
231
"There is, of course, no constitutional right to an appeal . . . ."  Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 
(1983).  "Following dictum written over a century ago, the Supreme Court has consistently maintained that the due 
process guaranteed to the accused by the Constitution does not include access to appellate review of criminal 
convictions."  LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 27.1(a), at 1255.  The Court wrote in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611 
(1974), that "it is clear that the State need not provide any appeal at all," and quoted that language with approval in 
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556 (1987).  In the latter case the Court also wrote that states have no 
obligation to permit collateral attacks on criminal convictions.  Id. at 557.  Accord, United States v. MacCollom, 426 
U.S. 317, 323 (1976) (holding that due process does not require that petitioner for collateral review of conviction 
have broader access to free trial transcript than federal statute provided, and stating that "[t]he Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment does not establish any right to an appeal, . . . and certainly does not establish any right to 
collaterally attack a final judgment of conviction").
Some scholars have urged the recognition or creation of such constitutional rights.  See, e.g., Marc M. 
Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 503, 544, 572-73 (1992) 
(calling the argument for a constitutional right to a criminal appeal "compelling," favoring what he calls "the 
Fairness Model" of appellate review, and observing with approval that sometimes the Supreme Court, following the 
rationale of that model, "has overridden established historical practice to institute rules of constitutional criminal 
procedure unknown both to common law and to early American practice").  Attempting to resolve the merits of such 
arguments is beyond the scope of this Article.
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different questions about the power of the Supreme Court.  A claim that the Supreme Court has 
power to prescribe standards for direct or collateral review in state courts of decisions previously 
made in state criminal cases would be one matter, currently an apparently debatable matter.  A 
quite different matter is the Court's well established power to prescribe such standards for review 
in federal courts either of decisions made by federal courts during federal prosecutions, or of 
decisions made by state courts during state prosecutions.
Power to perform the latter function, that of prescribing standards and procedures for 
direct and collateral review by federal courts of decisions in federal and state criminal cases, is 
solidly settled.  Congress long ago created appellate rights in federal criminal cases,232 authorized 
collateral attacks in federal district courts on federal criminal judgments,233 gave federal district 
courts power to grant the writ of habeas corpus to state prisoners,234 and gave federal courts of 
appeals jurisdiction both to review decisions in collateral attacks on federal criminal judgments 
and to review decisions in federal habeas cases involving state prisoners.235 It has long been 
established that the Supreme Court has considerable supervisory power to regulate the manner in 
which inferior federal courts exercise the jurisdiction given them by Congress.236  It is at least 
equally well settled that Congress has considerable power to prescribe procedures to be followed 
232See LA FAVE ET AL., supra note 15, § 27.2(a), at 1256 (stating that Congress gave federal circuit courts 
authority to review federal criminal convictions in 1879).
233See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255(2004)  (citing original enactment in 1948).
234See LA FAVE ET AL., supra note 15, § 28.2(b), at 1294-95 (describing Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 and 
successor statutes).
235See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000).
236See source cited supra note 72.
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by federal courts, and both the Court and Congress have exercised these powers on occasions too 
numerous and too obvious to bear discussion here.237  Federal legislative and judicial powers to 
prescribe federal courts' standards of review, and otherwise to regulate procedures used in federal 
reviewing courts, seem to flow from the federal powers to provide for such review in the first 
place.
Similarly, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court has claimed the power to require 
that state as well as federal courts in civil and criminal trials follow specified procedures that the 
Court deems essential to the fairness of those trials, since the Constitution not only provides a 
specific right to a trial in a criminal case238 but also and more generally requires due process, 
ordinarily including a trial, when one is deprived in any judicial proceeding of life, liberty or 
property.239  The constitutional right to a trial serves as a predicate for the Court to require, for 
example, that guilt be proved in a criminal trial beyond a reasonable doubt,240 and that in civil 
trials grounds for termination of parental rights241 and actual malice in First Amendment cases242
both be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
In each of the above examples, a requirement of federal law that a trial or appeal occur at 
237See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982) (describing 
and evaluating history of Congress's and Supreme Court's exercises of these powers).
238U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
239See 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK,  TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  SUBSTANCE & 
PROCEDURE § 17.9, at __ (2004).
240See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
241See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
242See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,30 (1971); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
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all serves as a predicate for imposing in the name of federal law particular procedural 
requirements for the manner in which the required trial or appeal must be conducted.243  By 
analogy to those examples, a federal constitutional requirement that all state appellate courts 
review decisions of certain mixed questions of federal constitutional law and fact according to a 
specified standard or standards of review would seem plausible, if the requirement were an 
appendage on a federal constitutional right to obtain direct review of decisions made in state 
criminal cases.
However, since it appears that, at least in ordinary cases and at least for the time being, 
federal law does not require states to provide the parties to criminal cases any access to direct 
review, it might seem surprising if the Supreme Court held that certain federally mandated 
procedures had to be followed if and when states chose to authorize such review.
Indeed, the Court has sometimes rejected criminal defendants' or prisoners' claims to be 
accorded certain desired procedures for appellate or collateral review of their cases, and in so 
doing has occasionally relied on the apparent lack of a federal constitutional right to review of 
decisions in criminal cases.  Thus, in the old case usually cited as the first to reject a 
constitutional right to appeal a criminal judgment, McKane v. Durston,244 the Court relied on the 
lack of any federal constitutional right to appeal in upholding a state's denial of bail pending 
appeal.245  The Court explained that "the right of appeal may be accorded by the state to the 
243There have been other examples of the Supreme Court piggy-backing one federal constitutional right on 
another.  See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 554 (1987) (explaining that "[t]he holding in [Anders v. 
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), that appointed appellate counsel who deems the case wholly frivolous must follow 
specified procedures] . . . was based on the underlying constitutional right to appointed counsel . . .").
244153 U.S. 684 (1894).
245Id. at 687-88.
64
accused upon such terms as in its wisdom may be [deemed] proper," and that "whether an appeal
should be allowed, and, if so, under what circumstances, or on what conditions, are matters for 
each state to determine for itself."246
Much more recently, the Court in Ross v. Moffitt247 rejected the claim that a defendant has 
a federal constitutional right to appointed counsel on discretionary direct appeal of a criminal 
judgment, relying in part on the lack of a federal constitutional right to appeal at all.248  Even 
more recently and using a similar analysis, the Court in Pennsylvania v. Finley249 held that there 
is no federal constitutional right to appointment of counsel to represent a petitioner for collateral 
relief from a criminal judgment, in part because there is no constitutional right to file such 
petition at all.250
2. Relevance of Chapman and Griffith
However, despite these repeated refusals to impose procedural requirements on review 
246Id.
247417 U.S. 600 (1974).
248Id. at 610-11.
249481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987).
250Id. at 555-57.  Eminent legal scholars have made arguments along similar lines.  For example, Professor 
Monaghan has written that it is "troublesome" to attempt to locate the Bose Corporation duty of independent review 
in the First Amendment "given the general rule that there is no constitutional right to appellate review in any civil 
case."  Monaghan, supra note 24, at 246.  Also, addressing the question of retroactivity of new constitutional law, 
Professors Fallon and Meltzer wrote, in an article published in 1991, that "[t]he Supreme Court's restriction of 
federal habeas corpus review in cases involving new law raises no question of withdrawal of constitutionally 
required remedies," since "[h]istory marks federal habeas corpus as constitutionally gratuitous as a means of 
postconviction review."  Richard H. Fallon & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional 
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1813 (1991).  If a state's allowing criminal defendants to take direct appeals is 
likewise "constitutionally gratuitous," then perhaps it similarly follows that at least some particular procedures 
desired by state-court defendants (such as application of new law, de novo review of application of law to facts, and 
use of a harmless-error standard favorable to defendants) in appeals that states choose to allow are not or should not 
be constitutionally required.  But see infra note 297 (citing scholarly writings assuming that Griffith governs state 
appellate courts or ignoring this issue).
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proceedings that the states could withhold entirely, the Court did impose both the Chapman
harmless-error test and the Griffith retroactivity rule on state appellate courts.  It is remarkable 
how nearly contemporaneous were the Court's 1974 Ross and 1987 Finley refusals to regulate 
review proceedings on the ground that states need not provide them at all, on the one hand, with 
its 1967 Chapman ruling and the 1987 Griffith decision, since both Chapman and Griffith do 
nevertheless regulate such optional review proceedings.  Even more remarkable is the clearly 
inadequate manner in which the Court announced and explained the Chapman and Griffith
decisions.  It is important now to evaluate in depth the Court's explanations of those two 
decisions, since the Court's manner of announcing the line of recent decisions on de novo review 
that began with Ornelas is quite analogous.
The Griffith issue, of whether a claim that a trial court erred is governed by old or new 
law, is analytically prior to the Chapman issue of whether any such error was harmless.  In this 
Article, however, I shall discuss harmlessness first, since the Court mandated use of the 
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in 1967, another twenty years passed before the 
Court in 1987 required retroactive application of new rules on direct review, and almost another 
ten years elapsed before the Court launched its current project of requiring de novo appellate 
review.  Analysis of the 1967 and 1987 developments in chronological sequence reveals much 
about the Court's track record of governance of state appellate procedure, and suggests that the 
Court's recent decisions about de novo review may well be further steps designed to lead state 
appellate courts down a third primrose path parallel to the previous two.
a. Chapman v. California
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The Supreme Court in Chapman v. California251 dictated use by appellate courts of an 
extremely onerous test of the harmlessness of federal constitutional error.  Chapman held that an 
appellate court is required to reverse a criminal judgment on account of such an error unless the 
error was harmless "beyond a reasonable doubt."252  Later the Court even identified a few kinds 
of constitutional error that must be deemed or conclusively presumed never to be harmless.253
In Chapman, by the time the case reached the United States Supreme Court, the 
California Supreme Court had already determined that the criminal defendants' federal 
constitutional rights had been violated during their trials.  However, the state supreme court had 
applied the California Constitution's provision forbidding reversal of a judgment unless "the error 
complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice,"254 and had concluded under that standard 
that the error had been harmless.
The United States Supreme Court in turn held (insofar as is relevant to this Article) (1) 
that "federal law" of an unspecified kind governs the question whether a particular federal 
constitutional error was harmless,255 (2) that under this federal law the question is whether the 
error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,"256 and (3) that on the Court's own application of 
251386 U.S. 18 (1967).
252Id. at 24.
253See, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) (holding that instruction overstating degree of 
doubt jury can have when rendering guilty verdict cannot be harmless).




this standard to the record the error in this case was not harmless.257  The Court therefore 
reversed and remanded the case, explaining that "[p]etitioners are entitled to a trial free from 
[federal constitutional error]"258 and thus doubtless expecting a state-court retrial unless the 
charges were dropped or dismissed.
The Court's conclusion that federal law governs its own review of the harmlessness of a 
federal constitutional error in a state's judicial proceeding is not very surprising.  But what is the 
source of this federal law?  As Justice White wrote, dissenting in Brecht v. Abrahamson259 over a 
quarter-century after Chapman, the Court in Chapman "never expressly identified the source" of 
the rule it created, as being either the Constitution or another source of federal law.260
The Court in Chapman did not even state expressly whether federal law required use of 
this standard of harmlessness only by the Supreme Court itself (and presumably by lower federal 
appellate courts), or also by state appellate courts.  Justice Harlan in dissent was perfectly explicit 
in giving the latter interpretation to the Court's opinion,261 and in sharply questioning the Court's 
power to impose the Chapman doctrine on state courts.
I would hold that a state appellate court's reasonable application of a constitutionally 
proper state harmless-error rule to sustain a state conviction constitutes an independent 
and adequate state ground of judgment.  . . .
. . .
257Id. at  24-26.
258Id. at 26.
259507 U.S. 619 (1993).
260Id. at 645 (White, J., dissenting).
261Justice Harlan wrote that "[t[he Court imposes [the Chapman standard of harmlessness] . . . on state 
appellate courts . . . ."  386 U.S. at 46 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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I regard the Court's assumption of what amounts to a general supervisory power 
over the trial of federal constitutional issues in state courts as a startling constitutional 
development that is wholly out of keeping with our federal system and completely 
unsupported by the Fourteenth Amendment where the source of such a power must be 
found.  . . .
. . .
Even assuming that the Court has the power to fashion remedies and procedures 
binding on state courts for the protection of particular constitutional rights, I could not 
agree that a general harmless-error rule falls into that category.262
Remarkably, the Court did not even mention any of this very pointed language concerning 
whether the Chapman holding governs state appellate courts' decisions, and concerning what law 
might empower the Court so to regulate state courts' proceedings, so of course the Court did not 
respond to Justice Harlan's views on their merits.
The alternatives of course depended upon whether this harmlessness standard came (1) 
from some unspecified part of the Constitution that applies to state courts, such as the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, (2) from some power of the Court to create sub-
constitutional federal law binding state courts, or instead (3) from the Court's power to regulate 
its own and lower federal courts' procedures.  With no more guidance than the Court's passing 
reference to "the absence of appropriate congressional action" concerning a test for harmlessness 
of error,263 which could have implied that the Constitution did not dictate the Chapman standard 
(since at least ordinarily congressional acts cannot trump constitutional requirements), state 
courts and commentators reading the opinion were left to speculate about the source of this new 
test of harmlessness and about the scope of its applicability.
262Id. at 46-48 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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About three weeks after handing down its Chapman decision, the Court granted certiorari 
and summarily vacated about a score of California appellate decisions "for further consideration 
in the light of" Chapman.264  However, these actions provided only a weak indication that 
Chapman governed state appellate courts, since these actions could have been designed only to 
require the state courts to address issues the Court itself had not clearly resolved in Chapman, 
especially whether Chapman governed state appellate courts and, if so, on what constitutional 
basis.
Nevertheless, many state appellate courts jumped to the conclusion that they were 
required to employ the Chapman test of harmlessness of federal constitutional errors.  For 
example, in other cases that later came before the California Supreme Court, whose own 
judgment the United States Supreme Court had reversed in Chapman, that state court promptly 
interpreted the new test as binding on state appellate courts, without explaining why or even 
considering the alternative interpretations of Chapman.265  Appellate courts in other states did 
likewise,266 even though doing so often required their rejecting the less strict rules of 
263Id. at 21 (opinion of the Court).
264See, e.g., Wheaton v. California, 386 U.S. 267 (1967).  These actions are listed in Westlaw's KeyCite 
pages for Chapman.
265See, e.g., People v. Modesto, 427 P.2d 788, 799 (Cal. 1967) (en banc) (holding that state supreme court 
"must" determine claimed harmlessness of federal constitutional error "in accordance with the Chapman test," 
because the Chapman rule "requires us" to do so, and thus applying that test in affirming conviction).
266See, e.g., Raphael v. State, 994 P.2d 1004, 1013 n.40 (Alaska 2000) (applying Chapman standard to 
reverse conviction, and explaining that in 1977 the court had replaced its previously applicable "affect a substantial 
right" standard "in accord with . . . Chapman");  State v. Smith, 242 A.2d 49, 52-53 (N.J. App. Div. 1968) (applying 
Chapman standard without considering its alternative possible sources, holding that error was not harmless under 
that standard, and reversing convictions); Commonwealth v. Pearson, 233 A.2d 552, 554 (Pa. 1967) (applying 
Chapman standard without considering its alternative possible sources, holding that error was not harmless under 
that standard, reversing convictions, and explaining that "as we read Chapman" the prosecution "must now 
demonstrate" to the state appellate court that the Chapman test is met).
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harmlessness of error they previously had used.267
For many years, commentators too paid little attention to the questions of the Chapman
rule's source and scope.268  More than twenty-five years after the Supreme Court decided 
Chapman, the eminent legal scholar Daniel Meltzer still considered "the source of the rule" 
announced in Chapman to be mysterious enough to warrant his writing an article attempting to 
solve the puzzle.269  Professor Meltzer's effort was necessary, in his view, because "[t]he 
Chapman opinion was cryptic . . ." as to the source of the law it created, and "[f]or the most part, 
the Court and commentators have passed by this question entirely."270
Eventually, twenty-six years after deciding Chapman, the Court did write expressly that 
state appellate courts were obliged to use this test of harmlessness.271  This necessarily implied 
that the obligation either was found in the Constitution or was created under some unspecified 
and not-yet-explained power of the Supreme Court to create sub-constitutional federal law 
binding the states.
Even today, though, more than thirty-five years after Chapman, the Court has never even 
tried to identify which provision of the Constitution is the source of the obligation, much less to 
267See Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 22 n.89 
(1994).
268
"Justice Harlan's dissent did not generate much debate in subsequent years about the legal basis for the 
Chapman rule."  Id. at 2.
269Id.
270Id. at 2-3.
271See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 636 (1993) (stating that one reason for adopting a narrower 
standard of harmlessness of federal constitutional errors for federal courts' habeas review of state criminal judgments 
than for federal courts' direct review is that "Chapman requires state courts to engage in on direct review" 
consideration of such errors under the Chapman harmless-error standard).
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persuade readers that the obligation really is found there.  Neither has the Court attempted to 
identify any source of power in the Court to impose the Chapman doctrine on state courts as a 
sub-constitutional requirement of federal law.
Professor Meltzer's careful analysis of the possible bases of the doctrine led him to 
conclude that each presents a "profound conceptual difficulty"272 or more flatly "fails to sustain 
the argument"273 and "cannot account for Chapman."274  He ultimately concluded that the theory 
of "constitutional common law" is "the best explanation for the Chapman rule."275  However, his 
conclusion appeared to rest in significant part on his assumption -- reflecting perhaps undeserved 
faith in the Court -- that the Court could not have exceeded its powers when it established that 
rule.  He wrote that, since there is "no firm basis for understanding the Chapman decision as a 
constitutional mandate, . . . understanding Chapman instead as constitutional common law seems 
to me the only plausible alternative."276  I, in contrast, consider it also plausible that the Court in 
Chapman and in other cases discussed in this Article exceeded the powers conferred on it by the 
272Meltzer, supra note 267, at 2 (referring to the theory that Chapman rests squarely on the Constitution).
273Id. at 15 (referring to the theory that the Chapman rule is "required by due process or by fundamental 
presuppositions about judicial review" because appellate courts with jurisdiction are "obliged to apply the 
Constitution").
274Id. at 23 (referring to the theory that the Chapman rule is necessary "to protect the Supreme Court's 
appellate jurisdiction").  See also id. at 14 (concluding that "harmless error rules do not run afoul of the Equal 
Protection Clause"), 15 (concluding that "a state harmless error rule does not fall within the doctrine that proscribes 
unconstitutional conditions"), 19 (concluding that the Chapman rule cannot rest on FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a)), 21 
(concluding that "difficulties stand in the way of resting Chapman on [28 U.S.C.] § 2111"), and 26 (concluding that 
"Chapman is hard to understand as a rule of constitutionally mandated remediation").  In an earlier article, Professor 
Meltzer had noted that another possible explanation for the Court's decision in Chapman is "that the Supreme Court 
was simply confused."  Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials:  
Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 279 n.166 (1988).




Despite the failure of the Court to explain the source of Chapman at all, and despite the 
weaknesses of others' explanations, today state appellate courts and scholars seem uniformly to 
accept this obligation as part of federal constitutional law.  The Court appears to have 
accomplished in the Chapman line of cases the imposition of a federal constitutional requirement 
on state appellate courts by stealth.277
b. Griffith v. Kentucky
Twenty years after the Court in 1967 had in this manner begun the process by which state 
appellate courts implemented the Court's view of harmlessness of errors, the Court in 1987 
handed down its decision in Griffith v. Kentucky,278 which would come to require state appellate 
courts to follow the Court's current doctrine concerning retroactive application of new rules of 
federal constitutional criminal procedure announced after occurrence of the events they are 
deemed to regulate.  The Court's method in announcing Griffith, and the responses of state courts 
and commentators, were on this occasion very similar to what had already happened concerning 
Chapman and would later happen in the Ornelas line of cases.
The Court held in Griffith that "a new [federal constitutional] rule for the conduct of 
277In case the word "stealth" strikes one as harsh, I remind the reader that equally strong or stronger 
language is not unusual in legal scholarship.  See, e.g., John Gava, Another Blast from the Past or Why the Left 
Should Embrace Strict Legalism:  A Reply to Frank Carrigan, 27 MELB. U. L. REV. 186, 194 (2003) (referring to 
judges' "constitutional amendment by stealth"); Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error:  Constitutional Sneak Thief, 
71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1980); Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Law:  A Ruse for Government By an 
Intellectual Elite, 14 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 767, 773 (1998) (referring in heading to "The Fraud of Constitutional 
'Interpretation'"); Sylvia A. Law, Physician-Assisted Death:  An Essay on Constitutional Rights and Remedies, 55 
MD. L. REV. 292, 325 (1996) (referring in heading to "The Stealth Destruction of Constitutional Liberty"); Adam 
Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon:  Woman Suffragists and the "Living Constitution," 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456, 1500 
(2001) (stating that "[i]nterpreting the Constitution solely with regard to the intent of 'dead men' was a fraudulent 
method of constitutional interpretation . . . .").
278479 U.S. 314 (1987).
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criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct 
review or not yet final . . . ."279  This holding, as the Court announced it in the quoted language, 
expressly applied to state as well as to federal cases.  The Court also wrote expressly elsewhere 
in the opinion that retroactivity was required for a new rule announced while the case in question 
was "pending on direct state or federal review or not yet final."280
However, those two utterances, even the references to state proceedings that I have 
italicized above and below to highlight the point to be made in this paragraph, did not necessarily 
resolve a further issue.  Even given that the Griffith retroactivity doctrine governs state as well as 
federal cases, and given also that the Court's criterion for application of the Griffith doctrine 
turns on whether the litigation in question was final or instead was still pending on direct review
in a state or federal court when the new constitutional rule was announced, the question 
remained:  Did the Court's holding require retroactive application to state cases according to the 
Griffith criterion only by the United States Supreme Court itself and by lower federal courts 
reviewing state convictions and sentences, or also by state courts reviewing their own criminal 
judgments on direct or on collateral review?  The former version of the holding could have been 
an exercise of the Court's supervisory power over federal courts, since it would have governed 
only proceedings in federal courts.  The latter would have to be an interpretation of an 
unspecified constitutional provision, a piece of so-called constitutional common law, or some 
other kind of Supreme Court governance of state courts, since it would have applied also to 
proceedings in state courts.
279Id. at 328.
280Id. at 316 (italics added).
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The Court used some language tending to support the former interpretation, not binding 
state courts.  For example, the Court quoted with approval its statement in Linkletter v. Walker281
that "'the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect' of a new constitutional 
rule."282  The Court also explained its decision largely in terms of the duties and practices of "this 
Court"283 under "Art[icle] III,"284 which of course has no direct application whatever to state 
courts.285  The rationale in the opinion was expressed primarily in the general and not necessarily 
constitutional terms of "inequity" and "the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the 
same,"286 without even a mention in this connection of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal 
Protection Clause or Due Process Clause as conceivable sources of this doctrine of equity or 
equality.  Also, the Court expressed its conclusion on what it saw as the most specific issue 
presented by the case -- "whether a different retroactivity rule should apply when a new rule is a 
'clear break' with the past," an issue the Court deemed "squarely before us in the present cases"287
-- as a conclusion that such an exception was "inappropriate."288  Not unconstitutional; 
inappropriate.
281381 U.S. 618, 629 (1961).
282479 U.S. at 320 (quoting Linkletter).
283Id. at 322, 326.
284Id. at 322.
285See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 239, § 2.13, at __ ("State courts are not bound by Article III of 
the U.S. Constitution . . . .").




However, the Court also used language one might view as tending to indicate that 
somehow state appellate courts were bound to follow the new rule concerning retroactivity.  The 
Court wrote that "failure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending 
on direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudication,"289 and referred to "the 
nature of judicial review"290 and even "the integrity of judicial review."291  Quite remarkably, the 
Court wrote that "[a]s a practical matter . . . we cannot hear each case pending on direct review 
and apply the new rule.  But we fulfill our judicial responsibility by instructing the lower courts 
to apply the new rule retroactively to cases not yet final."292  Perhaps these parts of the opinion 
can be interpreted as carrying the implication -- to borrow Justice Harlan's word in Chapman, the 
"startling" implication293 -- that Article III, by giving the Court specified and limited powers to 
do its own business, implicitly gave it also authority to require state courts to supplement the 
Court's powers by implementing the Court's views, or that some other unspecified part of the 
Constitution requires state courts to adhere to a conception of judicial powers which includes the 
Court's specific view of retroactivity.
The Court in this opinion passed up many chances to clarify the matter.  For example, it 





293See supra text accompanying note 262.
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specifying whether it was so instructing lower state as well as lower federal courts.294  Similarly, 
the Court used the passive voice in writing twice that a new rule "is to be applied retroactively," 
without saying by what courts the rule must be so applied.295
As it had done in the immediate aftermath of its Chapman decision, about six weeks after 
handing down Griffith the Court granted certiorari and summarily vacated about a dozen 
decisions of various state appellate courts on direct review of convictions or sentences "for 
further consideration in light of" Griffith.296  However, again these actions provided only an 
ambiguous indication that Griffith governed state appellate courts, since these actions could have 
been designed only to require the state courts to address issues the Court itself had not clearly 
resolved in Griffith, especially whether Griffith governs state appellate courts and, if so, on what 
constitutional basis.
Faced with the ambiguity of Griffith, regrettably even the most astute commentators 
seemed to assume without discussion that state appellate courts were bound by the new 
requirement of retroactive application of new rules of federal constitutional law.297  Likewise, 
294479 U.S. at 323.
295Id. at 324, 328.
296See, e.g., Mack v. Illinois, 479 U.S. 1074 (1987).  These actions are listed in Westlaw's KeyCite pages 
for Griffith.
297See, e.g., Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 250.  Professors Fallon and Meltzer in this article addressed the 
issue of whether the Court has power under Article III to deny retroactive effect to its new constitutional rules, e.g., 
id. at 1734, and discussed at length the issue of the Court's power to compel state courts to provide remedies for 
constitutional violations, id. at 1786-96.  However, they omitted to mention the distinct issue of whether the Court 
has power to require state appellate courts to give such rules retroactive effect, and stated that, in a hypothetical case 
of a state criminal conviction for failure to pay a highway use tax held unconstitutional during the pendency of the 
criminal appeal, "[t]he criminal conviction . . . could not stand," without specifying whether the conviction must fall 
in a state or only in a federal court.  Id. at 1768.
Comments on previous Supreme Court rulings on retroactivity similarly neglected the issue.  See, e.g., Paul 
J. Mishkin, Foreword:  The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 
56 (1965) (addressing the Court's power to limit the retroactive effects of its decisions, but not its power to require 
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state appellate courts assumed without discussion that they were compelled to follow this new 
mandate.298  Such assumptions seem, however, poor substitutes for analysis by state courts and 
by commentators, and no substitutes at all for explication by the Supreme Court itself of the 
specifics of its constitutional authority to impose such requirements on state appellate courts.
Eventually, years after it had decided Griffith, the Court did make it reasonably clear in 
Powell v. Nevada299 that it considers state appellate courts bound to apply the Griffith holding.300
state appellate courts to give retroactive effects to such decisions).
Even today, when Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, and Nancy J. King discuss Griffith in their excellent 
treatise, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, they make no mention of the issue of the Court's power to impose its view of 
retroactivity on state appellate courts.  See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 72 §§ 2.10(a), (d) & (e).  Professor LaFave's 
fine treatise on the Fourth Amendment discusses retroactivity and cites decades of relevant articles, but again is 
silent as to whether and why the Court can require state appellate courts to follow its view of retroactivity.  See 5 
LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 11.5.  I have been unable to find a mention of this issue even in the current edition of the 
masterful casebook, RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM (5th ed. 2003).
298See, e.g., Taylor v. Sherrill, 802 P.2d 1058, 1062-63 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (applying the then-new 
double-jeopardy rule of Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), to a not-yet-final state conviction, on the sole basis 
of a citation to Griffith), vacated on other grounds, 819 P.2d 921 (Ariz. 1991) (en banc); Commonwealth v. 
Bembury, 548 N.E.2d 1255, 1259 & n.3 (Mass. 1990) (retroactively applying Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), 
"under Griffith," to a direct appeal during the long pendency of which (as a result of the defendant's escape from 
custody and delay in his recapture) Davis had been decided); People v. Scott, 516 N.E.2d 1208, 1210 (N.Y. 1987) 
(retroactively applying Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), to a direct appeal during the pendency of which 
Batson had been decided, and explaining only that "[i]n Griffith . . . the Supreme Court declared that Batson applied 
retroactively to all pending appeals").  Only rarely did a state appellate court even make explicit its assumption that it 
was bound by Griffith.  See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 10 S.W.3d 673, 679 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 2000) (stating that "[t]he 
Supreme Court's retroactivity analysis for federal constitutional errors is binding upon the states when federal 
constitutional errors are involved," and supporting that statement only by a citation to James B. Beam Distilling Co. 
v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535 (1991)).
As a refreshing contrast, in the context of collateral rather than direct review of criminal judgments, a panel 
of the Appellate Court of Illinois identified and addressed the issue of whether state courts are bound by the United 
States Supreme Court's pronouncements on retroactivity.  That court wrote that state courts are not bound, when 
hearing collateral attacks based on new federal constitutional rules, to apply the Court's view of the extent and limits 
of retroactivity in federal habeas corpus proceedings.  People v. Kizer, 741 N.E.2d 1103, 1110 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
299511 U.S. 79 (1994).
300See id. at 84 (vacating the state supreme court's judgment on the grounds that "[t]he State . . . concedes 
that the Nevada Supreme Court's retroactivity analysis was incorrect" with regard to a new rule of federal 
constitutional law and that ". . . Griffith entitles [the state-court appellant] to rely on . . ." the new rule").
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However, the Powell opinion did not even attempt to explain why.301  Indeed, in none of the 
cases after Griffith in which the Court has discussed or applied its doctrine of mandatory direct-
review retroactivity has the Court provided a specific and thorough explanation of its purported 
power to impose that doctrine on state appellate courts.  Worse, much of what the Court actually 
has written tends to undermine its implicit claim to such power.
The best the Court has offered in these cases are repeated statements that its holding in 
Griffith
. . . rested on two "basic norms of constitutional adjudication."  First, we reasoned that 
"the nature of judicial review" strips us of the quintessentially "legislat[ive]" prerogative 
to make rules of law retroactive or prospective as we see fit.  Second, we concluded that 
"selective application of new rules violates the principle of treating similarly situated 
[parties] the same."302
Individual justices from time to time have elaborated on those rationales or added to them, by 
expressly relying on Article III of the Constitution and by explaining that "[t]he true traditional
view is that prospective decisionmaking is quite incompatible with the judicial power, and that 
301The Court has performed similarly concerning retroactivity of new constitutional rules in civil cases.  
See, e.g., Ashland Oil, Inc., v. Caryl, 497 U.S. 916, 918 (1990) (quoting the statement in the opinion of Justice 
O'Connor for herself and three other justices in American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 177 (1990), 
that "[t]he determination whether a constitutional decision of this Court is retroactive . . . is a matter of federal law," 
and reversing a judgment on the ground that the state appellate court had erred in failing to apply such a Supreme 
Court precedent retroactively, without identifying the federal law that authorizes the Court to impose its view of 
retroactivity of new constitutional rulings on state appellate courts); American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 
U.S. 167, 177-78 (1990) (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (making the statement quoted in Ashland Oil, and adding that ". . 
. we have consistently required that state courts adhere to our retroactivity decisions," without trying to identify the 
source of the Court's purported power to impose this requirement on state appellate courts).
302Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 95 (1993) (citations omitted).  See also Powell 
v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 84 (1994) (explaining Griffith in terms of "the nature of judicial review");  Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288, 304 (1989) (explaining Griffith in terms of "basic norms of constitutional adjudication").  Harper was 
a civil case, but the opinion of the Court is an example of opinions in several civil and criminal cases in which the 
Court has drawn on principles discussed in one category of cases when considering retroactivity in the other 
category, and thus has explained criminal retroactivity in civil cases and vice versa.  See, e.g., James B. Beam 
Distilling Company v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 540 (1991) (reasoning in a civil case that "Griffith cannot be confined 
to the criminal law"); Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 642 (1984) (relying, in a case reviewing a state criminal 
conviction on federal habeas, on a statement in the civil case of Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining 
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courts have no authority to engage in the practice."303  Indeed, the Court in Griffith itself cited 
Article III as a predicate for basing its holding on "basic norms of constitutional adjudication" 
and "the nature of judicial review."304
How cogent are these reasons for imposing the Griffith rule on state appellate courts?  As 
for the Court's references to "treating similarly situated [parties] the same," neither the Court nor 
any single justice has stated that the Griffith requirement of retroactivity is a command of the 
Equal Protection Clause, which of course does in other contexts limit various actions by state 
courts and other state actors.  Seldom has such a claim been made even in the opinions of lower 
federal courts305 or of state courts,306 or in the writings of commentators.307  Even if some lower 
Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932), that ". . . retroactive application is not compelled, constitutionally or otherwise"). 
303Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 106 (1993) (concurring opinion of Scalia, J.); 
see James B. Beam Distilling Company v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 547 (1991) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment 
and joined by Marshall and Scalia, JJ.) (citing Article III and relying on "basic norms of constitutional adjudication" 
and "[t]he nature of judicial review"); id. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment and joined by Marshall and 
Blackmun, JJ.) (writing that the reference in Article III to "[t]he judicial Power of the United States" conferred on 
federal courts "must be deemed to be the judicial power as understood by our common-law tradition").
304Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1987).
305A March 10, 2004, Westlaw search of the Allcases and Journals and Law Reviews databases for 
documents containing both the word "Griffith" six words or less before the word "Kentucky," and the word 
"Griffith" in the same paragraph as the phrase "Equal Protection," yielded 116 federal and state cases and 21 
documents published in legal journals.  Among those 137 documents, every one relevant to the possibility that 
Griffith is based on the Equal Protection Clause is described in this footnote and the two immediately following it.
There are three relevant decisions of lower federal courts.  First, two judges of a three-judge panel in Myers 
v. Ylst, 897 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1990), reversed the denial of habeas relief to a state prisoner on the ground that the 
state supreme court had violated the Equal Protection Clause by denying him the retroactive benefit of a new rule of 
state law while granting such benefit to another prisoner, though the cases of both were pending on direct review 
when the new rule was announced, and cited Griffith while writing that it did not reach "the issue of whether Griffith
applies to state court decisions promulgating new rules . . . ."  Id. at 424.  This holding and its explanation by the 
Ninth Circuit do not comprise an assertion that the Griffith holding itself is required by the Equal Protection Clause, 
but instead are based on unequal treatment of two prisoners both of whose cases were pending on direct review.
Second, a grant of habeas relief on Equal Protection grounds with a citation of Griffith, by two judges of a 
three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit in Williams v. Armontrout, 891 F.2d 656, 658-59 & n.1 (1989), vacated on 
other grounds, 912 F.2d 924 (1990) (en banc), provides an even weaker indication that Griffith is an Equal 
Protection mandate, since those judges relied not only on the state supreme court's "selective application" of its new 
state-law rule but also on the judges' conclusion that that court's "only purpose has been to affirm convictions."
Third, the only other relevant decision of a lower federal court is United States ex rel. Mahaffey v. Peters, 
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court or commentator had written a plausible argument that Griffith is an interpretation of the 
Equal Protection Clause, that would be a poor substitute for a similar opinion of the Supreme 
Court itself.  And if, as currently appears most likely, the Griffith holding is not mandated by 
Equal Protection, then presumably state appellate courts are free to decide by their own standards 
whether or not particular parties to litigation are similarly situated and, even if they are similarly 
situated, to treat them differently when the kind or degree of similarity is insufficient to require 
identical treatment, insofar as retroactivity is concerned.
Turning from the Court's invocations of the principle of equality, to the Court's and 
particular justices' references in these retroactivity cases to Article III, to the "judicial power" and 
978 F.Supp. 762 (N.D. Ill. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 162 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1998).  There the judge relied on 
Griffith in rejecting a state prisoner's claim on habeas that the state supreme court's failure to apply one of its 
decisions to him retroactively had violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 777 n.18.
306None of the five relevant state cases yielded by the search described in the immediately preceding 
footnote includes a holding or statement that Griffith is an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause, and some 
contain contrary holdings or statements.  See Smith v. State, 598 So.2d 1063, 1066 (Fla. 1992), receded from in
Wuornos v. State, 644 So.2d 1000, 1007 n.4 (Fla. 1994) (relying on Griffith to interpret state constitution's equal 
protection provisions to require retrospective application of new judicial rules to all non-final cases); Commonwealth 
v. Waters, 511 N.E.2d 356, 357 (Mass. 1987) (stating that ". . . Griffith . . . is not based on equal protection . . . 
grounds); State v. Burgess, 689 A.2d 730, 736 n.4 (N.J. App. Div. 1997) (stating that "[w]e . . . do not address the 
question of whether, to the extent Griffith rests upon an equal-protection foundation, the Griffith rule itself is one of 
constitutional magnitude requiring compliance by the states" with regard to new rules of state law); Burr v. Kulas, 
532 N.W.2d 388, 391-92 (N.D. 1995) (rejecting Equal Protection Clause challenge based in part on Griffith to 
prospective application of new rule of state civil law); State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137, 143 (Utah 1989) (rejecting 
Equal Protection claim based on Griffith).  All or most of the federal and state cases cited in this footnote and the 
immediately preceding one involved claims that Equal Protection was violated by failure retroactively to apply new 
rules of state rather than federal law, but this probably is insignificant, since of course the Equal Protection Clause 
limits the power of states to apply not only federal but also state law unequally.
307Only two published commentaries found by the search described in the footnote before last shed any 
light on whether Griffith is an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.  See Robert A. Destro, The Structure of 
the Religious Liberty Guarantee, 11 J.L. & RELIGION 355, 380 n.103 (1994-95) (citing Griffith and stating that the 
view of the justices who announced the judgment of the Court in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 
529 (1991), "has strong Article III, Supremacy Clause, Due Process and Equal Protection components"); Norman 
Cole Williams & Katherine M. Zehmisch, Note, Section 27A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:  Did Congress 
Grant Itself New Constitutional Powers?, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 607, 623 (1993) (stating that ". . . the 
Court's decision in Beam was . . . based on the Constitution" and that ". . . Justice Souter's . . . reliance on the 
principle of 'equality' . . . suggested a constitutional analysis based on the Equal Protection Clause," and then 
mentioning the heavy reliance on Griffith in Justice Souter's opinion for the Court in Beam).
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"the nature of judicial review," and to the distinction between judicial and legislative 
prerogatives, such phrases are understandable when the powers and functions of federal courts 
are under discussion.  The first three articles of the United States Constitution separate the 
powers of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the federal government.  Article III 
begins with the phrase "the judicial Power," and its use of that phrase seems to require courts to 
consider its meaning.  Such deliberations might well produce conclusions about the extent and 
limits of the federal judicial power, and perhaps those conclusions might include matters of 
retroactivity of judicial rulings.
However, that phrase in Article III in context clearly refers only to the federal  judicial 
power.308  For the sake of discussion, let us suppose that implicitly, among the various 
components of the federal judicial power, that phrase grants to the United States Supreme Court 
the power to bind all the lower federal courts by this rule:  Federal district courts' rulings that 
were correct when made will be deemed on direct review to have been incorrect because of the 
Supreme Court's intervening changes in the relevant law.  It does not follow from that 
proposition that state appellate courts, when hearing appeals that the Constitution does not 
require to be heard at all, likewise must treat as erroneous rulings that were correct when state 
trial courts made them, simply because after the rulings the relevant federal constitutional law 
changed.
On its face, the Constitution does not speak to the nature of the judicial power of state 
courts in general, much less to the more specific subject of the extent and limits of the powers of 
state appellate courts that the Constitution does not even require states to create.  Whatever the 
308See supra note 285.
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Constitution may or may not say implicitly about the extent and limits of the "judicial power" of 
state trial courts, it is a remarkable stretch to read it as speaking to the nature of the judicial 
power of state appellate courts.  If the United States Supreme Court disagrees -- if it really 
construes "the judicial Power" conferred on it by Article III as including a power to require state 
appellate courts to review state trial courts' rulings that way -- then the Court owes us a much 
better explanation of why state appellate courts, which states are free to abolish, must while they 
do exist deem erroneous state trial court rulings that were correct when made.
The Court's sketchy and implausible explanations in Griffith and in the later cases on 
retroactivity, as to why that precedent binds state appellate courts, is slightly preferable to the 
Court's utter silence in Chapman and later harmlessness cases as to why Chapman binds state 
appellate courts, but still the Court has clearly failed to provide a specific and thorough 
justification for this aspect of the Griffith doctrine.  The manner in which the Court has led state 
courts and commentators alike to accept the proposition that state courts must apply the Court's 
Griffith doctrine on retroactive application of new federal constitutional rules appears, here as 
previously with Chapman, remarkably stealthy and probably unsound.
To summarize my criticism of application of Griffith to state appellate courts, the Court's 
stated reasons for the Griffith rule have included citation of only one federal constitutional 
provision, Article III, which does not apply to state courts, plus citations of many of the Court's 
own precedents on retroactivity, which the Court and commentators have admitted have been 
confused, conflicting, and sometimes overruled.309  The Court's other stated reasons for the 
309See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 95 (1993) (overruling Chevron Oil 
Co. v. Huson, 404U.S.  97 ( 1971); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 250, at 1736 (stating that "[e]specially in the area 
of criminal law and procedure, the recurrent effort to identify 'new' law with that which is made, not found, leads to 
unhelpful debates and conceptual confusions"); id. at 1744 (stating that ". . . the views of the judicial role implicit in 
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Griffith rule have been mere policies, principles, and equities.  People often can reasonably 
disagree about the kinds of policies, principles, and equities the Court has discussed in its 
retroactivity cases, as is illustrated not only by disagreements over them among individual 
members of the Court, but also by changing conclusions about them reached over relatively short 
periods of time by the Court's majorities.
Since reasonable disagreements over these particular policies, principles, and equities are 
so clearly possible, the Court probably should not have imposed its current views of them upon 
state appellate courts.  At the very least, it should not have done so without providing a specific 
identification of the constitutional provision authorizing the Court so to regulate state appellate 
procedure, and without a thorough explanation of why that constitutional provision contains this 
particular rule of appellate retroactivity when neither it nor any other constitutional provision 
contains a requirement that states provide appellate review at all.  The Court owes us much more 
than it provided in the Griffith line of cases, just as in the Chapman line of cases.
Now that this Article has reviewed Professor Meltzer's critique of the possible bases of 
the Court's power to impose the Chapman harmlessness test on state courts, and has provided an 
original critique of the possible bases of the Court's power to require state appellate courts to 
follow the Griffith rule of retroactivity, it seems warranted to make another point supporting a 
suspicion that the Court lacks the authority it has been exercising to regulate state criminal 
appeals.
Failure to explain significant conduct often results from the lack of a good explanation.  
Every parent, spouse and employer knows this, since in those relationships, as in the relationship 
recent opinions [on retroactivity] are mixed and sometimes conflicting . . .").
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the Court is obliged to maintain with the legal community, explanations are ordinarily expected 
and provided.  The Court's complete failure to explain its supposed constitutional power to 
govern state criminal appeals in the Chapman and Ornelas contexts, and its transparently 
inadequate explanations in the Griffith context, all occurring consistently over a period of almost 
forty years, are added reasons to doubt that the Constitution authorizes the Court's regulations of 
state criminal appeals.
3. Due Process Argument for De Novo Review 
If the Court were now to give us belated but specific and thorough explanations of its 
already asserted power to require state appellate courts to follow Chapman and Griffith, and 
perhaps also to tell us that the newer Ornelas line of cases binds state courts, how might it 
explain?  There seem to be three possibilities.
First and most likely, the Court might explain that all these doctrines regulating state 
appellate practice are interpretations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Second, the Court might try to base particular holdings in some of these cases on specific 
provisions of the Bill of Rights, claiming for example that the Fourth Amendment dictates the 
Ornelas rule of de novo review, the Eighth Amendment Bajakajian's similar rule, and so on.  
Third, the Court might assert that the Constitution gives it power to create sub-constitutional 
rules of procedural and remedial law that bear certain relationships to the actual content of the 
Constitution, and that these doctrines are manifestations of that power.
The first of these three, the due process possibility, seems worth discussing in this Article 
at some length.  At the opposite extreme from the Supreme Court's stealthy methods in the 
Chapman and Griffith lines of cases, where it created new doctrines and for years left state courts 
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merely to assume themselves bound to apply those doctrines, the Court often has overtly 
exercised enormous power by expressly imposing constitutional duties on state courts.  Its 
broadest rationale for creating such explicit procedural obligations in state criminal cases, 
whether in the contexts of pretrial, trial, sentencing, appellate, or post-conviction procedure, has 
been that a state choosing to use (or constitutionally compelled to use) a given process must do 
so in a manner consistent with the federal constitutional guarantee of due process.  In this manner 
the Court has created literally dozens of due-process protections of suspects, defendants, and 
convicts going beyond the specific rights enumerated in the Constitution's Bill of Rights, some 
appended to proceedings states constitutionally must provide in criminal cases such as trials, but 
others appended to procedures states constitutionally could withhold entirely.310  Since such 
precedents exist, it seems quite possible that the Court would explain its various regulations of 
state criminal appeals as interpretations of the Due Process Clause.
The second possibility, a claim by the Court that its various regulations of state appellate 
practice are based on the particular Bill of Rights provisions affected by these regulations, seems 
unlikely.  It is true, of course, that the Court has explicitly created various constitutional doctrines 
as purported aspects of particular provisions of the Bill of Rights.  For example, in Ashe v.
Swenson311 the Court reversed a state conviction by expressly adding collateral estoppel to the set 
of rights deemed contained in the Double Jeopardy Clause, writing that collateral estoppel "is 
embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy."312  It seems conceivable, 
310See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 15, § 2.7(a), at 77-80 (listing dozens of such due-process rights).
311397 U.S. 436 (1970).
312Id. at 445.  The Court's explanation of this conclusion was cursory at best, but at least the Court 
explicitly placed a state-court defendant's right to the benefit of collateral estoppel within the Fifth Amendment 
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therefore, that the Court might find it implicit in each of several constitutional provisions that 
decisions about its application must be reviewed de novo on appeal.  However, the Court has 
already applied all three of its regulations of state appellate practice -- on retroactivity of new 
rules, on harmlessness of error, and on de novo review -- to various issues arising under several 
particular provisions of the Bill of Rights as well as under general due process principles.313  It 
therefore seems that the Court would be hard-pressed to convince readers that each of those 
particular provisions implicitly requires, as to each of various issues arising under that provision, 
that appeals must be conducted in the ways the Court has specified.
That leaves the third conceivable basis for Supreme Court authority to impose procedural 
and remedial requirements on state criminal appeals.  Some commentators have argued that the 
Court can regulate criminal procedure in state courts under a power to create sub-constitutional 
law designed to prevent or remedy constitutional violations.  Such arguments have been made by
certain brilliant scholars and endorsed by others, perhaps most notably in the case of Professor 
Monaghan's theory of "constitutional common law."314
However, the Court has never expressly accepted such an argument, even when it was 
exercising great yet long-unexplained power and therefore was under considerable pressure to do 
Double Jeopardy Clause, as deemed applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.  See id. at 445-46 & n.10.
313See, e.g., Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79 (1994)  (applying Griffith test to retroactivity of Fourth 
Amendment rule for prompt determination of probable cause to detain defendant); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 
279 (1991) (applying Chapman test to harmlessness of admission of coerced confession in evidence in violation of 
privilege against self-incrimination); Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988) (applying Chapman test to 
harmlessness of violation of right to confrontation).  See also supra text Parts III.A-D.  See generally LAFAVE, supra
note 15, at 1284-86 (listing with citations many issues to which the Court has applied its Chapman test of 
harmlessness, and many others to which it has applied its doctrine that some kinds of errors cannot be harmless).
314See Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword:  Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).  This 
very thoughtful article has been extremely influential in the legal academy.  See, e.g., Meltzer, supra note 267, at 26 
(writing that constitutional common law is "the only plausible" basis of Chapman v. California).
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so.315  As a clear and quite recent example, the need arose in Dickerson v. United States316 for the 
Court to explain why Congress (or, hypothetically, a state legislature) could not by statute 
overrule requirements that the Court first had created and applied in Miranda v. Arizona317 and 
later had denied were personal constitutional rights.318 Even when pressed sharply in 
Dickerson,319 the Court rested its decision not on a claim of power to make "constitutional 
common law" or something like it, but on vague and conclusory assertions that Miranda was "a 
constitutional decision of this Court"320 and established "a constitutional rule."321  The Court's 
failure for decades to use the life lines scholars have offered on this conceivable aspect of its 
powers makes its resort to such a theory seem unlikely to occur in the context under discussion in 
this Article.
To summarize, the Court has never adopted commentators' theories along the lines of 
"constitutional common law," and the Court has applied to too many rights arising under too 
many constitutional provisions all three of the doctrines regulating state appellate practice that 
315My March 29, 2004, search of Westlaw's SCT database with the terms-and-connectors search 
"constitutional common law" produced six Supreme Court cases, in none of which the Court cited Professor 
Monaghan's article and endorsed his theory for a power of the Court to create rules supplementing constitutional 
interpretation.
316530 U.S. 428 (2000).
317384 U.S. 436 (1966).
318See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (stating that the Miranda rights are "not 
themselves rights protected by the Constitution").
319530 U.S. at 444  (Scalia, J., dissenting).
320530 U.S. at 432.
321Id. at 437.  See generally Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe 
Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,  99 MICH. L. REV. 1030, 1032 (1999) 
(referring to "Chief Justice Rehnquist's embarrassing failure in Dickerson v. United States to acknowledge, much less 
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are discussed in this Article.  Consequently, a unitary theory of due process seems the most 
plausible basis for applying to the states the Court's retroactivity, harmlessness, and de novo 
review doctrines concerning appellate review, and I therefore shall address at some length only 
that arguable basis for these requirements.
The Court's methods for identifying the demands of due process give it extremely wide 
latitude to reach unpredictable and debatable conclusions on a wide variety of matters.  True, the 
Court has written that "[b]eyond the specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due 
Process Clause has limited operation,"322 and that "expansion of those constitutional guarantees 
[found in the Bill of Rights] under the open-ended rubric of the Due Process Clause invites 
undue interference with both considered legislative judgments and the careful balance that the 
constitution strikes between liberty and order."323  However, as Professor LaFave has observed, 
these pious disclaimers have not prevented the Court from "imposing due process requirements 
invalidating practices that had been followed for many years in many states."324
The Court's due-process standards lend themselves to such decisions.  For example, in 
criminal cases the Court often has written that procedural due process demands those processes 
that meet a general standard of "fundamental fairness."325  Elaborating this standard in almost 
equally general words, the Court has written that the due-process question is whether a particular 
resolve, the Miranda conundrum").
322Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990).
323Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992).
324LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 15,§ 2.7(b), at 86.
325See, e.g., Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 362 (1996); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448 
(1992).
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procedure being used in criminal cases "offends some principle of justice so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."326  Yet another very 
general phrase the Court treats as instructive in this regard is that a challenged criminal procedure 
must not offend one of those "fundamental conceptions of justice . . . which define the 
community's sense of fair play and decency."327
When applying these extremely general standards to decide one or another particular 
issue of criminal procedure, the Court sometimes even relies on its interpretations not only of the 
constitutional text and historical practice but also of modern views regarding the issue.328  In 
addition, there is wide recognition that often individual justices' decisions on how to apply the 
general standards of due process in resolving specific issues are, in the words of Professor 
LaFave, "influenced by the personal perspectives of the members of the Court,"329 and by their 
"personal values and . . . subjective judgments."330  The combination of such general, 
incommensurable and competing legal standards and factors, along with the subjective influences 
on justices' votes, has led the Court on some occasions to reach conclusions concerning 
procedural due process in criminal cases that have deeply divided the Court and provoked 
326See, e.g., Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 367 (1996); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446 
(1992).
327See, e.g., Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 353 (1990); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 
790 (1977).
328See, e.g., Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 356, 360, 362 (1996) (relying on "modern practice," 
"contemporary practice," and "contemporary procedures" as reasons to create new due process requirement); Medina 
v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 447 (1992) (considering "contemporary practice" in rejecting due process argument).




Among the decisions the Court has made in this manner, probably the one most relevant 
to the possibility that due process is the basis for Chapman and Griffith, and that it also requires 
de novo appellate review of decisions of mixed questions of federal constitutional law and fact, is 
the Court's ruling that the Due Process Clause guarantees defendant-appellants the assistance of 
counsel in a first appeal of right that a state chooses to permit.  However, this precedent is not 
very instructive, except in the sense that it instructs us that the Court has given itself enormous 
latitude to resolve such matters in almost any manner it chooses.
The Court created this right in Douglas v. California332 as an Equal Protection Clause 
right of indigents to have free counsel appointed for them.  In Douglas, the Court did not even 
mention due process as a basis of the decision, and cited "fair procedure" only with regard to the 
perceived unfairness of unequal economic resources.333  More than a decade later the Court 
admitted that the "precise rationale" for Douglas and related cases had "never been explicitly 
stated," attributed these decisions to the Due Process Clause as well as equal protection,334 and 
enlarged the right to cover retained as well as appointed counsel.335  In applying the general 
standards of due process in these cases, the Court relied on such varied, policy-based factors as 
331See, e.g., Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (rejecting claim that police failure to preserve 
evidence violated due process, over vigorous dissent of three justices).  "Due process doctrine subsists in confusion."  
Fallon, supra note 225, at 309.
332372 U.S. 353 (1963).
333Id. at 357.
334Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1974).
335See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
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economic and administrative costs, along with the benefit of an appellate lawyer in a proceeding 
that otherwise might be a "meaningless ritual."336  The latter factor has the ring of the ultimate 
due-process test of "fundamental fairness."  However, as Professor LaFave and his co-authors 
have explained, the Court treated its concern about a "meaningless ritual" first as an aspect of the 
equal-protection analysis and only later of the due-process analysis,337 and ultimately the 
interaction the Court saw between the two constitutional clauses has been "left unclear."338  Thus 
the cases establishing the due-process right to counsel on a first appeal of right provide a slim 
basis to predict what else the Court might require of state criminal appeals under the Due Process 
Clause.339
The Court has not yet disclosed how, if at all, its extremely malleable due-process 
rationale may apply to the specific issue of standards of appellate review of decisions of mixed 
questions of federal constitutional law and fact.  The Court's pre-Ornelas precedents concerning 
such standards of review seem to convey conflicting messages.  On many occasions and in a 
336See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 15, § 11.1(b), at 558-59.
337Id. at 566.
338Id. at 565.
339In regulating review of criminal proceedings, the Court has even gone beyond procedural and remedial 
requirements such as the provision of counsel, the use of a specified test of harmlessness of error, or the refusal to 
consider the possibility that some kinds of error are harmless in particular cases.  For example, in a series of cases 
beginning with Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974),  the Court has placed quite substantive federal 
constitutional limits on the power of a state to treat an admittedly lawful guilty plea as creating a forfeiture of the 
right to raise certain issues on appeal or collateral attack.  See, e.g., Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (per 
curiam)  (holding that defendant's right to litigate double jeopardy claim survived valid guilty plea, despite contrary 
state law).  See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 15, § 21.6(a), at 1014-16.  The Court has done so despite the 
state's apparent lack of an obligation either to permit guilty pleas at all, or to create vehicles for direct or collateral 
review.  See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 584  (1968) (quoting with approval the statement "that a 
criminal defendant has [no] absolute right to have his guilty plea accepted by the court" made in Lynch v. 
Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962)).  But see Barry J. Fisher, Judicial Suicide or Constitutional Autonomy?  A 
Capital Defendant's Right to Plead Guilty, 65 Alb. L. Rev. 181 (2001) (arguing that capital defendants have a due 
process right to plead guilty).
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variety of contexts, the Court has conducted de novo review itself of such decisions, or has held 
that lower courts must do so, without expressly holding that this requirement governs review not 
only by federal courts but also by state courts, and without attempting to explain its possible 
authority to impose this requirement on state reviewing courts.  The Court has treated in this 
fashion, for example, review of decisions as to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
voluntariness of confessions340 and the Sixth Amendment effectiveness of counsel341 and 
effectiveness of waiver of counsel.342
On the other hand, the Court has not uniformly prescribed or applied de novo appellate 
review of decisions of mixed questions of federal constitutional law and fact.  Instead, sometimes 
the Court has shown deference to decisions of such questions by trial courts, or has respected 
rulings in which lower appellate courts did so.343  For example, in Minnesota v. Olson344 the 
Court upheld a state court's application to the facts of the case of "essentially the correct 
standard" for a Fourth Amendment exigency, and wrote that the Supreme Court did "not disturb 
the state court's judgment that these facts do not add up to exigent circumstances" excusing the 
340See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115-17 (1985).  This case was decided in the context of habeas 
review of a state conviction, and in that context Miller v. Fenton is no longer good law after enactment of the 
AEDPA.  See infra Part VI.  However, federal and state appellate courts continue to review decisions of this mixed 
question de novo on direct review.  See, e.g., United States v. Bautista, No. 02-50664, 2004 WL 595351, at *4 (9th 
Cir. March 26, 2004); State v. Ramsey, No. 2002-577-CA, 2002 WL 602708, at *3 (R.I. 2004).
341See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698-99 (1984).
342See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 397 n.4 (1977).  Like Miller v. Fenton, see supra note 340, this 
case has been superseded in the habeas context by the AEDPA.  However, federal and state appellate courts continue 
to review decisions of this mixed question de novo on direct review.  See, e.g., United States v. Hazelwood, 40 Fed. 
Appx. 347, 349 (9th Cir. 2002); State v. Coleman, 69 P.3d 1097, 1098, 1103 (Kan. 2003).
343
"Some ultimate facts that have a constitutional nexus and that in theory could be regarded as 
constitutional facts are not so classified, apparently because the Supreme Court does not feel that free review of these 
facts is essential."  Louis, supra note 18, at 1036.
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lack of a warrant.345  The concurring opinion in Olson interpreted the Court's opinion as showing 
deference to the lower court's decision of this mixed question,346 and other courts have similarly 
interpreted it in subsequent cases.347
Similarly, the Supreme Court in both Illinois v. Somerville348 and Arizona v. 
Washington349 prescribed and applied a deferential standard for reviewing state trial courts' 
decisions that manifest necessity existed for declaration of mistrials.  Whether manifest necessity 
exists or not is in effect a mixed question of federal constitutional law, since the Court has held 
that use of this standard by state courts is dictated by the Double Jeopardy Clause, and both 
Somerville and Washington presented the Court with Double Jeopardy claims.
Ohio v. Robinette350 may be another example of Supreme Court approval of deference to 
trial courts' decisions of mixed questions of federal constitutional law and fact.  On direct review 
344495 U.S. 91 (1990).
345Id. at 100-10.
346Id. at 102 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
347See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 769 (2d Cir. 1990) (en banc) (describing Olson
decision as "showing deference to the state court's 'fact-specific' finding of exigent circumstances, and therefore 
applying "clearly erroneous" standard in affirming trial court's finding of exigency).
348410 U.S. 458, 459 (1973) (holding that there was no double jeopardy because the trial court "could 
reasonably have concluded" that declaration of a mistrial served the ends of public justice).
349434 U.S. 497, 510-11 (1978) (holding that trial court's decision concerning mistrial "is entitled to special 
respect" when prompted by a defense lawyers's "improper and prejudicial remarks," and according "the highest 
degree of respect to the trial judge's evaluation of the likelihood that the impartiality of one or more jurors may have 
been affected by the improper comment") .  Though the Court decided both Somerville and Washington on review of 
decisions of federal habeas courts rather than on direct review of decisions of state courts, that is not significant for 
present purposes, since the Court decided these cases during the period of time before the federal habeas statute was 
amended to require deference to state courts' decisions of mixed questions of federal constitutional law and fact.  See 
infra text accompanying note 397.
350519 U.S. 33 (1996).
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the Court reversed a state appellate court's judgment, on the ground that the court had used a 
bright-line rule instead of considering all the circumstances to determine the Fourth Amendment 
voluntariness of a consent to a search.  The Court quoted its previous statement in Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte351 that "[v]oluntariness is a question of fact,"352 and remanded for further 
proceedings in which presumably the state courts would reconsider the issue of voluntariness in 
light of that quotation.  Interpreting this language, the Fifth Circuit later wrote that "[t]he 
Supreme Court reiterated its deferential standard of review for Fourth Amendment voluntariness 
determinations in Ohio v. Robinette, a post-Ornelas decision."353  Relying on that interpretation 
of Robinette, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a judgment of criminal conviction on the ground that the 
federal trial court had not clearly erred in concluding that the defendant's consent to a search was 
voluntary.354
How can one reconcile these various Supreme Court precedents, some permitting or even 
showing deference to decisions of certain mixed questions of federal constitutional law and fact, 
and others demanding de novo review of decisions of certain other mixed questions? 
With broad and flexible tests for creating and reinterpreting due process requirements, 
with the checkered history of the Court's sometimes creating such rules and sometimes declining 
to do so, and specifically with the Court's practice of approving de novo review of decisions of 
some mixed constitutional questions and deferential review of decisions of others, the Court 
351412 U.S. 218 (1973).
352Id. at 248-49.
353United States v. Tompkins, 130 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 1997).
354Id. at 122-23.
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seems to have given itself latitude to do in the name of due process almost whatever it may 
please on almost any aspect of criminal procedure, particularly including standards of appellate 
review.  It therefore is very difficult if not impossible to determine whether or not the Court 
already views its recent decisions about standards of appellate review of decisions of mixed 
questions as components of due process, or may come to call them such if and when it explicitly 
addresses the issue.  One way the Court might take such a step is to repudiate its long history of 
rejecting any federal constitutional right to criminal appeals, but that option too seems virtually 
impossible to evaluate while the Court subscribes to its vague definition of due process.
B. Federal Mixed Questions To Be Reviewed De Novo 
1. Clues in the Recent Supreme Court Decisions 
Now we turn from the question of the legal source of the recently announced requirement 
of de novo review, to the question of its scope.  The opinions in the four recent Supreme Court 
cases contain language one could use in arguing that the requirement of de novo appellate review 
is applicable to a wide range of mixed questions of federal constitutional law and fact that arise 
in criminal cases.  For example in Ornelas, chronologically the first of the four cases, though the 
Court's opinion at some points identified the holding of the case with specific references to "the 
ultimate questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause to make a warrantless search,"355
at other points the Court used language susceptible of broader application.  As I wrote above,356
the Court described those mixed questions as "nontechnical" and "practical" conceptions that
"take their substantive content from the particular contexts in which the standards are being 
355See, e.g., 517 U.S. at 691.
356See supra notes 76, 77.
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assessed," that are applicable by ordinary persons, not only by "legal technicians," and that are 
"not reducible to legal rules."  The Court contrasted such mixed questions with standards of 
judicial persuasion, which the Court called "finely-tuned" and seemed to consider more technical 
and less dependent for their meanings on the contexts of their application.  Each of these two 
vaguely defined categories of mixed questions, the former category to be reviewed de novo and 
the latter apparently to be reviewed with deference, seems to have a potentially broad application 
to numerous mixed questions of constitutional law and fact.
As we saw above,357 the Court's discussion of the standard of appellate review in the next 
of these four decisions to be handed down, Bajakajian, was concise to a fault.  All the Court did 
was to identify Eighth Amendment excessiveness of a fine as a mixed question, to cite Ornelas, 
and to write that "in this context de novo review of that question is appropriate."358  It may seem 
difficult to ascribe much significance to this cursory language, particularly in view of the Court's 
failure to specify what about the context of the case made de novo review more appropriate than 
the abuse-of-discretion alternative urged by the defendant.
However, the very fact that the Court saw no need for detailed explanation, when 
extending the specific holding of Ornelas not to yet a third Fourth-Amendment mixed question 
but to a question arising under another amendment entirely, is an indication that at least the five 
justices in the Bajakajian majority view the new prescription of de novo review as having 
obviously very broad application.  This inference is especially strong, since these justices 
extended the Ornelas rule to a mixed question that is always initially decided not in the field by 
357See supra Part III.B.
358524 U.S. at 336 n.10.
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an ordinary person like a policeman (as are the Ornelas questions), but in a courtroom by a legal 
technician in a black robe (as are the applications of burdens of persuasion that the Ornelas court 
had contrasted with the Ornelas questions).
On the other hand, other language in the Court's and various justices' recent opinions 
concerning de novo review would be useful in arguing that such review is not required for a 
number of mixed questions of federal constitutional law and fact that arise in criminal cases.  For 
example, the Court's rationale in Ornelas included the two Fourth-Amendment-specific reasons 
for de novo review that were described above:359  first, a prediction that de novo review will 
produce clearer and more specific development of legal guidance to law enforcement officers 
about the constitutional limits on their powers to infringe persons' liberty and property interests; 
and second, a desire to increase deterrence of violations of those limits by creating a sharp 
contrast between reviewing courts' deference to conclusions of magistrates issuing warrants, on 
the one hand, and lack of deference to trial courts' conclusions concerning the lawfulness of 
warrantless police activities.
The latter of these reasons has no application to constitutional provisions other than the 
Fourth Amendment, or even to Fourth-Amendment doctrines concerning police conduct for 
which obtaining a warrant is seldom or never a realistic possibility, such as the doctrine 
permitting police to seize unexpected but sufficiently incriminating items they plainly perceive 
while engaging in lawful activities.360  Similarly, the former of these two reasons has little if any 
application to constitutional doctrines that govern conduct of legally trained state actors 
359See supra text accompanying notes 65, 66, 67, 68, 69.
360See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
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performing duties not in the field but in more fully transparent and regulated situations, such as 
the Equal-Protection doctrine forbidding attorneys for both sides of criminal cases to exercise 
peremptory challenges of trial jurors on racial and certain other proscribed grounds.361
Above I sufficiently quoted and summarized the relevant language in each opinion in the 
fragmented decision of Lilly  that bears on the breadth of applicability of the prescription of de 
novo review.362  It is not necessary to repeat those details here, especially since none of that 
language was joined by more than four justices.  It is sufficient here to summarize all that the 
justices have told us in the three cases of Ornelas, Bajakajian and Lilly -- the Arvizu opinion 
added nothing significant to the rationale -- about the scope of applicability of the new 
requirement of de novo review.
When majorities of the Court have provided clues concerning this, there has been conflict 
or at least tension among the clues.  When dissenters have objected to requiring de novo review 
of decisions of certain mixed questions, both the majorities and the dissenters have been able to 
advance plausible reasons, all of indeterminate breadth, for their respective views.  And the last 
time various justices addressed the scope of application of the new requirement, in Lilly, no five 
could agree even on a single standard, much less on reasons for its selection.  Consequently, 
readers of these four cases cannot predict more confidently the Court's eventual decision of how 
broadly de novo review of decisions of mixed questions of constitutional law and fact will be 
required, than they can predict exactly to what legal source the Court will ascribe the doctrine 
and how the Court will try to convince us that the source is genuine.  Indeed, prediction of the 
361See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
362See supra Part III.C.
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doctrine's scope will be virtual guesswork unless and until the Court identifies and explains the 
doctrine's legal source.
2. Enormous Potential Scope of Application 
When evaluating the arguments just above as to the scope of the mandate for de novo 
review, one should remember that mixed questions of federal constitutional law and fact 
commonly arising in criminal cases are extremely numerous and quite varied.  There literally are 
at least scores of them.  Indeed, above I cited state appellate cases considering de novo review of 
some twenty or thirty different mixed questions of federal constitutional law and fact.363
To give just a few additional examples, under the Fourth Amendment the following 
issues, among others, frequently arise:
Whether a defendant has made a sufficient preliminary showing that the affidavit on the 
basis of which a search warrant was issued contained a false statement, made by the affiant with 
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for its truth, to justify the hearing that Franks 
v. Delaware364 requires in such a case.365
Whether an investigation of premises occurred so promptly after a fire that no warrant for 
entry was needed.366
Whether the causal relationship between a Fourth Amendment violation and evidence 
offered at trial was sufficiently attenuated so that the evidence is not fruit of the poisonous 
363See supra Part IV.B.
364438U.S. 154 (1978).
365See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 167 F.3d 739, 747, 747 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999) (rejecting extension of 
Ornelas to this issue, and affirming judgment on ground that ruling was not clearly erroneous).
366See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984).
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tree.367
Likewise, the Fifth and Sixth Amendment law governing interrogations and other 
methods of obtaining evidence, introduction of evidence in criminal trials, and other aspects of 
criminal procedure commonly presents many additional issues, including the question whether a 
state actor "deliberately elicited" statements by an indicted defendant.368
Even under the Eighth Amendment numerous and varied additional issues arise, 
including whether bail in a particular case is excessive369 and whether the punishment imposed in 
a particular case is cruel and unusual.370
Besides the mixed questions arising under specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, many 
mixed questions arise under rules of "fundamental fairness" the Court has created pursuant to the 
general terms of the Due Process Clauses.  A single additional example of many such mixed 
questions is whether the circumstances of a pretrial identification of the defendant by a witness
created such a risk of misidentification that introduction of the evidence at trial violates due 
process.371
This small sampling of the very many mixed questions of federal constitutional law and 
fact commonly arising in state criminal cases should suffice to illustrate not only the enormous 
number of such questions, but also their varied natures, as well as the importance of the standard 
367See LAFAVE ET AL.,  supra note 15, § 9.3(c), at 503-04.
368See, e.g., United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
369See, e.g., State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573, 575 (Iowa 2003) (reviewing de novo excessiveness of bail).
370See, e.g., State v. Hurbenca, 669 N.W.2d 668, 674-75 (Neb. 2003) (independently reviewing claim that 
punishment was cruel and unusual).
371See,e.g., Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
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of review by which trial court's decisions of such questions will be reviewed.
3. Traditional Factors for Standards of Review 
When the Supreme Court, other courts, and commentators have considered choices of 
standards by which decisions of particular mixed questions would be reviewed, they have relied 
on a wide variety of factors, including those discussed above and the following.  Factors tending 
to support deferential review are listed first.  Neither list is exhaustive.
a. A perception that "[i]ntermediate appellate courts have no special 
competence over most mixed questions and would not necessarily decide them better than would 
trial level fact finders,"372 especially as to mixed questions decision of which "requires 
application of experience with human affairs."373
b. A perception that de novo review is "disruptive" and "time 
consuming"374 or expensive.375
c. A concern that de novo review "might attract additional or 
marginal appeals"376 or other requests for review.
d. A perception that de novo review "undermines the authority of trial 
372Louis, supra note 18, at 1013-14.
373HOUTS ET AL., supra note 16, § 6.04[3], p. 6-15.
374Louis, supra note 18, at 1032.
375Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 560 (1988) (stating that ". . . even where the district judge's full 
knowledge of the factual setting can be acquired by the appellate court, that acquisition will often come at unusual 
expense . . .").
376Louis, supra note 18, at 1014.
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judges."377
e. A perception that some mixed questions of procedural law and fact 
"are quite fact specific, dependent on a number of variables, or dependent on an intimate 'feel' for 
all the circumstances of the case that only a trial level fact finder has."378
f. A perception that "the fact specific opinions [rendered by courts 
conducting de novo review] would be readily distinguishable in subsequent cases"379 and thus 
would contribute little to the development of more specific or clearer law.380
Factors tending to support de novo review are listed next.
a. A perception that "[a]n appellate court is . . . likely to be more 
expert and reliable in matters of procedure than is a single trial judge . . . ,"381 especially as to 
mixed questions decision of which depends heavily on "legal principles and their underlying 
values."382
377Id. at 1015.
378Id. at 1041.  See also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (stating that sometimes the choice of a 
standard of review for decisions of a particular kind of mixed question "has turned on a determination that, as a 
matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in 
question").
379Louis, supra note18, at 1014.
380See, e.g., Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
635 at 662-63 (1971) (stating that a good reason for conferring discretion on trial judges and reviewing their 
decisions only for abuse of discretion is "the sheer impracticability of formulating a rule of decision for the matter in 
issue . . . at least, for the time being," until opinions explaining various results of deferential review "have allowed 
the formless problem to take shape, and the contours of a guiding principle to emerge").
381Louis, supra note 18, at 1040.
382HOUTS ET AL., supra note 16,§ 6.04[3], p. 6-15.
103
b. A "mistrust of local decision makers,"383 or a perception that "local 
trial judges are . . . often incompetent or untrustworthy."384
c. A perception that, since "trial judges sit alone, . . . [w]ithout voting 
colleagues to provide checks and balances, even the best trial judges will sometimes make 
aberrational decisions . . . ."385
d. An opinion that "[f]or . . . mixed questions . . . determinative of 
constitutional rights . . . even occasional wrong results are arguably unacceptable . . . ."386
e. An observation that de novo review "of questions arising out of 
police searches, seizures, and interrogations is designed to deter illegal police conduct."387
4. Relevant Variations Among Mixed Questions 
The numerous Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment and Due Process Clause 
questions of mixed law and fact mentioned above vary among themselves in ways that appear 
relevant at least to some of the factors traditionally influencing choices of standards of review, 
and at least to some of the factors the Supreme Court has mentioned in its recent decisions on de 
novo review.  For example, they vary in the degrees to which they (1) are sensitive to the detailed 
facts of particular cases and even to assessments of demeanor and of other factors in evaluation 
383Louis, supra note 18, at 1032.
384Id. at 1014.  See also id. at 1033 (referring to de novo review as "correcting for trial level bias, interest, 
or relative incompetence").
385Id. at 1014.
386Id. at 1027.  Cf. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 563 (1988) (stating that the kinds of decisions that 
ordinarily have substantial consequences might be expected to be reviewed more intensively than other kinds of 
decisons).
387Louis, supra note 18, at 1035.
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of witness credibility (a factor favoring appellate deference to trial judges), (2) often require very 
time-consuming consideration of voluminous and complex factual information about the 
particular case (a factor favoring appellate deference to trial judges), (3) depend upon judges' 
deep knowledge of legal principles and sensitivity to their underlying values (a factor 
discouraging such deference), (4) involve topics on which there are risks of state court or trial 
court bias or hostility to federal law or risks of other shortcomings of decision-makers (a factor 
discouraging deference), and (5) govern doctrines designed to create positive and negative 
incentives for particular conduct by law enforcement officer, prosecutors, judges, and others 
wielding governmental power (a factor perhaps discouraging deference).
When choices of standards of review are influenced by so many competing factors, and 
when quite various characteristics of particular mixed questions seem relevant to application of 
those factors, there often is ample room for reasonable differences of opinion concerning the 
most suitable standard of review for a particular mixed question.  For example, leading Fourth 
Amendment expert Professor Wayne LaFave wrote, concerning the standard of review of a 
decision whether police conduct constituted a seizure within the meaning of that amendment, that 
". . . compelling arguments have been put forward on both sides" of the choice between clearly-
erroneous and de novo review.388
To illustrate how such variations among the characteristics of particular mixed questions 
of federal constitutional law and fact could influence choices among standards of review for 
them, consider the last of these five examples of relevant factors, the one giving weight to likely 
incentives for desired conduct by police and other state actors.  Many of these mixed questions 
3885 LAFAVE, supra note 33, § 11.7.
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do indeed arise in proceedings in which constitutional rights are enforced by exclusion of 
evidence at trial or by other measures creating strong and systematic incentives, but not nearly all 
of them.  As a result, many such mixed questions are distinguishable from the two issues 
addressed in Ornelas, both of which implicate the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, when 
one is choosing a standard of appellate review.
The Court in Ornelas relied on the perceived incremental deterrence of warrantless 
investigative conduct thought to be provided by the contrast between, on the one hand, great 
deference to the probable cause conclusion of a magistrate issuing a warrant and, on the other 
hand, de novo review of the probable cause conclusion of a police officer acting in the field
without a warrant.  However, this part of the Ornelas rationale probably has less application to 
review of some of the mixed questions listed above, such as whether bail is excessive or 
punishment cruel and unusual, whether delay in indicting or trying the defendant has been 
excessive, whether retained counsel has given the defendant ineffective assistance, or whether the 
prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges of prospective jurors on impermissible grounds.
One obvious reply to this point is that the Court created the Ornelas requirement of de 
novo review for decisions not only about probable cause, which can justify either certain kinds of 
warrantless police conduct or, preferably, issuance of a warrant, but also about reasonable 
suspicion, questions concerning which are not presented to magistrates for prior evaluation and 
issuance of warrants but are made entirely by law enforcement officers in the field.  Moreover, 
the Court then extended that requirement in Bajakajian to the context of a ruling about the 
excessiveness of a fine under the Eighth Amendment, and a plurality further extended it in Lilly
to the Sixth Amendment question of admissibility of evidence at trial, despite the irrelevance of 
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incentives for seeking warrants in either of the latter two contexts.  This argument makes this 
factor in the analysis of the Ornelas Court appear less than decisive.
Even when one looks only at mixed questions on the determinations of which 
applications of exclusionary rules or other strong and systematic legal incentives for official 
conduct depend, it is not clear that the Court would extend the Ornelas rule to all of these 
contexts.  There are several exclusionary rules, not just one, and they have various contents and 
exceptions.389  Likewise other remedial law affecting incentives perceived by various kinds of 
state actors varies.390  A "one-size-fits-all" approach to standards of appellate review would be 
rather insensitive to these variations in the exclusionary rules and other remedies, and thus to the 
resulting variations in investigators', prosecutors', and judges' incentives, as well as to variations 
in the more substantive rules of criminal procedure enforced by the exclusionary rules.
5. Conclusion on Federal Questions Reviewed De Novo 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in the four cases that began with Ornelas made no 
attempt to discuss the matters raised in the preceding paragraphs of this Article.  When one 
reviews the above analysis, one is left with great uncertainty about whether this doctrine will be 
extended to other federal constitutional issues in the area of criminal law and procedure and, if 
so, to which issues and according to what test for determining the doctrine's scope.  Again, 
knowing what constitutional provision requires de novo review and why would be, to understate
389See, e.g., Robert A. Harvie, The Exclusionary Rule and the Good Faith Doctrine in the United States 
and Canada: A Comparison, 14 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 779, 784 n.24 (1992) (stating that ". . . in the United 
States the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments have different exclusionary rules that reflect and 
protect the different values underlying each amendment").
390Examples are variations among standards for civil actions against municipalities for damages resulting 
from police conduct, and standards for disciplinary proceedings against prosecutors and judges.
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the point, extremely helpful in determining the scope of the requirement.
C. De Novo Review for State-Law Mixed Questions 
Of course, none of the Supreme Court's recent decisions expanding federal courts' use of 
de novo review in criminal cases have involved federal judicial review of decisions of mixed 
questions of state law and fact.  If states were free to choose standards of review for all kinds of 
state and federal mixed questions, one would expect them ordinarily to choose the same 
standards for review of decisions of mixed questions of federal law and fact as of decisions of 
mixed questions of similar state law and fact, if only for the sake of simplicity and efficiency.
However, if it ever becomes clear that the United States Supreme Court has created new 
and broad mandates that state appellate courts use de novo review of decisions of some or all 
mixed questions of federal constitutional law and fact, then states will have newly important 
choices to make concerning review of decisions of mixed state-law questions, and probably will 
be constitutionally free to make them.  Just as state constitutional law can protect the interests of 
criminal suspects and defendants more than does federal constitutional law, states similarly are 
free to adopt rules for applying state constitutional law that are either more or less favorable to 
suspects and defendants than the analogous rules for applying federal constitutional law.  When 
particular state courts' or legislatures' own views concerning efficiency of judicial administration 
and other relevant factors lead them to confident conclusions about wise standards of review of 
decisions of certain mixed questions of state law and fact, they clearly can and arguably should 
implement their own conclusions, even if the resulting choices are different from the United 
States Supreme Court's choices of standards of review of decisions of similar mixed questions of 
federal constitutional law and fact.
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D. De Novo Review Favoring the Prosecution 
All of the Supreme Court's recent decisions expanding the use of de novo review have 
been cases in which such review would help the criminal defendant.  When the state takes a 
direct appeal in a criminal case, though, for example an interlocutory appeal of a pretrial order 
suppressing crucial evidence, de novo review would improve the state's chances of overturning 
the defendant's victory below.
If we eventually learn that states are free to choose their own standards for review of 
decisions of various mixed questions, then one would expect most states to make many such 
standards symmetrical.  Some of the policies tending to support de novo review of decisions of 
some mixed questions cut only one way, such as the Ornelas rationale that de novo review adds 
incentive for police to seek warrants.  However, most of the relevant factors cut both ways, and 
symmetry in giving appellants the same level of scrutiny regardless of which side of cases they 
represent seems presumptively fair because evenhanded.
Thus, most states probably would adopt this symmetrical approach for most mixed 
questions, whether they are left unencumbered by federal constitutional dictation of standards of 
review, or are required to employ de novo review on some federal questions.  In a sense this 
would benefit the state in some cases, to the crucial detriment of some defendants.  Again, 
though, state legislatures and courts would be wise to consider the alternatives, and make 
whatever choices are dictated by their own views of sound policies, within whatever latitude the 
Supreme Court has not abolished.
VI. Practical Significance of These Doctrinal Matters
States' efforts to control crime and defendants' efforts to avoid conviction and punishment 
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will be greatly affected by the resolutions of the issues discussed in this Article.  The main reason 
is that standards for state-court appellate review of decisions made by criminal trial courts 
determine the outcomes of many cases.  If federal constitutional law dictates de novo review of 
many such decisions, or if state courts conduct such review merely because they suspect that they 
are governed by such a federal requirement, then appellants (who predominantly are defendants) 
will prevail much more often.  If, instead, federal constitutional law leaves state appellate courts 
free to review all or many kinds of decisions of mixed questions in criminal cases with 
substantial deference to trial courts, and if states use that freedom to require or permit such 
appellate deference, then many more convictions and sentences will be affirmed.
There are two principal reasons for this.  First, the United States Supreme Court has only 
enough resources to review a very tiny fraction of all the criminal cases processed by state 
courts,391 even though very many of these cases involve issues of federal constitutional law.392
Second, other federal courts, which cannot directly review state convictions and sentences, but 
can in habeas proceedings review state courts' decisions of federal constitutional questions, are 
required to do the latter in ways that are much less favorable to criminal defendants, on all three 
of the points the Supreme Court addressed in Griffith, Chapman, and the Ornelas line of cases, 
391
"[F]or 1993, the available data suggest a nationwide criminal caseload of at least 12.5 million 
prosecutions, and probably exceeding 15 million prosecutions . . . .  [T]he states as a group . . . are responsible for 
97% of all felony prosecutions . . . .  When only felony convictions are considered, the federal portion rises [from 
3%] to 4% . . . ." 1 LAFAVE ET AL.., supra note 72, § 1.2(b) (footnotes omitted).  The Supreme Court's website 
displayed on March 3, 2004, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov /about/ justicecaseload.pdf, an excerpt from a 
booklet prepared by the Court and published with funding from the Supreme Court Historical Society, which 
included the statement that "[t]he Court's caseload has increased steadily to a current total of more than 7,000 cases 
on the docket per Term."
392
"In this century, the Court has greatly expanded the reach of the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth 
amendment and in the process has substantially increased the potential number of constitutional facts and cases 
raising constitutional fact issues on appeal."  Louis, supra note 18, at 1037.
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than if state courts reviewed those decisions de novo on direct appeals.
As I discussed above, the Supreme Court already has required state appellate courts to 
give defendant-appellants the benefit of Griffith's doctrine on new constitutional rules and of 
Chapman's harmless-error standard.  Petitioners for federal habeas relief, in contrast, lack both 
benefits.  If the Court is indeed now in the process of giving state-court defendant-appellants the 
additional benefit of de novo review, it will complete a sweep, requiring state appellate courts to 
treat defendant-appellants more favorably than federal habeas courts treat petitioners on all three 
of these crucial determinants of the success of a request for relief.
First, the constitutional doctrine applicable to a case is more likely to favor the defendant 
in a state appellate court than in a federal habeas court.  The reason is that, as I explained 
above,393 Griffith v. Kentucky requires defendants challenging their convictions or sentences on 
direct appeal in state courts to receive the benefit of new rules of federal constitutional law that 
favor them.  In contrast, the Supreme Court has held that, perhaps with narrow exceptions, state 
prisoners seeking habeas relief in federal courts do not receive that benefit.394  Although the 
Supreme Court in recent decades has created fewer new rules favoring defendants than it did in 
the heyday of the Warren Court, the Court does continue to generate new rules favoring 
defendants that are important enough so that direct appeal with the benefit of the Griffith rule 
393See supra Part V.A.2.b.
394See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion).  Though the general principle that habeas 
petitioners were denied the benefit of new constitutional rules began in this plurality opinion, the Court itself later 
adopted the Teague doctrine and applied it in many cases.  See LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 28.6(b), at 1336.  The 
exceptions to such denial, created in Teague itself, are new rules that "place certain kinds of primary, private conduct 
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority" and those that mandate procedures "central to an accurate 
determination of innocence or guilt."  Id. § 28.6(e), at 1338.  The Supreme Court created these exceptions before 
Congress in 1996 enacted various new limits on opportunities for federal habeas relief.  It is unclear whether the 
Court's exceptions to the non-retroactivity of new rules on habeas have survived the 1996 enactment.  See id. § 
28.6(g), at 1343.
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often is better for defendants than federal habeas review without it.395
Once this choice of the applicable federal constitutional law has been made, the outcome 
of the appeal often turns on the standard of review by which the court decides whether error 
occurred below, discussed at length above, and the standard by which the harmlessness of any 
error is determined, also discussed at length above.396  On both of these procedural and remedial 
points, just as on the choice-of-law point, the standards used in federal habeas proceedings are 
much less favorable to prisoners than are the standards many state appellate courts are using on 
direct review.
As to the procedural matter of the standard of review, a federal habeas court cannot 
employ de novo review to grant relief to a prisoner on the ground that the state trial or appellate 
court's decision of a mixed question of federal constitutional law and fact was erroneous.  
Instead, under a statute enacted in 1996 and commonly called the AEDPA397 the federal court 
can grant relief only if the state court's decision was unreasonable.398  The Supreme Court in 
Williams v. Taylor399 construed that statutory provision as requiring considerable deference to the 
395See, e.g., Sam-Miguel v. Dove, 291 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that new rule created by 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), does not apply retroactively on collateral review); Smith v. Moore, 
137 F.3d 808, 822 (4th Cir. 1998) (reaching same conclusion concerning new rule created by Simmons v. South 
Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994)).
396See WISOTSKY, supra note 14, § 8.01, at 160-61 (stating that in an appeal ". . . the critical questions are 
two:  the degree of deference that the appeals court will give to the judgment or order below -- the standard of review 
-- in deciding whether there is error, and the question of whether such error is harmless or reversible").
397 See generally LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 15, § 28.2(b).
39828 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (date).
399529 U.S. 362 (2000).
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state court's decision of the mixed question.400
Lower federal courts have shown such deference in denying relief in many cases,401 even 
when reviewing decisions of mixed questions of federal constitutional law and fact that were 
based on "sparse or otherwise unsatisfactory state court discussion" or, still more remarkably, 
were "summary, which is to say unexplicated," and made "without any discussion."402  Some 
commentators have criticized this kind of interpretation and application of the federal habeas 
statute403 but, so far at least, the courts of appeals seem unanimous in employing it.404
On the second, remedial matter of the harmlessness of error, even if a federal habeas 
court does conclude that a state court's decision of a mixed question of federal constitutional law 
was indeed unreasonable, relief must be denied to the prisoner if the state court's error was 
harmless, and here too the habeas standard is unfavorable to prisoners.  The federal court's test 
for harmlessness is not the Chapman "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" test applicable on 
400Id. at 411 (opinion of O'Connor, J., concurring on behalf of a majority of justices).
401See, e.g., Benefiel v. Davis, 357 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that state court decisions of mixed 
questions of federal constitutional law and fact were not unreasonable); Perry v. Kemna, 356 F.3d 880 (8th Cir. 
2004) (holding that state court decision of mixed question of federal constitutional law and fact was not 
unreasonable).
402Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1253-54 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 1511 (2003).
403See, e.g., Brittany Glidden, When the State Is Silent:  An Analysis of AEDPA's Adjudication 
Requirement, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 177, 179, 204, (2001-02) (footnotes omitted) (stating that 
"perfunctory opinions, which deny all of a petitioner's claims in a single sentence or statement, are common in state 
courts" and that "many scholars believe that state courts are always subject to interests that prevent the adequate 
protection of federal rights," and concluding that "when ambiguity exists [as to whether a state court adjudicated a 
federal issue], the issue should be reviewed de novo by the federal court); Monique Anne Gaylor, Note, Postcards 
from the Bench:  Federal Habeas Review of Unarticulated State Court Decisions, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1263 (2003); 
Claudia Wilner, Note, "We Would Not Defer to That Which Did Not Exist":  AEDPA Meets the Silent State Court 
Opinion, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1442 (2002).
404See Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d at 1254 & n.2 (citing cases from eight other federal circuits).
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direct review, but the less rigorous test of Brecht v. Abrahamson405 that the error had a 
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the outcome.  This broader test of 
harmlessness, like the statutory requirement of deference, has led to many denials of habeas 
relief.406
The results of these federal habeas standards -- for choosing the applicable rule of federal 
constitutional law, for identifying error in its application to the facts, and for assessing its 
harmlessness -- are these:  Currently criminal defendants' federal constitutional claims already 
must receive more favorable treatment in state appellate courts than in federal habeas courts on 
two of these three crucial determinants of success.407  As to the third, decisions of mixed 
questions of federal constitutional law and fact currently do not receive de novo review in any 
state or federal court unless state appellate courts either balance the competing policies for 
themselves and decide, contrary to some of their recent pre-Ornelas precedents, that such review 
is wise; or interpret the unclear Ornelas line of cases as binding them; or take the primrose path 
of least resistance by simply following and attributing breadth to that line of Supreme Court 
cases as insurance against reversal of judgments.
VII. Improving Review Standards and How They Are Chosen
After reviewing these Supreme Court decisions concerning de novo appellate review, and 
observing the confusion they have produced in the state appellate courts, one must regret that the 
405507 U.S. 619 (1993).
406See, e.g., Burgess v. Dretke, 350 F.3d 461, 472 (5th Cir. 2003); Lewis v. Pinchak, 348 F.3d 355, 359-60 
(3d Cir. 2003).
407As Professors Fallon and Meltzer have written, "[t]hough they differ in history and theory, reversal of a 
conviction on appeal and issuance of a writ of habeas corpus have similar consequences for the prosecution and the 
defendant."  Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 250, at 1813 n.455.
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Court did not write its opinions more completely and clearly and thereby prevent some of these 
problems.  This criticism is not a call for the Court to issue holdings broader than its role in our 
federal system dictates, nor a call for it to utter dicta unwisely.  I suggest only that the Court is 
obligated to make clear what it is deciding and why.  Most fundamentally under our Constitution 
it is especially important, when the source of the Court's power to create a particular rule of law 
is ambiguous and doubtful (as it certainly is concerning the subjects addressed in this Article), 
for the Court to identify, explain and support clearly and precisely the source of that power.  The 
Court's recent prescriptions of de novo review fall far short of these expectations.
It would be easy to belittle my suggestion by saying that creation of law is harder than 
criticism of it, and more specifically that I underestimate the difficulty of the Court's task:  
deciding debatable cases while collecting majorities of at least five disparate persons to agree on 
reasons for those decisions.  That response to this Article would sound plausible, unless one kept 
in mind the extent of the Court's past failures concerning the Chapman and Griffith doctrines and 
of its current failures concerning de novo review.  Over a period of almost four decades, the 
Court has never even told us whether these are rules of constitutional law or so-called 
constitutional common law, much less which specific constitutional provisions contain these 
rules.  After all this time, with the Court now apparently extending to yet a third context its 
regulation of state-court appeals that the Court continues to say are not themselves 
constitutionally required, the Court now more than ever owes us a clear, specific and thorough 
explanation of this body of law.  The gravity of this problem seems obvious when one reflects 
that the current situation would in a sense be improved if the Court even made a conscientious 
attempt to explain why it cannot or will not explain its power to regulate state appellate practice.  
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There surely are some contexts in which, "when no satisfactory answer to a question can be 
found, it is discreet to ignore the question,"408 but not in the context of such important exercises 
of federal judicial power at the expense of state authority.
There is another reason why specific and thorough explanation by the Court of its recent 
decisions concerning de novo review is especially desirable.  In the eyes of some informed 
observers, the Court has a spotty track record of explanations of its power to create other vital 
doctrines in the law of crimes and criminal procedure.  The detailed criticisms above of the 
Court's creations of the Chapman, Griffith and Ornelas doctrines do not nearly exhaust this 
general subject.  The Court has never provided a thorough explanation of some of the most 
important rules it has created in the area of criminal law and procedure, or of its power to create 
those rules, as even some apparent fans of the results of the Court's work have written.409
This is not just a matter of disagreements over the meanings of the Fourteenth 
Amendment or of specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.  As Professor Grano explained, some
of the Court's lawmaking on criminal law and procedure raises the more fundamental issue of 
408State v. Jones, 653 A.2d 1040, 551 n.1(Md. Ct. App. 1995), rev'd sub nom. Jones v. State, 682 A.2d 248 
(1996).
409A central example is the doctrine of "selective incorporation" by which the states came in the 1960's to 
be governed by most of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights, many of which of course address matters of 
criminal procedure.  As Professors LaFave, Israel and King have written, "[t]here are those who argue that the 
selective incorporation doctrine has no coherent constitutional rationale. . . .   [T]he Supreme Court majority never 
responded to such criticism . . .."  LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 15, § 2.5(b), at 66-67.  Another example,  having 
practical importance almost equal to that of the doctrine of selective incorporation, is the Court's adoption of a series 
of exclusionary rules as remedies for violations of various federal constitutional rights.  Regardless of the relative 
merits of such rules as a matter of policy, the Court has never provided a specific, thorough and cogent explanation 
of its authority under the Constitution to impose such exclusionary rules on state courts.  See generally Christopher 
Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 365-66 (writing that "[e]ven 
from a liberal's perspective, the arguments that have been derived from the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth
Amendment, and the Due Process Clause do not support more than a shadow of the present [exclusionary] rule").
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"whether article III of the Constitution grants the Court authority to take such action."410    It is 
beyond the scope of this Article to pick at these old sores in its text, but two footnotes here 
remind persons familiar with the law of criminal procedure of a few aspects of the broad context 
within which the Court's current project to reform state appellate practice demands justification 
of these purported powers of the Court.411  Perhaps it is not too optimistic to hope that the Court 
410Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure:  A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 
NW. U. L. REV. 100, 101-02 (1985).
411An important example to add to the two just described, supra note 409, is what Professor Barry Latzer 
has called the Court's various "prophylactic, quasiconstitutional or constitutional common law determinations that 
are not directly construing constitutional provisions."  Barry Latzer, Toward the Decentralization of Criminal 
Procedure:  State Constitutional Law and Selective Disincorporation, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 63, 128 
(1996).  For example, there are the Court's sub-constitutional prophylactic rules, some of which the Court has 
admitted are not interpretations of provisions of the Constitution itself, but instead are laws created by the Court 
itself as attempts to prevent violations of constitutional provisions.  See, e.g., id. at 125-26 (discussing United States 
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (creating right to counsel for suspects in lineups)).  Such prophylactic rules formerly 
included the rules created in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), until the Court recently reinterpreted them as 
constitutional rules lacking specific location in the Constitution, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), 
and still include rules designed to prevent violations of due process by vindictive judges and prosecutors, see, e.g., 
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).  As Professor Grano wrote,
 [a]lthough the Court has ignored the issue, prophylactic rules raise a question of constitutional legitimacy.  
When the Court holds that certain conduct violates the Constitution or that the Constitution requires a 
particular remedy, we may disagree strongly with the Court's interpretation of the Constitution, but we may 
not challenge the legitimacy of its authority.  Marbury settled this legitimacy issue.  "Mistake" remains 
possible, of course, because we cannot expect the Court to be infallible in exercising legitimate authority.  A 
legitimacy issue not addressed in Marbury is raised, however, when the Court invalidates official conduct 
without finding an actual constitutional violation.  The issue is whether article III of the Constitution grants 
the Court authority to take such action, an issue obviously more fundamental than whether the Court in a 
given case mistakenly has interpreted the Constitution.
Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure:  A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. 
REV. 100, 101-02 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
Not only has the Court on many occasions failed to identify the source of its purported power to create 
important rules of criminal law and procedure and to support its claim to such power, it also has shown a troubling 
tendency to create law under its supervisory power over lower federal courts or as federal statutory interpretations 
and then, using a kind of bootstrap, to rely on these precedents in elevating law that formerly bound only federal 
courts into constitutional commands that henceforth governed state courts as well.  Thus in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 
U.S. 436 (1970), the Court transformed the non-constitutional doctrine that federal criminal defendants get the 
benefit of collateral estoppel into a requirement of the Double Jeopardy clause.  Later in Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 
(1978), the Court converted the non-constitutional rule that, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, jeopardy 
attaches in a federal criminal case being tried by jury when the jury is sworn, and in a federal bench trial of a 
criminal case when the first witness is sworn, into a federal constitutional doctrine binding the states.  Still more 
recently, in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), the Court relied on the doctrine of "constitutional doubt" to 
interpret a federal statute as defining two offenses the elements of each of which must be proved to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Only a year later, the Court relied on its statutory interpretation conclusion in Jones as support for 
its decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to require states to treat as elements of offenses for 
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might see its recent rulings on de novo review as an opportunity to begin improving the clarity, 
specificity, and thoroughness of its explanations of the source and scope of its power to regulate 
state criminal proceedings.
This Article illustrates the undesirable consequences of the Court's failure to measure up 
to reasonable standards of clear, specific and thorough explanation when creating new law.  It 
also identifies clues that might lead one to suspect that the Court, with its recent expansion of 
requirements of de novo review, again is creating law of indeterminate source and scope as it 
initially did in Chapman and then also in Griffith, and is thereby either again inducing states to 
change their own law as a precaution against reversal of state judgments, or again laying a 
stealthy predicate for the Supreme Court's own later, explicit announcement of important new 
doctrines of federal constitutional law -- or both.  Even if the Court never follows up on its recent 
vague decisions concerning standards of review by converting those standards into constitutional 
mandates, it may accomplish much the same outcome, by creating uncertainty leading state 
courts to interpret the Court's decisions as either binding or very persuasive, and to attribute 
broad scope to the resulting doctrine.  As this Article has shown, such a process is underway in 
many states.
Some jurists and commentators might applaud state courts' adopting de novo review, no 
matter for which one of the three reasons mentioned above:  because the state courts' own views 
of competing policies dictate such review, or because they interpret the recent Supreme Court 
purposes of trial facts that the state legislature had deemed sentencing criteria.  The scope and consequences of these 
new Apprendi requirements are still the subject of great uncertainty and confusion.  See, e.g., State v. Wheeler, 34 
P.3d 799 (Wash. 2001) (en banc) (court dividing over interpretation and application of Apprendi).  The current 
uncertainty and confusion about the Supreme Court's new requirements of de novo appellate review may be another 
example of new doctrine being launched as apparent interpretation of the duties only of federal courts, and then 
sailing into port as constitutional commands.
118
decisions as binding on the states, or because they simply fear the latter may be true.  An expert 
might favor de novo review of decisions of mixed questions of federal constitutional law and fact 
fervently, and care less about how such review comes to be required.
For example, some justices of the United States Supreme Court412 and some 
commentators413 appear dissatisfied with the AEDPA's new requirement that federal habeas 
courts conduct only deferential review of state courts' decisions of mixed questions of federal 
constitutional law and fact.  Others have criticized the decision of the Supreme Court majority in 
Brecht v. Abrahamson that in federal habeas review of state convictions harmlessness is 
412For example, when the Court interpreted the AEDPA provision as requiring such deference, 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(d)(1), Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion urging an interpretation calling for less deference than that 
adopted by other justices.  Compare Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375-99 (2000) (opinion of Stevens, J.), with 
id. at 399-416 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) and id. at 416-19 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).  In a subsequent case, Justice 
Stevens dissented from the Court's holding that a state court had not unreasonably applied the relevant constitutional 
precedent, without citing § 2254(d)(1) or explaining why he ignored it.  Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 n.2 (2002) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court) (pointing out that "Justice STEVENS' dissent does not cite this statutory provision 
governing respondent's ability to obtain federal habeas relief, much less explain how his claim meets its standards"); 
id. at 702-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding that Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was 
violated, without showing deference to contrary conclusion of state courts).  It may not be a mere coincidence that in 
each of the four Supreme Court decisions this Article addresses, Justice Stevens wrote or joined opinions favoring de 
novo review.  See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-78 (2002) (unanimous, including Stevens, J., applying 
de novo review); Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 120, 135-39 (1999) (Stevens, J., for the plurality with Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer) (urging and applying de novo review); United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336-37 & 
n.10 (1998) (Thomas, J., for five justices including Stevens, J., adopting and applying de novo review); Ornelas v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697-700 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., for eight justices including Stevens, J., adopting de 
novo review).  Perhaps Justice Stevens, disappointed in the currently narrow standard of federal habeas review, 
views de novo review by state appellate courts as at least a partial substitute for the formerly more independent 
review by federal habeas courts.
413See, e.g., Brian M. Hoffstadt, How Congress Might Redesign a Leaner, Cleaner Writ of Habeas Corpus, 
49 DUKE L.J. 947, 1033 (2000) (writing that ". . .  it seems wrong to require federal courts to stand idly by when a 
state court interprets or applies such fundamental constitutional rights in an incorrect, but not unreasonable, 
manner"); Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional Claims Raised By State 
Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, 336-37 (writing that 
". . . the new reasonableness standard for mixed law-fact questions is unlikely to generate a workable or principled 
body of law" and that ". . . reasonableness review of mixed law-fact questions is likely to contribute significantly to 
the density and intricacy of the already dense and intricate habeas forum").  An article written before the AEDPA 
was enacted, and before the Court decided Ornelas, anticipated the current situation and supported de novo appellate 
review by state appellate courts because of limitations on federal habeas relief.  See Chris Hutton, The "New" 
Federal Habeas:  Implications for State Standards of Review, 40 S.D. L. REV. 442 (1995).
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determined by a test less favorable to prisoners than the formerly applied Chapman test of 
harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.414  Such critics of the current law of federal habeas 
corpus might welcome state courts' de novo review of decisions of mixed questions of federal 
constitutional law and fact, as a replacement for the more generous but now superseded federal 
habeas law they preferred, without caring much about whether de novo state-court review results 
from the Supreme Court's possibly exceeding any powers it may have to regulate state judicial 
proceedings, or from state courts' unwillingness to risk reversals in the face of unclear federal 
law, or from state courts' well-considered exercises of lawmaking power resting only in their own 
hands.  To me, though, the Supreme Court's providing clear explanations of why it has 
constitutional power to regulate the proceedings of state appellate courts, and of why the 
Constitution requires the specific regulations the Court adopts, is much more important under our 
Constitution than the particular outcomes reached when competing policies are weighed to select 
standards of appellate review of specific mixed questions.
I therefore would consider it regrettable if state courts were to continue assuming that 
United States Supreme Court pronouncements having undefined legal sources and indeterminate 
scopes should be given their most powerful possible interpretation and application by the state 
courts themselves.  It would be better if state courts, and state legislatures making and revising 
statutes governing state judicial procedures, would use whatever freedom the High Court has not 
specifically withdrawn from them.  They should form their own conclusions about the wisdom of 
414See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 644-47 (1993) (White, J., dissenting and joined by 
Blackman and Souter, JJ.) (writing that the Court's majority's conclusion is "untenable" and "inexplicable" and 
produces "illogically disparate treatment"); Bennett L. Gershman, The Gate Is Open But the Door Is Locked --
Habeas Corpus and Harmless Error, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 115, 116, 133 (1994) (writing that "Brecht is a 
paradigm of the Rehnquist Court's result-oriented approach to habeas corpus and harmless error," and calling the 
decision "confusing,"  "unprincipled," and "illogical and perverse").
120
employing particular standards of review of decisions of particular mixed questions of federal 
constitutional law and fact.  They should adopt and apply such rules, performing their own 
functions to the best of their abilities, unless and until the day comes when the United States 
Supreme Court begins more often to perform its functions at an adequate level and to explain 
with adequate thoroughness and clarity what it is doing to standards of appellate review and why.  
The primrose path now lying before state courts leads to an important shift in power from state 
authorities to federal, and specifically to the Supreme Court.  That is not a destination to be 
approached carelessly.
VIII.  Conclusion
By handing down a series of recent decisions calling for de novo appellate review of 
mixed questions arising under three different provisions of the Bill of Rights, perhaps implying 
but not expressly stating that state courts are bound by the decisions and without defining the 
scope or even the constitutional source of the new doctrine, the Supreme Court has created 
considerable uncertainty.  Many state courts have responded by beginning to use such de novo 
review, and by extending its use far beyond anything the Court's decisions specifically address.  
Prior to this Article commentators have almost entirely ignored the most fundamental issues 
raised by the recent decisions.
This Article has reminded readers that Professor Meltzer described similar treatment by 
the Court in the Chapman case of another aspect of state appellate practice, harmlessness of 
error.  The Article also has identified yet another similar performance by the Court, this aspect of 
which was not previously criticized in case law or published scholarship, when in the Griffith
line of cases the Court required state appellate courts to follow the Supreme Court's view on 
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retroactivity of new federal constitutional rules.  On both of those previous occasions, the Court 
began by letting state courts assume themselves bound to follow the Court's precedents, and only 
many years later confirmed that assumption.  However, in neither of those prior instances has the 
Court ever adequately explained its power so to regulate state criminal appeals, or even identified 
the specific source of that supposed power.
This Article calls upon the Supreme Court to clarify these matters, especially to clarify 
the recent prescriptions of de novo review that the Court has not yet even expressly said are 
applicable to state courts.  Unless and until it does so, the Article also suggests that state courts 
and legislatures seriously consider interpreting the recent decisions on de novo review as not 
binding state courts, or as regulating review only of the mixed questions so far specified by the 
Court.  The Article also has raised and addressed, without attempting thoroughly to resolve, the 
question whether the Court in the current instance and in the two previous ones has exceeded its 
powers.
When Professor Meltzer addressed the question of the Court's power to impose the 
Chapman harmlessness test on state appellate courts, he found every rationale for such power 
unconvincing, and deemed the idea of "constitutional common law" the only plausible basis for 
the decision.  However, the Court has never written that it considers "constitutional common 
law" even plausible.  The very fact that the Court has failed for decades to specify the source of 
the power it has exercised over three aspects of state criminal appellate practice should leave 
readers of its opinions with grave doubt that the Constitution really gives the Court that power, 
and with a thirst for an explanation by the Supreme Court itself.
